
Subject: [PATCH 0/4] user namespaces: introduction
Posted by [serue](#) on Mon, 28 Jan 2008 19:08:28 GMT
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Here is a small patchset I've been sitting on for awhile to make signaling mostly subject to user namespaces. In particular,

1. store user_namespace in user struct
2. introduce CAP_NS_OVERRIDE
3. require CAP_NS_OVERRIDE to signal another user namespace

The first step should have been done all along. Else wouldn't a hash collision on (ns1, uid) and (ns2, uid), however unlikely, give us wrong results at uid_hash_find()?

The main remaining signaling+usersns issue is of course the siginfo. Tacking a usersns onto siginfo is a pain due to lifetime mgmt issues. I haven't decided whether to just catch all the callers and fake uid=0 if user namespaces aren't the same, introduce some unique non-refcounted id to represent (user,user_ns), or find some other way to deal with it.

thanks,
-serge

Containers mailing list
Containers@lists.linux-foundation.org
<https://lists.linux-foundation.org/mailman/listinfo/containers>

Subject: [PATCH 1/4] user namespaces: add ns to user_struct
Posted by [serue](#) on Mon, 28 Jan 2008 19:09:20 GMT
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>From f032ac37281fb71a9e0fc5d71e1b268fd6a8cb3a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: sergeh@us.ibm.com <sergeh@us.ibm.com>
Date: Wed, 28 Nov 2007 14:50:54 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 1/4] user namespaces: add ns to user_struct

Add the user_namespace to user_struct.

Use ns to make sure we get right user with uid_hash_find().

Move /sys/kernel/uids/<uid> under
/sys/kernel/uids/<user_ns_address/<uid>

Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>

```
---
fs/dquot.c          |  2 +-
fs/ioprio.c         |  2 +-
include/linux/sched.h |  3 +-
include/linux/types.h | 10 +++++
include/linux/user_namespace.h |  3 ++
kernel/user.c       | 79 ++++++-----
kernel/user_namespace.c | 14 +++++-
security/keys/process_keys.c |  8 +-
8 files changed, 106 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/dquot.c b/fs/dquot.c
index 9c7feb6..f413094 100644
--- a/fs/dquot.c
+++ b/fs/dquot.c
@@ -960,7 +960,7 @@ static void send_warning(const struct dquot *dquot, const char warntype)
    MINOR(dquot->dq_sb->s_dev));
    if (ret)
        goto attr_err_out;
-   ret = nla_put_u64(skb, QUOTA_NL_A_CAUSED_ID, current->user->uid);
+   ret = nla_put_u64(skb, QUOTA_NL_A_CAUSED_ID, current->user->uid.uid);
    if (ret)
        goto attr_err_out;
    genlmsg_end(skb, msg_head);
diff --git a/fs/ioprio.c b/fs/ioprio.c
index e4e01bc..2ec1430 100644
--- a/fs/ioprio.c
+++ b/fs/ioprio.c
@@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_ioprio_get(int which, int who)
    break;

    do_each_thread(g, p) {
-   if (p->uid != user->uid)
+   if (!task_user_equiv(p, user))
        continue;
        tmpio = get_task_ioprio(p);
        if (tmpio < 0)
diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h
index 198659b..1206486 100644
--- a/include/linux/sched.h
+++ b/include/linux/sched.h
@@ -584,7 +584,7 @@ struct user_struct {

    /* Hash table maintenance information */
    struct hlist_node uidhash_node;
-   uid_t uid;
+   struct k_uid_t uid;
```

```

#ifdef CONFIG_FAIR_USER_SCHED
    struct task_group *tg;
@@ -1634,6 +1634,7 @@ static inline struct user_struct *get_uid(struct user_struct *u)
extern void free_uid(struct user_struct *);
extern void switch_uid(struct user_struct *);
extern void release_uids(struct user_namespace *ns);
+extern int task_user_equiv(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_struct *u);

```

```

#include <asm/current.h>

```

```

diff --git a/include/linux/types.h b/include/linux/types.h
index f4f8d19..a6a130e 100644
--- a/include/linux/types.h
+++ b/include/linux/types.h
@@ -37,6 +37,16 @@ typedef __kernel_gid32_t gid_t;
typedef __kernel_uid16_t    uid16_t;
typedef __kernel_gid16_t    gid16_t;

```

```

+struct k_uid_t {
+ uid_t uid;
+ struct user_namespace *ns;
+};
+
+struct k_gid_t {
+ gid_t gid;
+ struct user_namespace *ns;
+};
+
typedef unsigned long  uintptr_t;

```

```

#ifdef CONFIG_UID16
diff --git a/include/linux/user_namespace.h b/include/linux/user_namespace.h
index b5f41d4..bb5e88a 100644
--- a/include/linux/user_namespace.h
+++ b/include/linux/user_namespace.h
@@ -12,6 +12,9 @@
struct user_namespace {
    struct kref kref;
    struct hlist_head uidhash_table[UIDHASH_SZ];
+ #if defined(CONFIG_FAIR_USER_SCHED) && defined(CONFIG_SYSFS)
+ struct kobject kobject;
+ #endif
    struct user_struct *root_user;
};

```

```

diff --git a/kernel/user.c b/kernel/user.c
index 7d7900c..73dc8db 100644

```

```

--- a/kernel/user.c
+++ b/kernel/user.c
@@ -53,6 +53,10 @@ struct user_struct root_user = {
    .files = ATOMIC_INIT(0),
    .sigpending = ATOMIC_INIT(0),
    .locked_shm = 0,
+ .uid = {
+ .uid = 0,
+ .ns = &init_user_ns,
+ },
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
    .uid_keyring = &root_user_keyring,
    .session_keyring = &root_session_keyring,
@@ -75,13 +79,30 @@ static void uid_hash_remove(struct user_struct *up)
    hlist_del_init(&up->uidhash_node);
}

-static struct user_struct *uid_hash_find(uid_t uid, struct hlist_head *hashent)
+int k_uid_equiv(struct k_uid_t a, struct k_uid_t b)
+{
+ if (a.uid == b.uid && a.ns == b.ns)
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int task_user_equiv(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_struct *u)
+{
+ if (tsk->uid != u->uid.uid)
+ return 0;
+ if (tsk->nsproxy->user_ns != u->uid.ns)
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static struct user_struct *uid_hash_find(struct k_uid_t uid,
+ struct hlist_head *hashent)
+{
    struct user_struct *user;
    struct hlist_node *h;

    hlist_for_each_entry(user, h, hashent, uidhash_node) {
- if (user->uid == uid) {
+ if (k_uid_equiv(user->uid, uid)) {
        atomic_inc(&user->__count);
        return user;
    }
}
@@ -190,7 +211,8 @@ static int uids_user_create(struct user_struct *up)

```

```

    memset(kobj, 0, sizeof(struct kobject));
    kobj->kset = uids_kset;
- error = kobject_init_and_add(kobj, &uids_ktype, NULL, "%d", up->uid);
+ error = kobject_init_and_add(kobj, &uids_ktype, &up->uid.ns->kobject,
+     "%d", up->uid.uid);
    if (error) {
        kobject_put(kobj);
        goto done;
@@ -201,6 +223,9 @@ done:
    return error;
}

+int register_user_ns_kobj(struct user_namespace *ns);
+void unregister_user_ns_kobj(struct user_namespace *ns);
+
/* create these entries in sysfs:
 * "/sys/kernel/uids" directory
 * "/sys/kernel/uids/0" directory (for root user)
@@ -208,10 +233,16 @@ done:
 */
int __init uids_sysfs_init(void)
{
+ int error;
+
    uids_kset = kset_create_and_add("uids", NULL, kernel_kobj);
    if (!uids_kset)
        return -ENOMEM;

+ error = register_user_ns_kobj(&init_user_ns);
+ if (error)
+     return error;
+
    return uids_user_create(&root_user);
}

@@ -269,6 +300,30 @@ static inline void free_user(struct user_struct *up, unsigned long flags)
    schedule_work(&up->work);
}

+int register_user_ns_kobj(struct user_namespace *ns)
+{
+ struct kobject *obj = &ns->kobject;
+ int error;
+
+ obj->kset = uids_kset;
+
+ error = kobject_init_and_add(obj, &uids_ktype, &uids_kset->kobj,
+     "%lx", (unsigned long)ns);

```

```

+ if (error)
+ return error;
+
+ kobject_uevent(obj, KOBJ_ADD);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void unregister_user_ns_kobj(struct user_namespace *ns)
+{
+ struct kobject *obj = &ns->kobject;
+ kobject_uevent(obj, KOBJ_REMOVE);
+ kobject_del(obj);
+}
+
+/* CONFIG_FAIR_USER_SCHED && CONFIG_SYSFS */

int uids_sysfs_init(void) { return 0; }
@@ -290,6 +345,8 @@ static inline void free_user(struct user_struct *up, unsigned long flags)
    kmem_cache_free(uid_cachep, up);
}

+int register_user_ns_kobj(struct user_namespace *ns) { return 0; }
+void unregister_user_ns_kobj(struct user_namespace *ns) {}
+endif

/*
@@ -303,9 +360,12 @@ struct user_struct *find_user(uid_t uid)
    struct user_struct *ret;
    unsigned long flags;
    struct user_namespace *ns = current->nsproxy->user_ns;
+ struct k_uid_t kuid;

+ kuid.ns = current->nsproxy->user_ns;
+ kuid.uid = uid;
    spin_lock_irqsave(&uidhash_lock, flags);
- ret = uid_hash_find(uid, uidhashentry(ns, uid));
+ ret = uid_hash_find(kuid, uidhashentry(ns, uid));
    spin_unlock_irqrestore(&uidhash_lock, flags);
    return ret;
}
@@ -328,6 +388,10 @@ struct user_struct *alloc_uid(struct user_namespace *ns, uid_t uid)
{
    struct hlist_head *hashent = uidhashentry(ns, uid);
    struct user_struct *up, *new;
+ struct k_uid_t kuid;
+
+ kuid.ns = ns;

```

```

+ kuid.uid = uid;

/* Make uid_hash_find() + uids_user_create() + uid_hash_insert()
 * atomic.
@@ -335,7 +399,7 @@ struct user_struct * alloc_uid(struct user_namespace *ns, uid_t uid)
    uids_mutex_lock();

    spin_lock_irq(&uidhash_lock);
- up = uid_hash_find(uid, hashent);
+ up = uid_hash_find(kuid, hashent);
    spin_unlock_irq(&uidhash_lock);

    if (!up) {
@@ -343,7 +407,8 @@ struct user_struct * alloc_uid(struct user_namespace *ns, uid_t uid)
        if (!new)
            goto out_unlock;

- new->uid = uid;
+ new->uid.uid = uid;
+ new->uid.ns = ns;
    atomic_set(&new->__count, 1);
    atomic_set(&new->processes, 0);
    atomic_set(&new->files, 0);
@@ -371,7 +436,7 @@ struct user_struct * alloc_uid(struct user_namespace *ns, uid_t uid)
    * on adding the same user already..
    */
    spin_lock_irq(&uidhash_lock);
- up = uid_hash_find(uid, hashent);
+ up = uid_hash_find(kuid, hashent);
    if (up) {
        /* This case is not possible when CONFIG_FAIR_USER_SCHED
         * is defined, since we serialize alloc_uid() using
diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c
index 4c90062..7dc6cc7 100644
--- a/kernel/user_namespace.c
+++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c
@@ -10,6 +10,9 @@
#include <linux/nsproxy.h>
#include <linux/user_namespace.h>

+int register_user_ns_kobj(struct user_namespace *ns);
+void unregister_user_ns_kobj(struct user_namespace *ns);
+
/*
 * Clone a new ns copying an original user ns, setting refcount to 1
 * @old_ns: namespace to clone
@@ -19,12 +22,16 @@ static struct user_namespace *clone_user_ns(struct user_namespace
*old_ns)

```

```

{
    struct user_namespace *ns;
    struct user_struct *new_user;
- int n;
+ int n, err;

    ns = kmalloc(sizeof(struct user_namespace), GFP_KERNEL);
    if (!ns)
        return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);

+ err = register_user_ns_kobj(ns);
+ if (err)
+     goto out_free_ns;
+
    kref_init(&ns->kref);

    for (n = 0; n < UIDHASH_SZ; ++n)
@@ -47,6 +54,10 @@ static struct user_namespace *clone_user_ns(struct user_namespace
*old_ns)

    switch_uid(new_user);
    return ns;
+
+out_free_ns:
+ kfree(ns);
+ return ERR_PTR(err);
}

struct user_namespace * copy_user_ns(int flags, struct user_namespace *old_ns)
@@ -71,5 +82,6 @@ void free_user_ns(struct kref *kref)

    ns = container_of(kref, struct user_namespace, kref);
    release_uids(ns);
+ unregister_user_ns_kobj(ns);
    kfree(ns);
}
diff --git a/security/keys/process_keys.c b/security/keys/process_keys.c
index c886a2b..0343a52 100644
--- a/security/keys/process_keys.c
+++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c
@@ -75,9 +75,9 @@ int alloc_uid_keyring(struct user_struct *user,
int ret;

    /* concoct a default session keyring */
- sprintf(buf, "_uid_ses.%u", user->uid);
+ sprintf(buf, "_uid_ses.%u", user->uid.uid);

- session_keyring = keyring_alloc(buf, user->uid, (gid_t) -1, ctx,

```

```

+ session_keyring = keyring_alloc(buf, user->uid.uid, (gid_t) -1, ctx,
    KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(session_keyring)) {
    ret = PTR_ERR(session_keyring);
@@ -86,9 +86,9 @@ int alloc_uid_keyring(struct user_struct *user,

/* and a UID specific keyring, pointed to by the default session
 * keyring */
- sprintf(buf, "_uid.%u", user->uid);
+ sprintf(buf, "_uid.%u", user->uid.uid);

- uid_keyring = keyring_alloc(buf, user->uid, (gid_t) -1, ctx,
+ uid_keyring = keyring_alloc(buf, user->uid.uid, (gid_t) -1, ctx,
    KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA, session_keyring);
if (IS_ERR(uid_keyring)) {
    key_put(session_keyring);
--
1.5.1

```

Containers mailing list
Containers@lists.linux-foundation.org
<https://lists.linux-foundation.org/mailman/listinfo/containers>

Subject: [PATCH 2/4] containers: add CAP_NS_OVERRIDE capability
Posted by [serue](#) on Mon, 28 Jan 2008 19:09:40 GMT
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>From ce1cf14000860f82ab59a5253bbe468da767e77f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: sergeh@us.ibm.com <sergeh@us.ibm.com>
Date: Wed, 28 Nov 2007 18:52:28 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 2/4] containers: add CAP_NS_OVERRIDE capability

containers: add CAP_NS_OVERRIDE capability

Signed-off-by: sergeh@us.ibm.com <hallyn@kernel.(none)>

include/linux/capability.h | 9 +++++++-
1 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)

```

diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h
index 7d50ff6..58bc24e 100644
--- a/include/linux/capability.h
+++ b/include/linux/capability.h
@@ -332,7 +332,14 @@ typedef struct kernel_cap_struct {

```

```

#define CAP_MAC_ADMIN      33

```

```
-#define CAP_LAST_CAP      CAP_MAC_ADMIN
+/* Allow acting on resources in another namespace. In
+ particular:
+ 1. when combined with CAP_KILL, kill users in another
+    user namespace
+ */
+#define CAP_NS_OVERRIDE    34
+
+#define CAP_LAST_CAP      CAP_NS_OVERRIDE

#define cap_valid(x) ((x) >= 0 && (x) <= CAP_LAST_CAP)
```

--
1.5.1

Containers mailing list
Containers@lists.linux-foundation.org
<https://lists.linux-foundation.org/mailman/listinfo/containers>

Subject: [PATCH 3/4] user namespaces: enforce CAP_NS_OVERRIDE for cross-namespace kill
Posted by [serue](#) on Mon, 28 Jan 2008 19:09:58 GMT
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>From 491e532e336a98b1b9d1ecda6f4160d0c0adde89 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: sergeh@us.ibm.com <sergeh@us.ibm.com>
Date: Thu, 29 Nov 2007 08:18:16 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 3/4] user namespaces: enforce CAP_NS_OVERRIDE for cross-namespace kill

Require CAP_NS_OVERRIDE to 'kill' across user namespaces.

If the signaling task is exiting, then current->nsproxy is NULL. Since we are only notifying a parent of our death, we permit the signal.

If the target task is exiting, our signal doesn't matter anyway.

Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>

kernel/signal.c | 23 ++++++
1 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/signal.c b/kernel/signal.c
index 280bccb..de19433 100644

```

--- a/kernel/signal.c
+++ b/kernel/signal.c
@@ -531,9 +531,32 @@ static int check_kill_permission(int sig, struct siginfo *info,
    return error;

    if (info == SEND_SIG_NOINFO || (!is_si_special(info) && SI_FROMUSER(info))) {
+ struct nsproxy *nsproxy;
+ struct user_namespace *my_user_ns = NULL, *t_user_ns = NULL;
+
    error = audit_signal_info(sig, t); /* Let audit system see the signal */
    if (error)
        return error;
+
+ /*
+  * if current->nsproxy is NULL, then we are exiting and
+  * are just sending an exit signal to our parent.
+  * Uid may be wrong under certain circumstances, but
+  * global init shouldn't care, and a container creation
+  * program should know what it is doing.
+  * If target is exiting then it doesn't matter anyway.
+  */
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ nsproxy = task_nsproxy(t);
+ if (nsproxy)
+     t_user_ns = nsproxy->user_ns;
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ if (current->nsproxy)
+     my_user_ns = current->nsproxy->user_ns;
+ if (my_user_ns && t_user_ns && my_user_ns != t_user_ns
+     && !(capable(CAP_KILL) && capable(CAP_NS_OVERRIDE)))
+     return -EPERM;
+
    error = -EPERM;
    if (((sig != SIGCONT) ||
        (task_session_nr(current) != task_session_nr(t)))
--
1.5.1

```

Containers mailing list
Containers@lists.linux-foundation.org
<https://lists.linux-foundation.org/mailman/listinfo/containers>

Subject: [PATCH 4/4] user namespaces: handle user namespaces in file sigio
Posted by [serue](#) on Mon, 28 Jan 2008 19:10:13 GMT
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>From 1fa55246fc67f44e9c77829cb88a0df59e559bb5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: sergeh@us.ibm.com <sergeh@us.ibm.com>
Date: Tue, 4 Dec 2007 15:37:48 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 4/4] user namespaces: handle user namespaces in file sigio

Store user namespaces in fown_struct. _f_modown() sets the user_ns to current's, or to NULL if current has capable(CAP_NS_OVERRIDE).

Only allow a signal to be sent through sigio if the recipient is in the same user namespace or the sender (meaning the user who did the F_SETOWN, not the one triggering io) has CAP_NS_OVERRIDE.

Test as follows:

1. log in as user hallyn in two windows
2. in window 1, run vim
3. in window 2, get pid for vim, i.e. PID=`pidof vim`
4. mkfifo ab
5. set_sigio ab \$PID

If both logins are in same userns, the vim is killed.
if the logins are in separate user namespaces, vim is not killed.

set_sigio.c

```
#include <stdio.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#define __USE_GNU
#include <fcntl.h>
```

```
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
    int err;
    int pid;
    int fd = open(argv[1], O_RDWR);

    if (!fd) {
        perror("open");
        exit(1);
    }
    printf("asked to set owner to %s\n", argv[2]);
```

```

pid = atoi(argv[2]);
printf("setting owner to %d\n", pid);
err = fcntl(fd, F_SETOWN, pid);
if (err == -1) {
    perror("fcntl 1\n");
    exit(1);
}
err = fcntl(fd, F_SETSIG, 9);
if (err == -1) {
    perror("fcntl 3\n");
    exit(1);
}
err = fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, O_ASYNC);
if (err == -1) {
    perror("fcntl 2\n");
    exit(1);
}

write(fd, "ab", 2);

close(fd);
printf("done\n");
}
*****

```

Changelog:

jan 28: always NULL userns when freeing it in f_modown().
jan 28: fix sigio_userns_check_ok nsproxy access.

Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>

```

fs/fcntl.c      | 67 ++++++-----
include/linux/fs.h | 2 +-
2 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

```

```

diff --git a/fs/fcntl.c b/fs/fcntl.c
index 603732a..b2565b8 100644

```

```

--- a/fs/fcntl.c

```

```

+++ b/fs/fcntl.c

```

```

@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@

```

```

#include <linux/signal.h>

```

```

#include <linux/rcupdate.h>

```

```

#include <linux/pid_namespace.h>

```

```

+#include <linux/user_namespace.h>

```

```

#include <asm/poll.h>

```

```

#include <asm/signinfo.h>

```

```

@@ -259,10 +260,20 @@ static void f_modown(struct file *filp, struct pid *pid, enum pid_type

```

```

type,
    write_lock_irq(&filp->f_owner.lock);
    if (force || !filp->f_owner.pid) {
        put_pid(filp->f_owner.pid);
+   put_user_ns(filp->f_owner.uid.ns);
+   filp->f_owner.uid.ns = NULL;
+   filp->f_owner.euid.ns = NULL;
        filp->f_owner.pid = get_pid(pid);
        filp->f_owner.pid_type = type;
-   filp->f_owner.uid = uid;
-   filp->f_owner.euid = euid;
+   filp->f_owner.uid.uid = uid;
+   filp->f_owner.euid.uid = euid;
+   if (pid) {
+       if (!capable(CAP_NS_OVERRIDE)) {
+           filp->f_owner.uid.ns = current->nsproxy->user_ns;
+           filp->f_owner.euid.ns = current->nsproxy->user_ns;
+           get_user_ns(filp->f_owner.uid.ns);
+       }
+   }
    }
    write_unlock_irq(&filp->f_owner.lock);
}
@@ -457,13 +468,57 @@ static const long band_table[NSIGPOLL] = {
    POLLHUP | POLLERR /* POLL_HUP */
};

+/*
+ * If task doing fcntl(F_SETOWN) had CAP_NS_OVERRIDE then
+ * the signal can cross user namespaces. Otherwise, ensure
+ * that receiving task is in the same user namespace as the
+ * task which did the fcntl().
+ */
+static inline int sigio_userns_check_ok(struct task_struct *p,
+    struct fown_struct *fown)
+{
+   struct nsproxy *p_nsproxy;
+   struct user_namespace *p_userns = NULL;
+
+   if (!fown->euid.ns) /* sender had CAP_NS_OVERRIDE */
+       return 1;
+
+   rcu_read_lock();
+   p_nsproxy = task_nsproxy(p);
+   if (p_nsproxy)
+       p_userns = p_nsproxy->user_ns;
+   rcu_read_unlock();
+
+}

```

```

+ /* if p_users==NULL then p is exiting anyway */
+ if (!p_users || p_users == fown->euid.ns)
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int sigio_uids_check_ok(struct task_struct *p,
+      struct fown_struct *fown)
+{
+ return ((fown->euid.uid == 0) ||
+ (fown->euid.uid == p->suid) || (fown->euid.uid == p->uid) ||
+ (fown->uid.uid == p->suid) || (fown->uid.uid == p->uid));
+}
+
+
+#define lsm_sigiotask_ok(p, fown, sig) \
+ (!security_file_send_sigiotask(p, fown, sig))
+
+static inline int sigio_perm(struct task_struct *p,
+      struct fown_struct *fown, int sig)
+{
- return (((fown->euid == 0) ||
- (fown->euid == p->suid) || (fown->euid == p->uid) ||
- (fown->uid == p->suid) || (fown->uid == p->uid)) &&
- !security_file_send_sigiotask(p, fown, sig));
+ if (!sigio_users_check_ok(p, fown))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!sigio_uids_check_ok(p, fown))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!lsm_sigiotask_ok(p, fown, sig))
+ return 0;
+
+ return 1;
+}

static void send_sigio_to_task(struct task_struct *p,
diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h
index a456afe..6659081 100644
--- a/include/linux/fs.h
+++ b/include/linux/fs.h
@@ -749,7 +749,7 @@ struct fown_struct {
    rwlock_t lock; /* protects pid, uid, euid fields */
    struct pid *pid; /* pid or -pgrp where SIGIO should be sent */
    enum pid_type pid_type; /* Kind of process group SIGIO should be sent to */
- uid_t uid, euid; /* uid/euid of process setting the owner */
+ struct k_uid_t uid, euid; /* uid/euid of process setting the owner */
    int signum; /* posix.1b rt signal to be delivered on IO */

```

};

--

1.5.1

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Containers@lists.linux-foundation.org
<https://lists.linux-foundation.org/mailman/listinfo/containers>

Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/4] user namespaces: introduction
Posted by [Daniel Hokka Zakrisso](#) on Mon, 28 Jan 2008 19:24:24 GMT
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Serge E. Hallyn wrote:

> Here is a small patchset I've been sitting on for awhile
> to make signaling mostly subject to user namespaces. In
> particular,
>
> 1. store user_namespace in user struct
> 2. introduce CAP_NS_OVERRIDE
> 3. require CAP_NS_OVERRIDE to signal another user namespace
>
> The first step should have been done all along. Else wouldn't
> a hash collision on (ns1, uid) and (ns2, uid), however unlikely,
> give us wrong results at uid_hash_find()?

Unless I've completely misunderstood the code, each namespace has a separate hash. Please correct me if I'm wrong.

> The main remaining signaling+userns issue is of course the
> siginfo. Tacking a userns onto siginfo is a pain due to
> lifetime mgmt issues. I haven't decided whether to just
> catch all the callers and fake uid=0 if user namespaces
> aren't the same, introduce some unique non-refcounted id to
> represent (user,user_ns), or find some other way to deal with
> it.
>
> thanks,
> -serge

--

Daniel Hokka Zakrisson

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Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/4] user namespaces: introduction

Posted by [serue](#) on Mon, 28 Jan 2008 19:44:50 GMT

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Quoting Daniel Hokka Zakrisson (daniel@hozac.com):

> Serge E. Hallyn wrote:

> > Here is a small patchset I've been sitting on for awhile

> > to make signaling mostly subject to user namespaces. In

> > particular,

> >

> > 1. store user_namespace in user struct

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> > 3. require CAP_NS_OVERRIDE to signal another user namespace

> >

> > The first step should have been done all along. Else wouldn't

> > a hash collision on (ns1, uid) and (ns2, uid), however unlikely,

> > give us wrong results at uid_hash_find()?

>

> Unless I've completely misunderstood the code, each namespace has a

> separate hash. Please correct me if I'm wrong.

So it does!

Yikes, how did I misread that so badly?

That means the find_user() code may be simplified a bit after all.

Well, or we could keep this and go to a single hash to save some memory...

Thanks Daniel.

-serge

>

> > The main remaining signaling+userns issue is of course the

> > siginfo. Tacking a userns onto siginfo is a pain due to

> > lifetime mgmt issues. I haven't decided whether to just

> > catch all the callers and fake uid=0 if user namespaces

> > aren't the same, introduce some unique non-refcounted id to

> > represent (user,user_ns), or find some other way to deal with

> > it.

> >

> > thanks,

> > -serge

>

> --

> Daniel Hokka Zakrisson

> -

> To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in

> the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org
> More majordomo info at <http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html>

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Containers@lists.linux-foundation.org

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Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/4] user namespaces: introduction

Posted by [serue](#) on Mon, 04 Feb 2008 21:45:44 GMT

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Quoting Serge E. Hallyn (serue@us.ibm.com):

> Quoting Daniel Hokka Zakrisson (daniel@hozac.com):

> > Serge E. Hallyn wrote:

> > > Here is a small patchset I've been sitting on for awhile

> > > to make signaling mostly subject to user namespaces. In

> > > particular,

> > >

> > > 1. store user_namespace in user struct

> > > 2. introduce CAP_NS_OVERRIDE

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> >

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> So it does!

>

> Yikes, how did I misread that so badly?

>

> That means the find_user() code may be simplified a bit after all.

> Well, or we could keep this and go to a single hash to save some

> memory...

>

> Thanks Daniel.

>

> -serge

Oh, here is the slightly simplified patch exploiting the fact
that each user namespace has its own user hashlist.

The rest of the patches remain unchanged.

-serge

>From 5c22bd668795c069c595b17bcfcce7db0e2c5423 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: sergeh@us.ibm.com <sergeh@us.ibm.com>
Date: Wed, 28 Nov 2007 14:50:54 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 1/4] user namespaces: add ns to user_struct

Add the user_namespace to user_struct.

Use ns to make sure we get right user with uid_hash_find().

Move /sys/kernel/uids/<uid> under
/sys/kernel/uids/<user_ns_address/<uid>

Changelog: feb 4: user hash tables are separate by namespace,
so remove ns checks from uid_hash_find().

Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>

```
fs/dquot.c          |  2 +-  
fs/ioprio.c         |  2 +-  
include/linux/sched.h      |  3 +-  
include/linux/types.h      | 10 ++++++  
include/linux/user_namespace.h |  3 ++  
kernel/user.c          | 63 ++++++++-----  
kernel/user_namespace.c    | 14 ++++++  
security/keys/process_keys.c |  8 ++--  
8 files changed, 94 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
```

diff --git a/fs/dquot.c b/fs/dquot.c
index 9c7feb6..f413094 100644

--- a/fs/dquot.c

+++ b/fs/dquot.c

```
@@ -960,7 +960,7 @@ static void send_warning(const struct dquot *dquot, const char warntype)  
    MINOR(dquot->dq_sb->s_dev));
```

```
    if (ret)
```

```
        goto attr_err_out;
```

```
- ret = nla_put_u64(skb, QUOTA_NL_A_CAUSED_ID, current->user->uid);
```

```
+ ret = nla_put_u64(skb, QUOTA_NL_A_CAUSED_ID, current->user->uid.uid);
```

```
    if (ret)
```

```
        goto attr_err_out;
```

```
    genlmsg_end(skb, msg_head);
```

diff --git a/fs/ioprio.c b/fs/ioprio.c

index e4e01bc..2ec1430 100644

--- a/fs/ioprio.c

+++ b/fs/ioprio.c

```
@@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_ioprio_get(int which, int who)
```

```
    break;
```

```

do_each_thread(g, p) {
- if (p->uid != user->uid)
+ if (!task_user_equiv(p, user))
    continue;
    tmpio = get_task_ioprio(p);
    if (tmpio < 0)
diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h
index 198659b..1206486 100644
--- a/include/linux/sched.h
+++ b/include/linux/sched.h
@@ -584,7 +584,7 @@ struct user_struct {

    /* Hash table maintenance information */
    struct hlist_node uidhash_node;
- uid_t uid;
+ struct k_uid_t uid;

#ifdef CONFIG_FAIR_USER_SCHED
    struct task_group *tg;
@@ -1634,6 +1634,7 @@ static inline struct user_struct *get_uid(struct user_struct *u)
extern void free_uid(struct user_struct *);
extern void switch_uid(struct user_struct *);
extern void release_uids(struct user_namespace *ns);
+extern int task_user_equiv(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_struct *u);

#include <asm/current.h>

diff --git a/include/linux/types.h b/include/linux/types.h
index f4f8d19..a6a130e 100644
--- a/include/linux/types.h
+++ b/include/linux/types.h
@@ -37,6 +37,16 @@ typedef __kernel_gid32_t gid_t;
typedef __kernel_uid16_t    uid16_t;
typedef __kernel_gid16_t    gid16_t;

+struct k_uid_t {
+ uid_t uid;
+ struct user_namespace *ns;
+};
+
+struct k_gid_t {
+ gid_t gid;
+ struct user_namespace *ns;
+};
+
typedef unsigned long  uintptr_t;

#ifdef CONFIG_UID16

```

```

diff --git a/include/linux/user_namespace.h b/include/linux/user_namespace.h
index b5f41d4..bb5e88a 100644
--- a/include/linux/user_namespace.h
+++ b/include/linux/user_namespace.h
@@ -12,6 +12,9 @@
 struct user_namespace {
     struct kref kref;
     struct hlist_head uidhash_table[UIDHASH_SZ];
+ #if defined(CONFIG_FAIR_USER_SCHED) && defined(CONFIG_SYSFS)
+ struct kobject kobject;
+ #endif
     struct user_struct *root_user;
 };

```

```

diff --git a/kernel/user.c b/kernel/user.c
index 7d7900c..5cc9d77 100644
--- a/kernel/user.c
+++ b/kernel/user.c
@@ -53,6 +53,10 @@ struct user_struct root_user = {
     .files = ATOMIC_INIT(0),
     .sigpending = ATOMIC_INIT(0),
     .locked_shm = 0,
+ .uid = {
+ .uid = 0,
+ .ns = &init_user_ns,
+ },
+ #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
     .uid_keyring = &root_user_keyring,
     .session_keyring = &root_session_keyring,
@@ -75,13 +79,29 @@ static void uid_hash_remove(struct user_struct *up)
     hlist_del_init(&up->uidhash_node);
 }

```

```

+int k_uid_equiv(struct k_uid_t a, struct k_uid_t b)
+{
+ if (a.uid == b.uid && a.ns == b.ns)
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int task_user_equiv(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_struct *u)
+{
+ if (tsk->uid != u->uid.uid)
+ return 0;
+ if (tsk->nsproxy->user_ns != u->uid.ns)
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+}

```

```

+
static struct user_struct *uid_hash_find(uid_t uid, struct hlist_head *hashent)
{
    struct user_struct *user;
    struct hlist_node *h;

    hlist_for_each_entry(user, h, hashent, uidhash_node) {
- if (user->uid == uid) {
+ if (user->uid.uid == uid) {
    atomic_inc(&user->__count);
    return user;
    }
@@ -190,7 +210,8 @@ static int uids_user_create(struct user_struct *up)

    memset(kobj, 0, sizeof(struct kobject));
    kobj->kset = uids_kset;
- error = kobject_init_and_add(kobj, &uids_ktype, NULL, "%d", up->uid);
+ error = kobject_init_and_add(kobj, &uids_ktype, &up->uid.ns->kobject,
+     "%d", up->uid.uid);
    if (error) {
        kobject_put(kobj);
        goto done;
@@ -201,6 +222,9 @@ done:
    return error;
    }

+int register_user_ns_kobj(struct user_namespace *ns);
+void unregister_user_ns_kobj(struct user_namespace *ns);
+
/* create these entries in sysfs:
 * "/sys/kernel/uids" directory
 * "/sys/kernel/uids/0" directory (for root user)
@@ -208,10 +232,16 @@ done:
 */
int __init uids_sysfs_init(void)
{
+ int error;
+
    uids_kset = kset_create_and_add("uids", NULL, kernel_kobj);
    if (!uids_kset)
        return -ENOMEM;

+ error = register_user_ns_kobj(&init_user_ns);
+ if (error)
+     return error;
+
    return uids_user_create(&root_user);
}

```

```

@@ -269,6 +299,30 @@ static inline void free_user(struct user_struct *up, unsigned long flags)
    schedule_work(&up->work);
}

+int register_user_ns_kobj(struct user_namespace *ns)
+{
+ struct kobject *obj = &ns->kobject;
+ int error;
+
+ obj->kset = uids_kset;
+
+ error = kobject_init_and_add(obj, &uids_ktype, &uids_kset->kobj,
+     "%lx", (unsigned long)ns);
+ if (error)
+     return error;
+
+ kobject_uevent(obj, KOBJ_ADD);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void unregister_user_ns_kobj(struct user_namespace *ns)
+{
+ struct kobject *obj = &ns->kobject;
+ kobject_uevent(obj, KOBJ_REMOVE);
+ kobject_del(obj);
+}
+
+/* CONFIG_FAIR_USER_SCHED && CONFIG_SYSFS */

int uids_sysfs_init(void) { return 0; }
@@ -290,6 +344,8 @@ static inline void free_user(struct user_struct *up, unsigned long flags)
    kmem_cache_free(uid_cachep, up);
}

+int register_user_ns_kobj(struct user_namespace *ns) { return 0; }
+void unregister_user_ns_kobj(struct user_namespace *ns) {}
+
+/*
@@ -343,7 +399,8 @@ struct user_struct * alloc_uid(struct user_namespace *ns, uid_t uid)
    if (!new)
        goto out_unlock;

- new->uid = uid;
+ new->uid.uid = uid;
+ new->uid.ns = ns;

```

```

    atomic_set(&new->__count, 1);
    atomic_set(&new->processes, 0);
    atomic_set(&new->files, 0);
diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c
index 4c90062..7dc6cc7 100644
--- a/kernel/user_namespace.c
+++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c
@@ -10,6 +10,9 @@
#include <linux/nsproxy.h>
#include <linux/user_namespace.h>

+int register_user_ns_kobj(struct user_namespace *ns);
+void unregister_user_ns_kobj(struct user_namespace *ns);
+
+/*
+ * Clone a new ns copying an original user ns, setting refcount to 1
+ * @old_ns: namespace to clone
@@ -19,12 +22,16 @@ static struct user_namespace *clone_user_ns(struct user_namespace
*old_ns)
{
    struct user_namespace *ns;
    struct user_struct *new_user;
- int n;
+ int n, err;

    ns = kmalloc(sizeof(struct user_namespace), GFP_KERNEL);
    if (!ns)
        return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);

+ err = register_user_ns_kobj(ns);
+ if (err)
+     goto out_free_ns;
+
    kref_init(&ns->kref);

    for (n = 0; n < UIDHASH_SZ; ++n)
@@ -47,6 +54,10 @@ static struct user_namespace *clone_user_ns(struct user_namespace
*old_ns)

    switch_uid(new_user);
    return ns;
+
+out_free_ns:
+ kfree(ns);
+ return ERR_PTR(err);
}

struct user_namespace * copy_user_ns(int flags, struct user_namespace *old_ns)

```

```

@@ -71,5 +82,6 @@ void free_user_ns(struct kref *kref)

    ns = container_of(kref, struct user_namespace, kref);
    release_uids(ns);
+ unregister_user_ns_kobj(ns);
    kfree(ns);
}
diff --git a/security/keys/process_keys.c b/security/keys/process_keys.c
index c886a2b..0343a52 100644
--- a/security/keys/process_keys.c
+++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c
@@ -75,9 +75,9 @@ int alloc_uid_keyring(struct user_struct *user,
    int ret;

    /* concoct a default session keyring */
- sprintf(buf, "_uid_ses.%u", user->uid);
+ sprintf(buf, "_uid_ses.%u", user->uid.uid);

- session_keyring = keyring_alloc(buf, user->uid, (gid_t) -1, ctx,
+ session_keyring = keyring_alloc(buf, user->uid.uid, (gid_t) -1, ctx,
    KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA, NULL);
    if (IS_ERR(session_keyring)) {
        ret = PTR_ERR(session_keyring);
@@ -86,9 +86,9 @@ int alloc_uid_keyring(struct user_struct *user,

    /* and a UID specific keyring, pointed to by the default session
    * keyring */
- sprintf(buf, "_uid.%u", user->uid);
+ sprintf(buf, "_uid.%u", user->uid.uid);

- uid_keyring = keyring_alloc(buf, user->uid, (gid_t) -1, ctx,
+ uid_keyring = keyring_alloc(buf, user->uid.uid, (gid_t) -1, ctx,
    KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA, session_keyring);
    if (IS_ERR(uid_keyring)) {
        key_put(session_keyring);
--
1.5.1

```

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