
Subject: [PATCH 1/1] capabilities: introduce per-process capability bounding set (v8)

Posted by [serue](#) on Mon, 19 Nov 2007 21:25:19 GMT

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Andrew, this version follows all of your suggestions. Definately nicer userspace interface. thanks

-serge

>From b7c210160e3c210d63eca532289ca1c9caf1bd87 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001

From: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>

Date: Mon, 19 Nov 2007 13:54:05 -0500

Subject: [PATCH 1/1] capabilities: introduce per-process capability bounding set (v8)

The capability bounding set is a set beyond which capabilities cannot grow. Currently cap_bset is per-system. It can be manipulated through sysctl, but only init can add capabilities. Root can remove capabilities. By default it includes all caps except CAP_SETPCAP.

This patch makes the bounding set per-process when file capabilities are enabled. It is inherited at fork from parent. Noone can add elements, CAP_SETPCAP is required to remove them.

One example use of this is to start a safer container. For instance, until device namespaces or per-container device whitelists are introduced, it is best to take CAP_MKNOD away from a container.

The following test program will get and set the bounding set. For instance

```
./bset get  
(lists capabilities in bset)  
./bset drop cap_net_raw  
(starts shell with new bset)  
(use capset, setuid binary, or binary with  
file capabilities to try to increase caps)
```

cap_bound.c

```
#include <sys/prctl.h>  
#include <linux/capability.h>  
#include <sys/types.h>  
#include <unistd.h>  
#include <stdio.h>
```

```

#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>

#ifndef PR_CAPBSET_READ
#define PR_CAPBSET_READ 23
#endif

#ifndef PR_CAPBSET_DROP
#define PR_CAPBSET_DROP 24
#endif

int usage(char *me)
{
    printf("Usage: %s get\n", me);
    printf("      %s drop <capability>\n", me);
    return 1;
}

#define numcaps 32
char *captable[numcaps] = {
    "cap_chown",
    "cap_dac_override",
    "cap_dac_read_search",
    "cap_fowner",
    "cap_fsetid",
    "cap_kill",
    "cap_setgid",
    "cap_setuid",
    "cap_setpcap",
    "cap_linux_immutable",
    "cap_net_bind_service",
    "cap_net_broadcast",
    "cap_net_admin",
    "cap_net_raw",
    "cap_ipc_lock",
    "cap_ipc_owner",
    "cap_sys_module",
    "cap_sys_rawio",
    "cap_sys_chroot",
    "cap_sys_ptrace",
    "cap_sys_pacct",
    "cap_sys_admin",
    "cap_sys_boot",
    "cap_sys_nice",
    "cap_sys_resource",
    "cap_sys_time",
    "cap_sys_tty_config",
    "cap_mknod",
}

```

```

"cap_lease",
"cap_audit_write",
"cap_audit_control",
"cap_setfcap"
};

int getbcap(void)
{
    int comma=0;
    unsigned long i;
    int ret;

    printf("I know of %d capabilities\n", numcaps);
    printf("capability bounding set:");
    for (i=0; i<numcaps; i++) {
        ret = prctl(PR_CAPBSET_READ, i);
        if (ret < 0)
            perror("prctl");
        else if (ret==1)
            printf("%s%s", (comma++) ? ", " : " ", captable[i]);
    }
    printf("\n");
    return 0;
}

int capdrop(char *str)
{
    unsigned long i;

    int found=0;
    for (i=0; i<numcaps; i++) {
        if (strcmp(captable[i], str) == 0) {
            found=1;
            break;
        }
    }
    if (!found)
        return 1;
    if (prctl(PR_CAPBSET_DROP, i)) {
        perror("prctl");
        return 1;
    }
    return 0;
}

int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
    if (argc<2)

```

```

return usage(argv[0]);
if (strcmp(argv[1], "get") == 0)
    return getbcap();
if (strcmp(argv[1], "drop") != 0 || argc < 3)
    return usage(argv[0]);
if (capdrop(argv[2])) {
    printf("unknown capability\n");
    return 1;
}
return execl("/bin/bash", "/bin/bash", NULL);
}
*****

```

Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>

```

---
include/linux/capability.h | 25 ++++++=====
include/linux/init_task.h | 1 +
include/linux/prctl.h | 4 +++
include/linux/sched.h | 2 ++
include/linux/security.h | 5 -----
include/linux/sysctl.h | 3 ---
kernel/fork.c | 1 +
kernel/sys.c | 7 ++++++
kernel/sysctl.c | 35 -----
kernel/sysctl_check.c | 7 -----
security/commoncap.c | 29 ++++++=====
11 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 56 deletions(-)
```

```

diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h
index a1d93da..94638b2 100644
--- a/include/linux/capability.h
+++ b/include/linux/capability.h
@@ -153,6 +153,7 @@ typedef struct kernel_cap_struct {
 * remove any capability in your permitted set from any pid
 * With VFS support for capabilities (neither of above, but)
 * Add any capability to the current process' inheritable set
+ * Allow taking bits out of capability bounding set
 */
#define CAP_SETPCAP 8
@@ -202,7 +203,6 @@ typedef struct kernel_cap_struct {
#define CAP_IPC_OWNER 15

/* Insert and remove kernel modules - modify kernel without limit */
-/* Modify cap_bset */
#define CAP_SYS_MODULE 16

/* Allow ioperm/iopl access */
```

```

@@ -314,6 +314,10 @@ @@ typedef struct kernel_cap_struct {

#define CAP_SETFCAP    31

+/#define CAP_NUM_CAPS      32
+
+/#define cap_valid(x) ((x) >= 0 && (x) < CAP_NUM_CAPS)
+
/*
 * Bit location of each capability (used by user-space library and kernel)
 */

@@ -350,6 +354,17 @@ @@ typedef struct kernel_cap_struct {

#define CAP_INIT_INH_SET  CAP_EMPTY_SET

+/#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
+/*
+ * Because of the reduced scope of CAP_SETPCAP when filesystem
+ * capabilities are in effect, it is safe to allow this capability to
+ * be available in the default configuration.
+ */
+# define CAP_INIT_BSET CAP_FULL_SET
+/#else
+# define CAP_INIT_BSET CAP_INIT_EFF_SET
+/#endif
+
#define cap_clear(c)      do { (c) = __cap_empty_set; } while (0)
#define cap_set_full(c)   do { (c) = __cap_full_set; } while (0)
#define cap_set_init_eff(c) do { (c) = __cap_init_eff_set; } while (0)
@@ -465,6 +480,14 @@ extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_init_eff_set;
int capable(int cap);
int __capable(struct task_struct *t, int cap);

+/#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
+extern long cap_prctl_drop(unsigned long cap);
+/#else
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+static inline long cap_prctl_drop(unsigned long cap)
+{ return -EINVAL; }
+/#endif
+
#endif /* __KERNEL__ */

#endif /* !_LINUX_CAPABILITY_H */
diff --git a/include/linux/init_task.h b/include/linux/init_task.h
index cae35b6..5c84d14 100644
--- a/include/linux/init_task.h
+++ b/include/linux/init_task.h

```

```

@@ -147,6 +147,7 @@ extern struct group_info init_groups;
    .cap_effective = CAP_INIT_EFF_SET, \
    .cap_inheritable = CAP_INIT_INH_SET, \
    .cap_permitted = CAP_FULL_SET, \
+   .cap_bset = CAP_INIT_BSET, \
    .keep_capabilities = 0, \
    .user = INIT_USER, \
    .comm = "swapper", \
diff --git a/include/linux/prctl.h b/include/linux/prctl.h
index e2eff90..3800639 100644
--- a/include/linux/prctl.h
+++ b/include/linux/prctl.h
@@ -63,4 +63,8 @@
#define PR_GET_SECCOMP 21
#define PR_SET_SECCOMP 22

+/* Get/set the capability bounding set */
+#define PR_CAPBSET_READ 23
+#define PR_CAPBSET_DROP 24
+
#endif /* _LINUX_PRCTL_H */
diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h
index 1d17f7c..bf51a16 100644
--- a/include/linux/sched.h
+++ b/include/linux/sched.h
@@ -1041,7 +1041,7 @@ struct task_struct {
    uid_t uid,euid,suid,fsuid;
    gid_t gid,egid,sgid,fsgid;
    struct group_info *group_info;
-   kernel_cap_t cap_effective, cap_inheritable, cap_permitted;
+   kernel_cap_t cap_effective, cap_inheritable, cap_permitted, cap_bset;
    unsigned keep_capabilities:1;
    struct user_struct *user;
#endif CONFIG_KEYS
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index f771ad8..04b18f1 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -34,11 +34,6 @@ 
#include <linux/xfrm.h>
#include <net/flow.h>

-/*
- * Bounding set
- */
-extern kernel_cap_t cap_bset;
-
extern unsigned securebits;

```

```

struct ctl_table;
diff --git a/include/linux/sysctl.h b/include/linux/sysctl.h
index 4f5047d..fa900cb 100644
--- a/include/linux/sysctl.h
+++ b/include/linux/sysctl.h
@@ -102,7 +102,6 @@ enum
 KERN_NODENAME=7,
 KERN_DOMAINNAME=8,

- KERN_CAP_BSET=14, /* int: capability bounding set */
 KERN_PANIC=15, /* int: panic timeout */
 KERN_REALROOTDEV=16, /* real root device to mount after initrd */

@@ -962,8 +961,6 @@ extern int proc_destring(struct ctl_table *, int, struct file *,
 void __user *, size_t *, loff_t *);
extern int proc_dointvec(struct ctl_table *, int, struct file *,
 void __user *, size_t *, loff_t *);
-extern int proc_dointvec_bset(struct ctl_table *, int, struct file *,
-void __user *, size_t *, loff_t *);
extern int proc_dointvec_minmax(struct ctl_table *, int, struct file *,
 void __user *, size_t *, loff_t *);
extern int proc_dointvec_jiffies(struct ctl_table *, int, struct file *,
diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
index 5639b3e..9e4a5e1 100644
--- a/kernel/fork.c
+++ b/kernel/fork.c
@@ -1087,6 +1087,7 @@ static struct task_struct *copy_process(unsigned long clone_flags,
#endif CONFIG_SECURITY
p->security = NULL;
#endif
+ p->cap_bset = current->cap_bset;
p->io_context = NULL;
p->audit_context = NULL;
cgroup_fork(p);
diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c
index 4c77ed2..bed55dc 100644
--- a/kernel/sys.c
+++ b/kernel/sys.c
@@ -1742,6 +1742,13 @@ asmlinkage long sys_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned
long arg3,
error = prctl_set_seccomp(arg2);
break;

+ case PR_CAPBSET_READ:
+ if (!cap_valid(arg2))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ return !!cap_raised(current->cap_bset, arg2);

```

```

+ case PR_CAPBSET_DROP:
+     return cap_prctl_drop(arg2);
+
default:
    error = -EINVAL;
    break;
diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c
index 489b0d1..d858819 100644
--- a/kernel/sysctl.c
+++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
@@ -383,15 +383,6 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = {
     .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec_taint,
 },
#endif
#ifndef CONFIG_SECURITY_CAPABILITIES
{
- .procname = "cap-bound",
- .data = &cap_bset,
- . maxlen = sizeof(kernel_cap_t),
- .mode = 0600,
- .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec_bset,
- },
#endif /* def CONFIG_SECURITY_CAPABILITIES */
#ifndef CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD
{
    .ctl_name = KERN_REALROOTDEV,
@@ -1910,26 +1901,6 @@ static int do_proc_dointvec_bset_conv(int *negp, unsigned long
*lvalp,
    return 0;
}

#ifndef CONFIG_SECURITY_CAPABILITIES
/*
- * init may raise the set.
- */
-
-int proc_dointvec_bset(struct ctl_table *table, int write, struct file *filp,
- void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
-{
- int op;
-
- if (write && !capable(CAP_SYS_MODULE)) {
-     return -EPERM;
- }
-
- op = is_global_init(current) ? OP_SET : OP_AND;
- return do_proc_dointvec(table, write, filp, buffer, lenp, ppos,
- do_proc_dointvec_bset_conv, &op);

```

```

-}
-#endif /* def CONFIG_SECURITY_CAPABILITIES */
-
/*
 * Taint values can only be increased
 */
@@ -2343,12 +2314,6 @@ int proc_dointvec(struct ctl_table *table, int write, struct file *filp,
    return -ENOSYS;
}

-int proc_dointvec_bset(struct ctl_table *table, int write, struct file *filp,
-    void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
-{
-    return -ENOSYS;
-}

int proc_dointvec_minmax(struct ctl_table *table, int write, struct file *filp,
    void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
{
diff --git a/kernel/sysctl_check.c b/kernel/sysctl_check.c
index 8f5baac..526fa36 100644
--- a/kernel/sysctl_check.c
+++ b/kernel/sysctl_check.c
@@ @ -38,10 +38,6 @@ static struct trans_ctl_table trans_kern_table[] = {
 { KERN_NODENAME, "hostname" },
 { KERN_DOMAINNAME, "domainname" },

#ifndef CONFIG_SECURITY_CAPABILITIES
{ KERN_CAP_BSET, "cap-bound" },
#endif /* def CONFIG_SECURITY_CAPABILITIES */

{ KERN_PANIC, "panic" },
{ KERN_REALROOTDEV, "real-root-dev" },

@@ -1522,9 +1518,6 @@ int sysctl_check_table(struct ctl_table *table)
    (table->strategy == sysctl_ms_jiffies) ||
    (table->proc_handler == proc_dosstring) ||
    (table->proc_handler == proc_dointvec) ||
#ifndef CONFIG_SECURITY_CAPABILITIES
    (table->proc_handler == proc_dointvec_bset) ||
#endif /* def CONFIG_SECURITY_CAPABILITIES */
    (table->proc_handler == proc_dointvec_minmax) ||
    (table->proc_handler == proc_dointvec_jiffies) ||
    (table->proc_handler == proc_dointvec_userhz_jiffies) ||
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 3a95990..b6745f4 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c

```

```

@@ -36,9 +36,6 @@
#define CAP_INIT_BSET CAP_INIT_EFF_SET
#endif /* def CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES */

-kernel_cap_t cap_bset = CAP_INIT_BSET; /* systemwide capability bound */
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_bset);
-
/* Global security state */

unsigned securebits = SECUREBITS_DEFAULT; /* systemwide security settings */
@@ -330,7 +327,8 @@ void cap_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:compute_creds. */
 kernel_cap_t new_permitted, working;

- new_permitted = cap_intersect (bprm->cap_permitted, cap_bset);
+ new_permitted = cap_intersect (bprm->cap_permitted,
+     current->cap_bset);
 working = cap_intersect (bprm->cap_inheritable,
     current->cap_inheritable);
 new_permitted = cap_combine (new_permitted, working);
@@ -565,6 +563,29 @@ int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
    return -EPERM;
}

+/*
+ * called from kernel/sys.c for prctl(PR_CABSET_DROP)
+ * done without task_capability_lock() because it introduces
+ * no new races - i.e. only another task doing capget() on
+ * this task could get inconsistent info. There can be no
+ * racing writer bc a task can only change its own caps.
+ */
+long cap_prctl_drop(unsigned long cap)
+{
+ if (!capable(CAP_SETPCAP))
+ return -EPERM;
+ if (!cap_valid(cap))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ cap_lower(current->cap_bset, cap);
+ current->cap_effective = cap_intersect(current->cap_effective,
+ current->cap_bset);
+ current->cap_permitted = cap_intersect(current->cap_permitted,
+ current->cap_bset);
+ current->cap_inheritable = cap_intersect(current->cap_inheritable,
+ current->cap_bset);
+ return 0;
+}
#else

```

```
int cap_task_setscheduler (struct task_struct *p, int policy,
    struct sched_param *lp)
```

--
1.5.1.1.GIT

Containers mailing list
Containers@lists.linux-foundation.org
<https://lists.linux-foundation.org/mailman/listinfo/containers>

Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/1] capabilities: introduce per-process capability bounding set (v8)

Posted by [Andrew Morgan](#) on Tue, 20 Nov 2007 03:40:23 GMT

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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Hash: SHA1

Serge E. Hallyn wrote:

> Andrew, this version follows all of your suggestions. Definately nicer
> userspace interface. thanks

[...]

>

> /* Allow ioperm/iopl access */
> @@ -314,6 +314,10 @@ @@@ typedef struct kernel_cap_struct {
>
> #define CAP_SETFCAP 31
>
> +#define CAP_NUM_CAPS 32
> +
> +#define cap_valid(x) ((x) >= 0 && (x) < CAP_NUM_CAPS)
> +

Could you change the name of CAP_NUM_CAPS? There is some libcap building code that does the following to automatically build the "cap_%" names for libcap, and this new define above messes that up! :-(

```
sed -ne '/^#define[ \t]CAP[_A-Z]+[ \t]+[0-9]\+/{s/^#define \([^\n\t]*\)[ \t]*\([^\n\t]*\)/ \{\ \2, \"\1\"  
\},/y/ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ/abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz;/p;}' <  
$(KERNEL_HEADERS)/linux/capability.h | fgrep -v 0x > cap_names.sed
```

Something like:

```
#define CAP_NUM_CAPS (CAP_SETFCAP+1)
```

will save me some hassle. :-)

[...]

```
> /*
> * Bit location of each capability (used by user-space library and kernel)
> */
> @@ -350,6 +354,17 @@ typedef struct kernel_cap_struct {
>
> #define CAP_INIT_INH_SET  CAP_EMPTY_SET
>
```

Its kind of a pity to put a kernel config ifdef in a header file. Could you put the ifdef code in the c-files that uses these definitions?

```
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
```

In my experience when headers define things differently based on configuration #defines, other users of header files (apps, kernel modules etc.), never quite know what the current define is. If we can avoid conditional code like this in this header file, I'd be happier.

```
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
```

ditto.

[...]

```
> +extern long cap_prctl_drop(unsigned long cap);
> +#else
> +#include <linux/errno.h>
> +static inline long cap_prctl_drop(unsigned long cap)
> +{ return -EINVAL; }
> +#endif
> +
> +long cap_prctl_drop(unsigned long cap)
> +{
> + if (!capable(CAP_SETPCAP))
> + return -EPERM;
> + if (!cap_valid(cap))
> + return -EINVAL;
> + cap_lower(current->cap_bset, cap);
```

I think the following lines are overkill. Basically, the next exec() will perform the pP/pE clipping, and cap_bset should only interact with fP (and not fl).

We already have a mechanism to manipulate pl, which in turn gates fl. And this same mechanism (libcap) can clip pE, pP if it is needed pre-exec().

So, if you want to drop a capability irrevocably, you drop it in bset, and separately in pl. The current process may continue to have the capability, but post-exec the working process tree has lost it. For things like login, this is desirable.

This also makes it possible for you to allow pl to have a capability otherwise banned in cap_bset which is useful with limited role accounts.

```
> + current->cap_effective = cap_intersect(current->cap_effective,  
> + current->cap_bset);  
> + current->cap_permitted = cap_intersect(current->cap_permitted,  
> + current->cap_bset);  
> + current->cap_inheritable = cap_intersect(current->cap_inheritable,  
> + current->cap_bset);
```

You might want to replace the above three lines with a restriction elsewhere on what CAP_SETPCAP can newly set in commoncap.c:cap_capset_check().

That is, CAP_SETPCAP permits the current process to raise 'any' pl capability. I suspect that you'll want to prevent raising any bits not masked by this:

pl' & ~(pl | (pP & cap_bset)).

Cheers

Andrew

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----

Version: GnuPG v1.2.6 (GNU/Linux)

iD8DBQFHQlcIcQheEq9QabfIRAkF4AKCHuvuL23GjPB+bLHhBP7etBGn4/gCeL74C
PII6wm41m0dGNiGb1mKFGGU=
=7qUX
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Containers mailing list

Containers@lists.linux-foundation.org

<https://lists.linux-foundation.org/mailman/listinfo/containers>

Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/1] capabilities: introduce per-process capability bounding set (v8)

Posted by [Andrew Morgan](#) on Tue, 20 Nov 2007 05:37:03 GMT

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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Hash: SHA1

Andrew Morgan wrote:

```
>> + current->cap_effective = cap_intersect(current->cap_effective,
>> + current->cap_bset);
>> + current->cap_permitted = cap_intersect(current->cap_permitted,
>> + current->cap_bset);
>> + current->cap_inheritable = cap_intersect(current->cap_inheritable,
>> + current->cap_bset);
>
> You might want to replace the above three lines with a restriction
> elsewhere on what CAP_SETPCAP can newly set in
> commoncap.c:cap_capset_check().
>
> That is, CAP_SETPCAP permits the current process to raise 'any' pl
> capability. I suspect that you'll want to prevent raising any bits not
> masked by this:
>
> pl' & ~(pl | (pP & cap_bset)).
```

On second thoughts, I really meant this:

```
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 302e8d0..b28c0c1 100644
- --- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -133,6 +133,12 @@ int cap_capset_check (struct task_struct *target,
kernel_ca /* incapable of using this inheritable set */
        return -EPERM;
}
+    if (!cap_issubset(*inheritable,
+                      cap_combine(target->cap_inheritable,
+                                  current->cap_bset))) {
+        /* no new pl capabilities outside bounding set */
+        return -EPERM;
+    }
+
/* verify restrictions on target's new Permitted set */
if (!cap_issubset (*permitted,
```

Cheers

Andrew

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----

Version: GnuPG v1.2.6 (GNU/Linux)

iD8DBQFHQnJ8QheEq9QabfIRAI2rAJ4jH+l36N1+cHV+1A3DJpXs+UNsFgCgkg8H
xOU/7dCrEq02xk9EgcRarg0=
=FbqU

-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Containers mailing list
Containers@lists.linux-foundation.org
<https://lists.linux-foundation.org/mailman/listinfo/containers>

Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/1] capabilities: introduce per-process capability bounding set (v8)

Posted by [serue](#) on Tue, 20 Nov 2007 18:14:52 GMT

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Quoting Andrew Morgan (morgan@kernel.org):

> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

> Hash: SHA1

>

> Serge E. Hallyn wrote:

>> Andrew, this version follows all of your suggestions. Definately nicer

>> userspace interface. thanks

> [...]

>>

>> /* Allow ioperm/iopl access */

>> @@ -314,6 +314,10 @@ @@@ typedef struct kernel_cap_struct {

>>

>> #define CAP_SETFCAP 31

>>

>> +#define CAP_NUM_CAPS 32

>> +

>> +#define cap_valid(x) ((x) >= 0 && (x) < CAP_NUM_CAPS)

>> +

>

> Could you change the name of CAP_NUM_CAPS? There is some libcap building

> code that does the following to automatically build the "cap_*" names

> for libcap, and this new define above messes that up! :-(

>

> sed -ne '/^#define[\t]CAP[_A-Z]+[\t]+[0-9]\+/{s/^#define \([^\n

> \t]*\)[\t]*\([^\t]*\)/ \{\ \2, \"\1\"

> \},;/y/ABCDEFGHIJKLMNPQRSTUVWXYZ/abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz;/p;}' <

> \$(KERNEL_HEADERS)/linux/capability.h | fgrep -v 0x > cap_names.sed

>

> Something like:

>

> #define CAP_NUM_CAPS (CAP_SETFCAP+1)

>

> will save me some hassle. :-(

Gotcha. Will change that.

I worry that what you have is just a *touch* too busy so whoever adds capability #32 might forget to update CAP_NUM_CAPS, but it looks like

```
#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_SETFCAP  
  
#define cap_valid(x) ((x) >= 0 && (x) <= CAP_LAST_CAP)
```

should also be ok for libcap.

```
> [...]  
>  
> > /*  
> > * Bit location of each capability (used by user-space library and kernel)  
> > */  
> > @@ -350,6 +354,17 @@ typedef struct kernel_cap_struct {  
> >  
> > #define CAP_INIT_INH_SET CAP_EMPTY_SET  
> >  
>  
> Its kind of a pity to put a kernel config ifdef in a header file. Could  
> you put the ifdef code in the c-files that uses these definitions?
```

Hmm, now that you mention it, I notice that the exact same block of code is still in commoncap.c. I must have lost the patch hunk dropping that some time ago...

But at this point CAP_INIT_BSET is only used in include/linux/init_task.h. And I'd really rather not put the definition in there.

Note that the conditional is under a #ifdef __KERNEL__, so applications shouldn't be looking at it anyway. Does that help?

```
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES  
>  
> In my experience when headers define things differently based on  
> configuration #defines, other users of header files (apps, kernel  
> modules etc.), never quite know what the current define is. If we can  
> avoid conditional code like this in this header file, I'd be happier.  
>  
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES  
>  
> ditto.
```

For this I really can't, because that is the recommended way to handle functions with different behavior per CONFIG_ variables. #ifdefs are to be kept out of .c files to improve their readability, and helper functions called in .c files are to have their definition in .h files

depend on the CONFIG_ variables.

```
> [...]
> > +extern long cap_prctl_drop(unsigned long cap);
> > +#else
> > +#include <linux/errno.h>
> > +static inline long cap_prctl_drop(unsigned long cap)
> > +{ return -EINVAL; }
> > +#endif
> > +
> > +long cap_prctl_drop(unsigned long cap)
> > +{
> > + if (!capable(CAP_SETPCAP))
> > + return -EPERM;
> > + if (!cap_valid(cap))
> > + return -EINVAL;
> > + cap_lower(current->cap_bset, cap);
>
> I think the following lines are overkill. Basically, the next exec()
> will perform the pP/pE clipping, and cap_bset should only interact with
> fP (and not fI).
>
> We already have a mechanism to manipulate pl, which in turn gates fI.
> And this same mechanism (libcap) can clip pE, pP if it is needed pre-exec().
>
> So, if you want to drop a capability irrevocably, you drop it in bset,
> and separately in pl. The current process may continue to have the
> capability, but post-exec the working process tree has lost it. For
> things like login, this is desirable.
```

Ok...

I think this makes sense. It seems pretty subtle and complicated, and therefore I'm a little worried that it will be fragile against future code changes. Someone will think it's a good idea to slightly change the capset() semantics and only a year later will we realize that the bounding set is no longer working...

So this will all have to be very well documented (and tested).

(Actually I notice that capabilities(7) manpage isn't in the libcap sources. So an update to that is probably long overdue...)

> This also makes it possible for you to allow pl to have a capability
> otherwise banned in cap_bset which is useful with limited role accounts.

Yeah... so the way you'd see this happening, I assume, is that

1. login would keep some capset in pl for user hallyn,
2. so if /bin/foo had some nonempty fl, hallyn could run /bin/foo with cap_intersect(pl|fl)?

So now the bounding set would place a restriction on what /bin/login in some container could leave in hallyn's pl.

```
> > + current->cap_effective = cap_intersect(current->cap_effective,  
> > + current->cap_bset);  
> > + current->cap_permitted = cap_intersect(current->cap_permitted,  
> > + current->cap_bset);  
> > + current->cap_inheritable = cap_intersect(current->cap_inheritable,  
> > + current->cap_bset);  
>  
> You might want to replace the above three lines with a restriction  
> elsewhere on what CAP_SETPCAP can newly set in  
> commoncap.c:cap_capset_check().  
>  
> That is, CAP_SETPCAP permits the current process to raise 'any' pl  
> capability. I suspect that you'll want to prevent raising any bits not  
> masked by this:  
>  
> pl' & ~(pl | (pP & cap_bset)).  
>  
> Cheers  
>  
> Andrew
```

Ok, I'll try this and see where I get.

thanks,
-serge

Containers mailing list
Containers@lists.linux-foundation.org
<https://lists.linux-foundation.org/mailman/listinfo/containers>

Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/1] capabilities: introduce per-process capability bounding set (v8)

Posted by [serue](#) on Tue, 20 Nov 2007 18:32:42 GMT

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Quoting Serge E. Hallyn (serue@us.ibm.com):

> Quoting Andrew Morgan (morgan@kernel.org):

> > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

> > Hash: SHA1

> >

>> Serge E. Hallyn wrote:

>>> Andrew, this version follows all of your suggestions. Definately nicer
 >>> userspace interface. thanks

>> [...]

>>>

>>> /* Allow ioperm/iopl access */

>>> @@ -314,6 +314,10 @@ typedef struct kernel_cap_struct {

>>>

>>> #define CAP_SETFCAP 31

>>>

>>> +#define CAP_NUM_CAPS 32

>>> +

>>> +#define cap_valid(x) ((x) >= 0 && (x) < CAP_NUM_CAPS)

>>> +

>>

>> Could you change the name of CAP_NUM_CAPS? There is some libcap building
 >> code that does the following to automatically build the "cap_%" names
 >> for libcap, and this new define above messes that up! :-(

>>

>> sed -ne '/^#define[\t]CAP[_A-Z]+[\t]+[0-9]+\+/{s/^#define \([^\n\n>> \t]*\)[\t]*\([^\t]*\)/ \{ \2, \"\1\"

>> \},/y/ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ/abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz;/p;}' <
 >> \$(KERNEL_HEADERS)/linux/capability.h | fgrep -v 0x > cap_names.sed

>>

>> Something like:

>>

>> #define CAP_NUM_CAPS (CAP_SETFCAP+1)

>>

>> will save me some hassle. :-)

>

> Gotcha. Will change that.

>

> I worry that what you have is just a *touch* too busy so whoever adds
 > capability #32 might forget to update CAP_NUM_CAPS, but it looks like

>

> #define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_SETFCAP

>

> #define cap_valid(x) ((x) >= 0 && (x) <= CAP_LAST_CAP)

>

> should also be ok for libcap.

>

>> [...]

>>

>>> /*

>>> * Bit location of each capability (used by user-space library and kernel)

>>> */

>>> @@ -350,6 +354,17 @@ typedef struct kernel_cap_struct {

>>>

```
>>> #define CAP_INIT_INH_SET  CAP_EMPTY_SET
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>>
>> Its kind of a pity to put a kernel config ifdef in a header file. Could
>> you put the ifdef code in the c-files that uses these definitions?
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> Hmm, now that you mention it, I notice that the exact same block of
> code is still in commoncap.c. I must have lost the patch hunk dropping
> that some time ago...
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> But at this point CAP_INIT_BSET is only used in
> include/linux/init_task.h. And I'd really rather not put the definition
> in there.
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> Note that the conditional is under a #ifdef __KERNEL__, so applications
> shouldn't be looking at it anyway. Does that help?
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>>> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
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>> In my experience when headers define things differently based on
>> configuration #defines, other users of header files (apps, kernel
>> modules etc.), never quite know what the current define is. If we can
>> avoid conditional code like this in this header file, I'd be happier.
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> For this I really can't, because that is the recommended way to handle
> functions with different behavior per CONFIG_ variables. #ifdefs are to
> be kept out of .c files to improve their readability, and helper
> functions called in .c files are to have their definition in .h files
> depend on the CONFIG_ variables.
```

On second thought, I'm going to do exactly what you suggest, because removing CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES checks severaly reduces the amount of recompilation when you switch between CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES=y and n.

thanks,
-serge

Containers mailing list
Containers@lists.linux-foundation.org
<https://lists.linux-foundation.org/mailman/listinfo/containers>

Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/1] capabilities: introduce per-process capability bounding set (v8)

Posted by [serue](#) on Tue, 20 Nov 2007 20:07:46 GMT

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Quoting Andrew Morgan (morgan@kernel.org):

```
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----  
> Hash: SHA1  
>  
> Serge E. Hallyn wrote:  
>> Andrew, this version follows all of your suggestions. Definately nicer  
>> userspace interface. thanks  
> [...]  
>>  
>> /* Allow ioperm/iopl access */  
>> @@ -314,6 +314,10 @@ typedef struct kernel_cap_struct {  
>>  
>> #define CAP_SETFCAP    31  
>>  
>> +#define CAP_NUM_CAPS      32  
>> +  
>> +#define cap_valid(x) ((x) >= 0 && (x) < CAP_NUM_CAPS)  
>> +  
>  
> Could you change the name of CAP_NUM_CAPS? There is some libcap building  
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>  
> sed -ne '/^#define[ \t]CAP[_A-Z]\+[ \t]\+[0-9]\+/{s/^#define \([^\n  
> \t]*\)[ \t]*\([^\t]*\)/ \{ \2, \"\1\"  
> \},/y/ABCDEFGHIJKLMNPQRSTUVWXYZ/abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz;/p;}' <  
> $(KERNEL_HEADERS)/linux/capability.h | fgrep -v 0x > cap_names.sed  
>  
> Something like:  
>  
> #define CAP_NUM_CAPS (CAP_SETFCAP+1)  
>  
> will save me some hassle. :-(  
>  
> [...]  
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>> /*  
>> * Bit location of each capability (used by user-space library and kernel)  
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>>  
>> #define CAP_INIT_INH_SET  CAP_EMPTY_SET  
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> Its kind of a pity to put a kernel config ifdef in a header file. Could
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> [...]
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> > +
> > +long cap_prctl_drop(unsigned long cap)
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> So, if you want to drop a capability irrevocably, you drop it in bset,
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> capability, but post-exec the working process tree has lost it. For
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>
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```
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> commoncap.c:cap_capset_check().
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> That is, CAP_SETPCAP permits the current process to raise 'any' pl
> capability. I suspect that you'll want to prevent raising any bits not
> masked by this:
>
> pl' & ~(pl | (pP & cap_bset)).
>
> Cheers
>
> Andrew
```

How about the following?

thanks,
-serge

>From 16d76d11d27f32487366a7cec6a52f6ec4fb1cbb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Date: Mon, 19 Nov 2007 13:54:05 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 1/1] capabilities: introduce per-process capability bounding set (v9)

The capability bounding set is a set beyond which capabilities cannot grow. Currently cap_bset is per-system. It can be manipulated through sysctl, but only init can add capabilities. Root can remove capabilities. By default it includes all caps except CAP_SETPCAP.

This patch makes the bounding set per-process when file capabilities are enabled. It is inherited at fork from parent. No one can add elements, CAP_SETPCAP is required to remove them.

One example use of this is to start a safer container. For instance, until device namespaces or per-container device whitelists are introduced, it is best to take CAP_MKNOD away from a container.

The bounding set will not affect pP and pE immediately. It will only affect pP' and pE' after subsequent exec()'s. It also does not affect pl, and exec() does not constrain pl'. So to really start a shell with no way of regaining CAP_MKNOD, you would do

```

prctl(PR_CAPBSET_DROP, CAP_MKNOD);
cap_t cap = cap_get_proc();
cap_value_t caparray[1];
caparray[0] = CAP_MKNOD;
cap_set_flag(cap, CAP_INHERITABLE, 1, caparray, CAP_DROP);
cap_set_proc(cap);
cap_free(cap);

```

The following test program will get and set the bounding set. For instance

```

gcc -o capbound capbound.c -lcap
./capbound get
(lists capabilities in bset)
./capbound drop cap_net_raw
(starts shell with new bset)
(use capset, setuid binary, or binary with
file capabilities to try to increase caps)

```

```

*****
capbound.c
*****
#include <sys/prctl.h>
#include <sys/capability.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>

#ifndef PR_CAPBSET_READ
#define PR_CAPBSET_READ 23
#endif

#ifndef PR_CAPBSET_DROP
#define PR_CAPBSET_DROP 24
#endif

int usage(char *me)
{
printf("Usage: %s get\n", me);
printf("      %s drop <capability>\n", me);
return 1;
}

#define numcaps 32
char *capturable[numcaps] = {
"cap_chown",

```

```

"cap_dac_override",
"cap_dac_read_search",
"cap_fowner",
"cap_fsetid",
"cap_kill",
"cap_setgid",
"cap_setuid",
"cap_setpcap",
"cap_linux_immutable",
"cap_net_bind_service",
"cap_net_broadcast",
"cap_net_admin",
"cap_net_raw",
"cap_ipc_lock",
"cap_ipc_owner",
"cap_sys_module",
"cap_sys_rawio",
"cap_sys_chroot",
"cap_sys_ptrace",
"cap_sys_pacct",
"cap_sys_admin",
"cap_sys_boot",
"cap_sys_nice",
"cap_sys_resource",
"cap_sys_time",
"cap_sys_tty_config",
"cap_mknod",
"cap_lease",
"cap_audit_write",
"cap_audit_control",
"cap_setfcap"
};

int getbcap(void)
{
    int comma=0;
    unsigned long i;
    int ret;

    printf("I know of %d capabilities\n", numcaps);
    printf("capability bounding set:");
    for (i=0; i<numcaps; i++) {
        ret = prctl(PR_CAPBSET_READ, i);
        if (ret < 0)
            perror("prctl");
        else if (ret==1)
            printf("%s%s", (comma++) ? ", " : " ", captable[i]);
    }
}

```

```

printf("\n");
return 0;
}

int capdrop(char *str)
{
unsigned long i;

int found=0;
for (i=0; i<numcaps; i++) {
if (strcmp(captable[i], str) == 0) {
found=1;
break;
}
}
if (!found)
return 1;
if (prctl(PR_CAPBSET_DROP, i)) {
perror("prctl");
return 1;
}

cap_t cap = cap_get_proc();
cap_value_t caparray[1];
caparray[0] = i;
cap_set_flag(cap, CAP_INHERITABLE, 1, caparray, CAP_CLEAR);
cap_set_proc(cap);
cap_free(cap);
return 0;
}

int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
if (argc<2)
return usage(argv[0]);
if (strcmp(argv[1], "get") == 0)
return getbcap();
if (strcmp(argv[1], "drop") != 0 || argc<3)
return usage(argv[0]);
if (capdrop(argv[2])) {
printf("unknown capability\n");
return 1;
}
return execl("/bin/bash", "/bin/bash", NULL);
}
*****

```

Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>

```
---
include/linux/capability.h |  8 +++++++-
include/linux/init_task.h | 12 ++++++++-----
include/linux/prctl.h    |  4 ++++
include/linux/sched.h    |  2 ++
include/linux/security.h |  5 ----
include/linux/sysctl.h   |  3 ---
kernel/fork.c            |  1 +
kernel/sys.c              |  9 +++++++-
kernel/sysctl.c           | 35 -----
kernel/sysctl_check.c    |  7 -----
security/commoncap.c     | 44 ++++++-----+
11 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 68 deletions(-)
```

```
diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h
index a1d93da..e8aa972 100644
--- a/include/linux/capability.h
+++ b/include/linux/capability.h
@@ -153,6 +153,7 @@ typedef struct kernel_cap_struct {
 * remove any capability in your permitted set from any pid
 * With VFS support for capabilities (neither of above, but)
 * Add any capability to the current process' inheritable set
+ * Allow taking bits out of capability bounding set
 */
#define CAP_SETPCAP      8
@@ -202,7 +203,6 @@ typedef struct kernel_cap_struct {
#define CAP_IPC_OWNER    15

/* Insert and remove kernel modules - modify kernel without limit */
-/* Modify cap_bset */
#define CAP_SYS_MODULE   16

/* Allow ioperm/iopl access */
@@ -314,6 +314,10 @@ typedef struct kernel_cap_struct {

#define CAP_SETFCAP      31

+ #define CAP_LAST_CAP    CAP_SETFCAP
+
+ #define cap_valid(x) ((x) >= 0 && (x) <= CAP_LAST_CAP)
+
/*
 * Bit location of each capability (used by user-space library and kernel)
 */
@@ -465,6 +469,8 @@ extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_init_eff_set;
int capable(int cap);
int __capable(struct task_struct *t, int cap);
```

```

+extern long cap_prctl_drop(unsigned long cap);
+
#endif /* __KERNEL__ */

#endif /* !_LINUX_CAPABILITY_H */
diff --git a/include/linux/init_task.h b/include/linux/init_task.h
index cae35b6..83975d9 100644
--- a/include/linux/init_task.h
+++ b/include/linux/init_task.h
@@ -114,6 +114,17 @@ extern struct group_info init_groups;
.pid = &init_struct_pid, \
}

+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
+/*
+ * Because of the reduced scope of CAP_SETPCAP when filesystem
+ * capabilities are in effect, it is safe to allow CAP_SETPCAP to
+ * be available in the default configuration.
+ */
+# define CAP_INIT_BSET CAP_FULL_SET
+#else
+# define CAP_INIT_BSET CAP_INIT_EFF_SET
#endif
+
/*
 * INIT_TASK is used to set up the first task table, touch at
 * your own risk!. Base=0, limit=0x1fffff (=2MB)
@@ -147,6 +158,7 @@ extern struct group_info init_groups;
.cap_effective = CAP_INIT_EFF_SET, \
.cap_inheritable = CAP_INIT_INH_SET, \
.cap_permitted = CAP_FULL_SET, \
+.cap_bset = CAP_INIT_BSET, \
.keep_capabilities = 0, \
.user = INIT_USER, \
.comm = "swapper", \
diff --git a/include/linux/prctl.h b/include/linux/prctl.h
index e2eff90..3800639 100644
--- a/include/linux/prctl.h
+++ b/include/linux/prctl.h
@@ -63,4 +63,8 @@
#define PR_GET_SECCOMP 21
#define PR_SET_SECCOMP 22

+/* Get/set the capability bounding set */
#define PR_CAPBSET_READ 23
#define PR_CAPBSET_DROP 24
+

```

```

#endif /* _LINUX_PRCTL_H */
diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h
index 1d17f7c..bf51a16 100644
--- a/include/linux/sched.h
+++ b/include/linux/sched.h
@@ -1041,7 +1041,7 @@ struct task_struct {
    uid_t uid,euid,suid,fsuid;
    gid_t gid,egid,sgid,fsgid;
    struct group_info *group_info;
- kernel_cap_t cap_effective, cap_inheritable, cap_permitted;
+ kernel_cap_t cap_effective, cap_inheritable, cap_permitted, cap_bset;
    unsigned keep_capabilities:1;
    struct user_struct *user;
#ifndef CONFIG_KEYS
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index f771ad8..04b18f1 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -34,11 +34,6 @@ @
 #include <linux/xfrm.h>
 #include <net/flow.h>

-/*
- * Bounding set
- */
-extern kernel_cap_t cap_bset;
-
 extern unsigned securebits;

 struct ctl_table;
diff --git a/include/linux/sysctl.h b/include/linux/sysctl.h
index 4f5047d..fa900cb 100644
--- a/include/linux/sysctl.h
+++ b/include/linux/sysctl.h
@@ -102,7 +102,6 @@ enum
 KERN_NODENAME=7,
 KERN_DOMAINNAME=8,

-KERN_CAP_BSET=14, /* int: capability bounding set */
 KERN_PANIC=15, /* int: panic timeout */
 KERN_REALROOTDEV=16, /* real root device to mount after initrd */

@@ -962,8 +961,6 @@ extern int proc_dosstring(struct ctl_table *, int, struct file *,
     void __user *, size_t *, loff_t *);
extern int proc_dointvec(struct ctl_table *, int, struct file *,
     void __user *, size_t *, loff_t *);
-extern int proc_dointvec_bset(struct ctl_table *, int, struct file *,
-     void __user *, size_t *, loff_t *);

```

```

extern int proc_dointvec_minmax(struct ctl_table *, int, struct file *,
    void __user *, size_t *, loff_t *);
extern int proc_dointvec_jiffies(struct ctl_table *, int, struct file *,
diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
index 5639b3e..9e4a5e1 100644
--- a/kernel/fork.c
+++ b/kernel/fork.c
@@ -1087,6 +1087,7 @@ static struct task_struct *copy_process(unsigned long clone_flags,
#endif CONFIG_SECURITY
p->security = NULL;
#endif
+ p->cap_bset = current->cap_bset;
p->io_context = NULL;
p->audit_context = NULL;
cgroup_fork(p);
diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c
index 4c77ed2..b528e75 100644
--- a/kernel/sys.c
+++ b/kernel/sys.c
@@ -1637,7 +1637,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_umask(int mask)
mask = xchg(&current->fs->umask, mask & S_IRWXUGO);
return mask;
}
-
+
asmlinkage long sys_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
    unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5)
{
@@ -1742,6 +1742,13 @@ asmlinkage long sys_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned
long arg3,
    error = prctl_set_seccomp(arg2);
    break;
}

+ case PR_CAPBSET_READ:
+ if (!cap_valid(arg2))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ return !!cap_raised(current->cap_bset, arg2);
+ case PR_CAPBSET_DROP:
+ return cap_prctl_drop(arg2);
+
default:
error = -EINVAL;
break;
diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c
index 489b0d1..d858819 100644
--- a/kernel/sysctl.c
+++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
@@ -383,15 +383,6 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = {

```

```

.proc_handler = &proc_dointvec_taint,
},
#endif
#ifndef CONFIG_SECURITY_CAPABILITIES
{
- .procname = "cap-bound",
- .data = &cap_bset,
- . maxlen = sizeof(kernel_cap_t),
- .mode = 0600,
- .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec_bset,
- },
#endif /* def CONFIG_SECURITY_CAPABILITIES */
#ifndef CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD
{
.ctl_name = KERN_REALROOTDEV,
@@ -1910,26 +1901,6 @@ static int do_proc_dointvec_bset_conv(int *negp, unsigned long
*lvalp,
return 0;
}

#ifndef CONFIG_SECURITY_CAPABILITIES
/*
- * init may raise the set.
*/
-
-int proc_dointvec_bset(struct ctl_table *table, int write, struct file *filp,
- void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
-{
- int op;
-
- if (write && !capable(CAP_SYS_MODULE)) {
- return -EPERM;
- }
-
- op = is_global_init(current) ? OP_SET : OP_AND;
- return do_proc_dointvec(table, write, filp, buffer, lenp, ppos,
- do_proc_dointvec_bset_conv, &op);
-}
#endif /* def CONFIG_SECURITY_CAPABILITIES */
-
/*
 * Taint values can only be increased
*/
@@ -2343,12 +2314,6 @@ int proc_dointvec(struct ctl_table *table, int write, struct file *filp,
return -ENOSYS;
}

-int proc_dointvec_bset(struct ctl_table *table, int write, struct file *filp,

```

```

- void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
-{
- return -ENOSYS;
-}

int proc_dointvec_minmax(struct ctl_table *table, int write, struct file *filp,
    void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
{
diff --git a/kernel/sysctl_check.c b/kernel/sysctl_check.c
index 8f5baac..526fa36 100644
--- a/kernel/sysctl_check.c
+++ b/kernel/sysctl_check.c
@@ -38,10 +38,6 @@ static struct trans_ctl_table trans_kern_table[] = {
 { KERN_NODENAME, "hostname" },
 { KERN_DOMAINNAME, "domainname" },

#ifndef CONFIG_SECURITY_CAPABILITIES
-{ KERN_CAP_BSET, "cap-bound" },
#endif /* def CONFIG_SECURITY_CAPABILITIES */

{ KERN_PANIC, "panic" },
{ KERN_REALROOTDEV, "real-root-dev" },

@@ -1522,9 +1518,6 @@ int sysctl_check_table(struct ctl_table *table)
    (table->strategy == sysctl_ms_jiffies) ||
    (table->proc_handler == proc_dosstring) ||
    (table->proc_handler == proc_dointvec) ||
#ifndef CONFIG_SECURITY_CAPABILITIES
-(table->proc_handler == proc_dointvec_bset) ||
#endif /* def CONFIG_SECURITY_CAPABILITIES */
    (table->proc_handler == proc_dointvec_minmax) ||
    (table->proc_handler == proc_dointvec_jiffies) ||
    (table->proc_handler == proc_dointvec_userhz_jiffies) ||
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 3a95990..b72825e 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -25,20 +25,6 @@
#include <linux/mount.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>

#ifndef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
/*
- * Because of the reduced scope of CAP_SETPCAP when filesystem
- * capabilities are in effect, it is safe to allow this capability to
- * be available in the default configuration.
- */
#define CAP_INIT_BSET CAP_FULL_SET

```

```

-#else /* ie. ndef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES */
-# define CAP_INIT_BSET CAP_INIT_EFF_SET
-#endif /* def CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES */

-
-kernel_cap_t cap_bset = CAP_INIT_BSET; /* systemwide capability bound */
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_bset);

-
/* Global security state */

unsigned securebits = SECUREBITS_DEFAULT; /* systemwide security settings */
@@ -133,6 +119,12 @@ int cap_capset_check (struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t
*effective,
/* incapable of using this inheritable set */
return -EPERM;
}
+ if (!cap_issubset(*inheritable,
+     cap_combine(target->cap_inheritable,
+         current->cap_bset))) {
+ /* no new pl capabilities outside bounding set */
+ return -EPERM;
+ }

/* verify restrictions on target's new Permitted set */
if (!cap_issubset (*permitted,
@@ -330,7 +322,8 @@ void cap_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
/* Derived from fs/exec.c:compute_creds. */
kernel_cap_t new_permitted, working;

- new_permitted = cap_intersect (bprm->cap_permitted, cap_bset);
+ new_permitted = cap_intersect (bprm->cap_permitted,
+     current->cap_bset);
working = cap_intersect (bprm->cap_inheritable,
    current->cap_inheritable);
new_permitted = cap_combine (new_permitted, working);
@@ -565,6 +558,23 @@ int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
    return -EPERM;
}

+/*
+ * called from kernel/sys.c for prctl(PR_CABSET_DROP)
+ * done without task_capability_lock() because it introduces
+ * no new races - i.e. only another task doing capget() on
+ * this task could get inconsistent info. There can be no
+ * racing writer bc a task can only change its own caps.
+ */
+long cap_prctl_drop(unsigned long cap)
+{

```

```

+ if (!capable(CAP_SETPCAP))
+ return -EPERM;
+ if (!cap_valid(cap))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ cap_lower(current->cap_bset, cap);
+ return 0;
+}
#else
int cap_task_setscheduler (struct task_struct *p, int policy,
    struct sched_param *lp)
@@ -584,6 +594,10 @@ int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
{
return 0;
}
+long cap_prctl_drop(unsigned long cap)
+{
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
#endif

void cap_task_reparent_to_init (struct task_struct *p)
--
```

1.5.1.1.GIT

Containers mailing list
 Containers@lists.linux-foundation.org
<https://lists.linux-foundation.org/mailman/listinfo/containers>

Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/1] capabilities: introduce per-process capability bounding set (v8)
 Posted by [serue](#) on Tue, 20 Nov 2007 20:23:40 GMT
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Quoting Serge E. Hallyn (serue@us.ibm.com):
 > How about the following?

Argh, with the following on top of it...

-serge

>From 470a68120cda83875a281354b897f3bda04b58fc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
 Date: Tue, 20 Nov 2007 15:12:54 -0500
 Subject: [PATCH 1/1] capbset: fix compilation when CONFIG_SECURITY=n

without this patch, kernel/sys.c has undefined reference
to cap_prctl_drop().

Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>

```
kernel/sys.c      |  4 +++
security/commoncap.c |  4 ---
2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
```

```
diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c
index b528e75..efc495e 100644
--- a/kernel/sys.c
+++ b/kernel/sys.c
@@ -1747,7 +1747,11 @@ asmlinkage long sys_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned
long arg3,
    return -EINVAL;
    return !!cap_raised(current->cap_bset, arg2);
    case PR_CAPBSET_DROP:
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
    return cap_prctl_drop(arg2);
+#else
+    return -EINVAL;
+#endif

    default:
        error = -EINVAL;
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index b72825e..e909f4f 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -594,10 +594,6 @@ int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
{
    return 0;
}
-long cap_prctl_drop(unsigned long cap)
-{
-    return -EINVAL;
-}
#endif

void cap_task_reparent_to_init (struct task_struct *p)
--
```

1.5.1.1.GIT

Containers mailing list
Containers@lists.linux-foundation.org
<https://lists.linux-foundation.org/mailman/listinfo/containers>

Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/1] capabilities: introduce per-process capability bounding set (v8)

Posted by [Andrew Morgan](#) on Thu, 22 Nov 2007 06:41:45 GMT

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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Hash: SHA1

Serge,

16d76d11d27f32487366a7cec6a52f6ec4fb1cbb
+ 470a68120cda83875a281354b897f3bda04b58fc

Could you also modify the old comment above

#define CAP_SETPCAP 8

"add any capability to the current process' inheritable set"

to read

"add any capability, from cap_bset, to the current process' inheritable set"

Otherwise, this all looks good.

Thanks

Andrew

Serge E. Hallyn wrote:

> Quoting Serge E. Hallyn (<serue@us.ibm.com>):

>> How about the following?

>

> Argh, with the following on top of it...

>

> -serge

>

>

>>From 470a68120cda83875a281354b897f3bda04b58fc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001

> From: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>

> Date: Tue, 20 Nov 2007 15:12:54 -0500

> Subject: [PATCH 1/1] capbset: fix compilation when CONFIG_SECURITY=n

>

> without this patch, kernel/sys.c has undefined reference

> to cap_prctl_drop().

>

> Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>

> ---

> kernel/sys.c | 4 ++++

```
> security/commoncap.c |  4 ----
> 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c
> index b528e75..efc495e 100644
> --- a/kernel/sys.c
> +++ b/kernel/sys.c
> @@ -1747,7 +1747,11 @@ asmlinkage long sys_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned
long arg3,
>     return -EINVAL;
>     return !!cap_raised(current->cap_bset, arg2);
>     case PR_CAPBSET_DROP:
>+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
>     return cap_prctl_drop(arg2);
>+#else
>+    return -EINVAL;
>+#endif
>
>     default:
>     error = -EINVAL;
> diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
> index b72825e..e909f4f 100644
> --- a/security/commoncap.c
> +++ b/security/commoncap.c
> @@ -594,10 +594,6 @@ int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
> {
>     return 0;
> }
> -long cap_prctl_drop(unsigned long cap)
> -{
>     return -EINVAL;
> }
> #endif
>
> void cap_task_reparent_to_init (struct task_struct *p)
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v1.2.6 (GNU/Linux)
```

iD8DBQFHRSSmQheEq9QabfIRAk8zAJ9u+RFKmZroCUIZzyHDX9XIP4v/EgCcCTJN
eGcNpqTMzOiLYwMGow3RAWQ=
=GSo6
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Containers mailing list
Containers@lists.linux-foundation.org
<https://lists.linux-foundation.org/mailman/listinfo/containers>

Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/1] capabilities: introduce per-process capability bounding set (v8)

Posted by Andrew Morgan on Thu, 22 Nov 2007 07:10:13 GMT

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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Hash: SHA1

Serge E. Hallyn wrote:

> I worry that what you have is just a *touch* too busy so whoever adds
> capability #32 might forget to update CAP_NUM_CAPS, but it looks like
>
> #define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_SETFCAP
>
> #define cap_valid(x) ((x) >= 0 && (x) <= CAP_LAST_CAP)
>
> should also be ok for libcap.

FWIW libcap computes the upper limit itself in the process of consuming all that sed'ed stuff. You do need it for the kernel, and this seems like a fine mechanism.

```
>>> +long cap_prctl_drop(unsigned long cap)
>>> +{
>>> + if (!capable(CAP_SETPCAP))
>>> + return -EPERM;
>>> + if (!cap_valid(cap))
>>> + return -EINVAL;
>>> + cap_lower(current->cap_bset, cap);
>> I think the following lines are overkill. Basically, the next exec()
>> will perform the pP/pE clipping, and cap_bset should only interact with
>> fP (and not fI).
>>
>> We already have a mechanism to manipulate pl, which in turn gates fl.
>> And this same mechanism (libcap) can clip pE, pP if it is needed pre-exec().
>>
>> So, if you want to drop a capability irrevocably, you drop it in bset,
>> and separately in pl. The current process may continue to have the
>> capability, but post-exec the working process tree has lost it. For
>> things like login, this is desirable.
>
> Ok...
>
> I think this makes sense. It seems pretty subtle and complicated, and
> therefore I'm a little worried that it will be fragile against future
> code changes. Someone will think it's a good idea to slightly change
> the capset() semantics and only a year later will we realize that the
> bounding set is no longer working...
```

We'll have to be diligent then :-) In truth, the whole model is not entirely unsubtle.

> So this will all have to be very well documented (and tested).
>
> (Actually I notice that capabilities(7) manpage isn't in the libcap
> sources. So an update to that is probably long overdue...)

I don't believe it ever was. So far as I can tell this file has had its own life as part of the 'manpages' package.

>> This also makes it possible for you to allow pl to have a capability
>> otherwise banned in cap_bset which is useful with limited role accounts.
>
> Yeah... so the way you'd see this happening, I assume, is that
>
> 1. login would keep some capset in pl for user hallyn,

The pam_cap module in the libcap2 tree already does the pl part of this via libcap (and I intend adding this prctl/cap_bset support in libcap and that module too).

> 2. so if /bin/foo had some nonempty fl, hallyn could run
> /bin/foo with cap_intersect(pl|fl)?

Yes. The inheritable set is precisely for supporting role-account things like this, but unlike the superuser concept (any app can be run with privilege), the application needs to be prepared to wield them - via its fl bits - before the capabilities are available.

> So now the bounding set would place a restriction on what /bin/login in > some container could leave in hallyn's pl.

To be clear, I'm saying that cap_bset will limit what a process can 'add' to the pre-existing pl set, and not what can be 'left in' there. That is, if pl contains something not present in cap_bset, it will survive unless some process drops it.

For completeness, without this new check:

>> You might want to replace the above three lines with a restriction
>> elsewhere on what CAP_SETPCAP can newly set in
>> commoncap.c:cap_capset_check().

it was possible to subvert the bounding set (in your container, but more generally in any process tree) as follows:

capbound drop cap_net_raw

```
noraw> cp /bin/ping evil-ping  
noraw> cc evil-shell.c -o evil-shell
```

<since you've not dropped cap_setfcap, the following will work>

```
noraw> sudo /sbin/setcap cap_setpcap=pe evil-shell  
noraw> sudo /sbin/setcap cap_net_raw=ie evil-ping  
noraw> ./evil-shell
```

<evil-shell uses CAP_SETPCAP to raise pl=CAP_NET_RAW>

```
evil> ./evil-ping another-hack-completed.evil.com
```

Cheers

Andrew

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----

Version: GnuPG v1.2.6 (GNU/Linux)

```
iD8DBQFHRStSQheEq9QabfIRAqo8AJ9wr+h0bTHgp7iT5fl2lYmuKKa75wCffMsT  
Q7y/JN4NulmodhYvm5mvGwY=  
=sTdY  
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
```

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