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Subject: [PATCH] namespaces: introduce sys\_hijack (v7)

Posted by [serue](#) on Wed, 24 Oct 2007 22:21:25 GMT

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This is just a first stab at doing hijack by cgroup files. I force using the 'tasks' file just so that I can (a) predict and check the name of the file, (b) make sure it's a cgroup file, and then (c) trust that taking `__d_cont(dentry parent)` gives me a legitimate container.

Seems to work at least.

Paul, does this look reasonable? `task_from_cgroup_fd()` in particular.

thanks,  
-serge

>From 8ba6a4ae33da18b95d967a799c5edce4266d1f1f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001

From: sergeh@us.ibm.com <sergeh@us.ibm.com>

Date: Tue, 16 Oct 2007 09:36:49 -0700

Subject: [PATCH] namespaces: introduce sys\_hijack (v7)

Move most of `do_fork()` into a new `do_fork_task()` which acts on a new argument, `task`, rather than on `current`. `do_fork()` becomes a call to `do_fork_task(current, ...)`.

Introduce `sys_hijack` (for x86 only so far). It is like `clone`, but in place of a stack pointer (which is assumed null) it accepts a `pid`. The process identified by that `pid` is the one which is actually cloned. Some state - include the file table, the signals and `sighand` (and hence `tty`), and the `->parent` are taken from the calling process.

A process to be hijacked may be identified by process id. Alternatively, an open fd for a cgroup 'tasks' file may be specified. The first available task in that cgroup will then be hijacked.

In order to hijack a process, the calling process must be allowed to `ptrace` the target.

The effect is a sort of namespace enter. The following program uses `sys_hijack` to 'enter' all namespaces of the specified task. For instance in one terminal, do

```
mount -t cgroup -ons /cgroup
hostname
qemu
```

```
ns_exec -u /bin/sh
hostname serge
echo $$
1073
cat /proc/$$/cgroup
ns:/node_1073
```

In another terminal then do

```
hostname
qemu
cat /proc/$$/cgroup
ns:/
hijack pid 1073
hostname
serge
cat /proc/$$/cgroup
ns:/node_1073
hijack cgroup /cgroup/node_1073/tasks
```

Changelog:

Aug 23: send a stop signal to the hijacked process  
(like ptrace does).  
Oct 09: Update for 2.6.23-rc8-mm2 (mainly pidns)  
Don't take task\_lock under rcu\_read\_lock  
Send hijacked process to cgroup\_fork() as  
the first argument.  
Removed some unneeded task\_locks.  
Oct 16: Fix bug introduced into alloc\_pid.  
Oct 16: Add 'int which' argument to sys\_hijack to  
allow later expansion to use cgroup in place  
of pid to specify what to hijack.  
Oct 24: Implement hijack by open cgroup file.

```
=====
hijack.c
=====
#define _BSD_SOURCE
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <sched.h>

void usage(char *me)
{
```

```

printf("Usage: %s pid <pid> | %s cgroup <cgroup_tasks_file>\n", me, me);
}

int exec_shell(void)
{
    execl("/bin/sh", "/bin/sh", NULL);
}

int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
    int id;
    int ret;
    int status;
    int use_pid = 0;

    if (argc < 3 || !strcmp(argv[1], "-h")) {
        usage(argv[0]);
        return 1;
    }
    if (strcmp(argv[1], "pid") == 0)
        use_pid = 1;

    if (use_pid)
        id = atoi(argv[2]);
    else {
        id = open(argv[2], O_RDONLY);
        if (id == -1) {
            perror("cgroup open");
            return 1;
        }
    }

    ret = syscall(327, SIGCHLD, use_pid ? 1 : 2, (unsigned long)id);

    if (use_pid)
        close(id);
    if (ret == 0) {
        return exec_shell();
    } else if (ret < 0) {
        perror("sys_hijack");
    } else {
        printf("waiting on cloned process %d\n", ret);
        // ret = waitpid(ret, &status, __WALL);
        while(waitpid(-1, &status, __WALL) != -1)
            ;
        printf("cloned process exited with %d (waitpid ret %d)\n",
            status, ret);
    }
}

```

```
return ret;
}
```

Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>

---

```
arch/i386/kernel/process.c      | 87 ++++++
arch/i386/kernel/syscall_table.S |  1 +
arch/s390/kernel/process.c      | 12 +++++
include/asm-i386/unistd.h       |  3 +-
include/linux/cgroup.h          | 10 +++++
include/linux/ptrace.h          |  1 +
include/linux/sched.h           |  8 +++++
include/linux/syscalls.h        |  1 +
kernel/cgroup.c                 | 69 ++++++
kernel/fork.c                   | 67 ++++++
kernel/ptrace.c                 |  7 +++
11 files changed, 237 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
```

```
diff --git a/arch/i386/kernel/process.c b/arch/i386/kernel/process.c
```

```
index eab6c62..4b631b9 100644
```

```
--- a/arch/i386/kernel/process.c
```

```
+++ b/arch/i386/kernel/process.c
```

```
@ @ -39,6 +39,7 @ @
```

```
#include <linux/personality.h>
```

```
#include <linux/tick.h>
```

```
#include <linux/percpu.h>
```

```
+#include <linux/cgroup.h>
```

```
#include <asm/uaccess.h>
```

```
#include <asm/pgtable.h>
```

```
@ @ -455,8 +456,15 @ @ int copy_thread(int nr, unsigned long clone_flags, unsigned long esp,
    unsigned long unused,
    struct task_struct * p, struct pt_regs * regs)
```

```
{
```

```
+ return copy_a_thread(current, nr, clone_flags, esp, unused,
+ p, regs);
```

```
+}
```

```
+
```

```
+int copy_a_thread(struct task_struct *tsk, int nr, unsigned long clone_flags,
+ unsigned long esp, unsigned long unused,
+ struct task_struct * p, struct pt_regs * regs)
```

```
+{
```

```
    struct pt_regs * childregs;
```

```
- struct task_struct *tsk;
```

```
    int err;
```

```

    childregs = task_pt_regs(p);
@@ -471,7 +479,6 @@ int copy_thread(int nr, unsigned long clone_flags, unsigned long esp,

    savesegment(gs,p->thread.gs);

- tsk = current;
  if (unlikely(test_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_IO_BITMAP))) {
    p->thread.io_bitmap_ptr = kmemdup(tsk->thread.io_bitmap_ptr,
      IO_BITMAP_BYTES, GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -784,6 +791,82 @@ asmlinkage int sys_clone(struct pt_regs regs)
  }

  /*
+ * Called with task count bumped, drops task count before returning
+ */
+static int hijack_task(struct task_struct *task, struct pt_regs regs)
+{
+ unsigned long clone_flags = regs.ebx;
+ int ret = -EINVAL;
+
+ task_lock(task);
+ put_task_struct(task);
+ if (!ptrace_may_attach_locked(task)) {
+ ret = -EPERM;
+ goto out_put_task;
+ }
+ if (task->ptrace) {
+ ret = -EBUSY;
+ goto out_put_task;
+ }
+ force_sig_specific(SIGSTOP, task);
+
+ task_unlock(task);
+ ret = do_fork_task(task, clone_flags, regs.esp, &regs, 0,
+ NULL, NULL);
+ wake_up_process(task);
+ return ret;
+
+out_put_task:
+ task_unlock(task);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int hijack_pid(struct pt_regs regs)
+{
+ pid_t pid = regs.edx;
+ struct task_struct *task;
+

```

```

+ rcu_read_lock();
+ task = find_task_by_vpid(pid);
+ if (task)
+ get_task_struct(task);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ if (!task)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ return hijack_task(task, regs);
+}
+
+static int hijack_cgroup(struct pt_regs regs)
+{
+ unsigned int fd;
+ struct task_struct *task;
+
+ fd = (unsigned int) regs.edx;
+ task = task_from_cgroup_fd(fd);
+ if (IS_ERR(task))
+ return PTR_ERR(task);
+
+ return hijack_task(task, regs);
+}
+
+asmlinkage int sys_hijack(struct pt_regs regs)
+{
+ int which = regs.ecx;
+
+ switch (which) {
+ case HIJACK_PID:
+ return hijack_pid(regs);
+ case HIJACK_CGROUP:
+ return hijack_cgroup(regs);
+ default:
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+}
+
+/*
+ * This is trivial, and on the face of it looks like it
+ * could equally well be done in user mode.
+ */

```

```

diff --git a/arch/i386/kernel/syscall_table.S b/arch/i386/kernel/syscall_table.S
index df6e41e..495930c 100644
--- a/arch/i386/kernel/syscall_table.S
+++ b/arch/i386/kernel/syscall_table.S

```

```

@@ -326,3 +326,4 @@ ENTRY(sys_call_table)
    .long sys_fallocate
    .long sys_revokeat /* 325 */
    .long sys_frevoke
+ .long sys_hijack
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/process.c b/arch/s390/kernel/process.c
index 70c5737..f256e7a 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/process.c
@@ -223,6 +223,14 @@ int copy_thread(int nr, unsigned long clone_flags, unsigned long
new_stackp,
    unsigned long unused,
    struct task_struct * p, struct pt_regs * regs)
{
+ return copy_a_thread(current, nr, clone_flags, new_stackp, unused,
+   p, regs);
+}
+
+int copy_a_thread(struct task_struct *task, int nr, unsigned long clone_flags,
+ unsigned long new_stackp, unsigned long unused,
+   struct task_struct * p, struct pt_regs * regs)
+{
    struct fake_frame
    {
        struct stack_frame sf;
@@ -251,8 +251,8 @@ int copy_thread(int nr, unsigned long clone_flags, unsigned long
new_stackp,
    * save fprs to current->thread.fp_regs to merge them with
    * the emulated registers and then copy the result to the child.
    */
- save_fp_regs(&current->thread.fp_regs);
- memcpy(&p->thread.fp_regs, &current->thread.fp_regs,
+ save_fp_regs(&task->thread.fp_regs);
+ memcpy(&p->thread.fp_regs, &task->thread.fp_regs,
    sizeof(s390_fp_regs));
    p->thread.user_seg = __pa((unsigned long) p->mm->pgd) | _SEGMENT_TABLE;
    /* Set a new TLS ? */
diff --git a/include/asm-i386/unistd.h b/include/asm-i386/unistd.h
index 006c1b3..fe6eeb4 100644
--- a/include/asm-i386/unistd.h
+++ b/include/asm-i386/unistd.h
@@ -332,10 +332,11 @@
#define __NR_fallocate 324
#define __NR_revokeat 325
#define __NR_frevoke 326
+#define __NR_hijack 327

#ifdef __KERNEL__

```

```

-#define NR_syscalls 327
+#define NR_syscalls 328

#define __ARCH_WANT_IPC_PARSE_VERSION
#define __ARCH_WANT_OLD_READDIR
diff --git a/include/linux/cgroup.h b/include/linux/cgroup.h
index 8747932..3edb820 100644
--- a/include/linux/cgroup.h
+++ b/include/linux/cgroup.h
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ extern int cgroup_init(void);
extern void cgroup_init_smp(void);
extern void cgroup_lock(void);
extern void cgroup_unlock(void);
-extern void cgroup_fork(struct task_struct *p);
+extern void cgroup_fork(struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *p);
extern void cgroup_fork_callbacks(struct task_struct *p);
extern void cgroup_post_fork(struct task_struct *p);
extern void cgroup_exit(struct task_struct *p, int run_callbacks);
@@ -304,12 +304,14 @@ struct task_struct *cgroup_iter_next(struct cgroup *cont,
    struct cgroup_iter *it);
void cgroup_iter_end(struct cgroup *cont, struct cgroup_iter *it);

+struct task_struct *task_from_cgroup_fd(unsigned int fd);
#else /* !CONFIG_CGROUPS */

static inline int cgroup_init_early(void) { return 0; }
static inline int cgroup_init(void) { return 0; }
static inline void cgroup_init_smp(void) {}
-static inline void cgroup_fork(struct task_struct *p) {}
+static inline void cgroup_fork(struct task_struct *parent,
+    struct task_struct *p) {}
static inline void cgroup_fork_callbacks(struct task_struct *p) {}
static inline void cgroup_post_fork(struct task_struct *p) {}
static inline void cgroup_exit(struct task_struct *p, int callbacks) {}
@@ -322,6 +324,10 @@ static inline int cgroupstats_build(struct cgroupstats *stats,
    return -EINVAL;
}

+static inline struct task_struct *task_from_cgroup_fd(unsigned int fd)
+{
+    return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+}
#endif /* !CONFIG_CGROUPS */

#endif /* _LINUX_CGROUP_H */
diff --git a/include/linux/ptrace.h b/include/linux/ptrace.h
index ae8146a..727a4a9 100644

```



```

--- a/include/linux/ptrace.h
+++ b/include/linux/ptrace.h
@@ -97,6 +97,7 @@ extern void __ptrace_link(struct task_struct *child,
extern void __ptrace_unlink(struct task_struct *child);
extern void ptrace_untrace(struct task_struct *child);
extern int ptrace_may_attach(struct task_struct *task);
+extern int ptrace_may_attach_locked(struct task_struct *task);

static inline void ptrace_link(struct task_struct *child,
                               struct task_struct *new_parent)
diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h
index 3436b98..6478cbb 100644
--- a/include/linux/sched.h
+++ b/include/linux/sched.h
@@ -29,6 +29,12 @@
#define CLONE_NEWNET 0x40000000 /* New network namespace */

/*
+ * Hijack flags
+ */
+#define HIJACK_PID 1 /* 'id' is a pid */
+#define HIJACK_CGROUP 2 /* 'id' is an open fd for a cgroup dir */
+
+/*
 * Scheduling policies
 */
#define SCHED_NORMAL 0
@@ -1643,6 +1649,7 @@ extern struct mm_struct *get_task_mm(struct task_struct *task);
extern void mm_release(struct task_struct *, struct mm_struct *);

extern int copy_thread(int, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, struct task_struct *,
struct pt_regs *);
+extern int copy_a_thread(struct task_struct *, int, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long,
struct task_struct *, struct pt_regs *);
extern void flush_thread(void);
extern void exit_thread(void);

@@ -1658,6 +1665,7 @@ extern int allow_signal(int);
extern int disallow_signal(int);

extern int do_execve(char *, char __user * __user *, char __user * __user *, struct pt_regs *);
+extern long do_fork_task(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long, unsigned long, struct pt_regs *,
unsigned long, int __user *, int __user *);
extern long do_fork(unsigned long, unsigned long, struct pt_regs *, unsigned long, int __user *,
int __user *);
struct task_struct *fork_idle(int);

diff --git a/include/linux/syscalls.h b/include/linux/syscalls.h

```

index f696874..31f0c79 100644

--- a/include/linux/syscalls.h

+++ b/include/linux/syscalls.h

@@ -616,5 +616,6 @@ int kernel\_execve(const char \*filename, char \*const argv[], char \*const envp[]);

asmlinkage long sys\_revocate(int dfd, const char \_\_user \*filename);

asmlinkage long sys\_frevocate(unsigned int fd);

+asmlinkage long sys\_hijack(unsigned long flags, int which, unsigned long id);

#endif

diff --git a/kernel/cgroup.c b/kernel/cgroup.c

index 8720881..2d1d67e 100644

--- a/kernel/cgroup.c

+++ b/kernel/cgroup.c

@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@

#include <linux/sort.h>

#include <linux/delayacct.h>

#include <linux/cgroupstats.h>

+#include <linux/file.h>

#include <asm/atomic.h>

@@ -2460,12 +2461,12 @@ static struct file\_operations proc\_cgroupstats\_operations = {

\* At the point that cgroup\_fork() is called, 'current' is the parent

\* task, and the passed argument 'child' points to the child task.

\*/

-void cgroup\_fork(struct task\_struct \*child)

+void cgroup\_fork(struct task\_struct \*parent, struct task\_struct \*child)

{

- task\_lock(current);

- child->cgroups = current->cgroups;

+ task\_lock(parent);

+ child->cgroups = parent->cgroups;

get\_css\_set(child->cgroups);

- task\_unlock(current);

+ task\_unlock(parent);

INIT\_LIST\_HEAD(&child->cg\_list);

}

@@ -2819,3 +2820,63 @@ static void cgroup\_release\_agent(struct work\_struct \*work)

spin\_unlock(&release\_list\_lock);

mutex\_unlock(&cgroup\_mutex);

}

+

+static inline int task\_available(struct task\_struct \*task)

+{

+ switch(task->state) {

```

+ case TASK_RUNNING:
+ case TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE:
+ return 1;
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Takes an integer which is a open fd in current for a valid
+ * cgroupfs file. Returns a task in that cgroup, with its
+ * refcount bumped.
+ */
+struct task_struct *task_from_cgroup_fd(unsigned int fd)
+{
+ struct file *file;
+ struct cgroup *cgroup;
+ struct cgroup_iter it;
+ struct task_struct *task = NULL;
+
+ file = fget(fd);
+ if (!file)
+ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
+ if (!file->f_dentry || !file->f_dentry->d_sb)
+ goto out_fput;
+ if (file->f_dentry->d_parent->d_sb->s_magic != CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC)
+ goto out_fput;
+ if (strcmp(file->f_dentry->d_name.name, "tasks"))
+ goto out_fput;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ cgroup = __d_cont(file->f_dentry->d_parent);
+ printk(KERN_NOTICE "cgroup is %lu\n", (unsigned long)cgroup);
+ if (!cgroup)
+ goto out_unlock;
+ cgroup_iter_start(cgroup, &it);
+ do {
+ task = cgroup_iter_next(cgroup, &it);
+ if (task)
+ printk(KERN_NOTICE "task %d state %d\n",
+ task->pid, task->state);
+ } while (task && !task_available(task));
+ cgroup_iter_end(cgroup, &it);
+ printk(KERN_NOTICE "task is %lu\n", (unsigned long)task);
+ if (task)
+ get_task_struct(task);
+
+

```

```

+out_unlock:
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+out_fput:
+ fput(file);
+ if (!task)
+ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+ return task;
+}
diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
index 64860ef..20b4902 100644
--- a/kernel/fork.c
+++ b/kernel/fork.c
@@ -621,13 +621,14 @@ struct fs_struct *copy_fs_struct(struct fs_struct *old)

EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(copy_fs_struct);

-static int copy_fs(unsigned long clone_flags, struct task_struct *tsk)
+static inline int copy_fs(unsigned long clone_flags,
+ struct task_struct * src, struct task_struct * tsk)
{
    if (clone_flags & CLONE_FS) {
- atomic_inc(&current->fs->count);
+ atomic_inc(&src->fs->count);
        return 0;
    }
- tsk->fs = __copy_fs_struct(current->fs);
+ tsk->fs = __copy_fs_struct(src->fs);
    if (!tsk->fs)
        return -ENOMEM;
    return 0;
@@ -973,7 +974,8 @@ static void rt_mutex_init_task(struct task_struct *p)
    * parts of the process environment (as per the clone
    * flags). The actual kick-off is left to the caller.
    */
-static struct task_struct *copy_process(unsigned long clone_flags,
+static struct task_struct *copy_process(struct task_struct *task,
+ unsigned long clone_flags,
+ unsigned long stack_start,
+ struct pt_regs *regs,
+ unsigned long stack_size,
@@ -1007,15 +1009,17 @@ static struct task_struct *copy_process(unsigned long clone_flags,
    goto fork_out;

    retval = -ENOMEM;
- p = dup_task_struct(current);
+ p = dup_task_struct(task);
    if (!p)
        goto fork_out;

```

```

rt_mutex_init_task(p);

#ifdef CONFIG_TRACE_IRQFLAGS
- DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(!p->hardirqs_enabled);
- DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(!p->softirqs_enabled);
+ if (task == current) {
+ DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(!p->hardirqs_enabled);
+ DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(!p->softirqs_enabled);
+ }
#endif
retval = -EAGAIN;
if (atomic_read(&p->user->processes) >=
@@ -1084,7 +1088,7 @@ static struct task_struct *copy_process(unsigned long clone_flags,
#endif
p->io_context = NULL;
p->audit_context = NULL;
- cgroup_fork(p);
+ cgroup_fork(task, p);
#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
p->mempolicy = mpol_copy(p->mempolicy);
if (IS_ERR(p->mempolicy)) {
@@ -1132,7 +1136,7 @@ static struct task_struct *copy_process(unsigned long clone_flags,
goto bad_fork_cleanup_audit;
if ((retval = copy_files(clone_flags, p)))
goto bad_fork_cleanup_semundo;
- if ((retval = copy_fs(clone_flags, p)))
+ if ((retval = copy_fs(clone_flags, task, p)))
goto bad_fork_cleanup_files;
if ((retval = copy_sighand(clone_flags, p)))
goto bad_fork_cleanup_fs;
@@ -1144,7 +1148,7 @@ static struct task_struct *copy_process(unsigned long clone_flags,
goto bad_fork_cleanup_mm;
if ((retval = copy_namespaces(clone_flags, p)))
goto bad_fork_cleanup_keys;
- retval = copy_thread(0, clone_flags, stack_start, stack_size, p, regs);
+ retval = copy_a_thread(task, 0, clone_flags, stack_start, stack_size, p, regs);
if (retval)
goto bad_fork_cleanup_namespaces;

@@ -1164,7 +1168,7 @@ static struct task_struct *copy_process(unsigned long clone_flags,
p->pid = pid_nr(pid);
p->tgid = p->pid;
if (clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD)
- p->tgid = current->tgid;
+ p->tgid = task->tgid;

p->set_child_tid = (clone_flags & CLONE_CHILD_SETTID) ? child_tidptr : NULL;

```

```

/*
@@ -1379,7 +1383,7 @@ struct task_struct * __cpuinit fork_idle(int cpu)
    struct task_struct *task;
    struct pt_regs regs;

- task = copy_process(CLONE_VM, 0, idle_regs(&regs), 0, NULL,
+ task = copy_process(current, CLONE_VM, 0, idle_regs(&regs), 0, NULL,
    &init_struct_pid);
    if (!IS_ERR(task))
        init_idle(task, cpu);
@@ -1404,12 +1408,12 @@ static int fork_traceflag(unsigned clone_flags)
}

/*
- * Ok, this is the main fork-routine.
- *
- * It copies the process, and if successful kick-starts
- * it and waits for it to finish using the VM if required.
+ * if called with task!=current, then caller must ensure that
+ * 1. it has a reference to task
+ * 2. current must have ptrace permission to task
*/
-long do_fork(unsigned long clone_flags,
+long do_fork_task(struct task_struct *task,
+ unsigned long clone_flags,
    unsigned long stack_start,
    struct pt_regs *regs,
    unsigned long stack_size,
@@ -1420,13 +1424,23 @@ long do_fork(unsigned long clone_flags,
    int trace = 0;
    long nr;

+ if (task != current) {
+     /* sanity checks */
+     /* we only want to allow hijacking the simplest cases */
+     if (clone_flags & CLONE_SYSVSEM)
+         return -EINVAL;
+     if (current->ptrace)
+         return -EPERM;
+     if (task->ptrace)
+         return -EINVAL;
+ }
    if (unlikely(current->ptrace)) {
        trace = fork_traceflag(clone_flags);
        if (trace)
            clone_flags |= CLONE_PTRACE;
    }

```

```

- p = copy_process(clone_flags, stack_start, regs, stack_size,
+ p = copy_process(task, clone_flags, stack_start, regs, stack_size,
    child_tidptr, NULL);
/*
 * Do this prior waking up the new thread - the thread pointer
@@ -1481,6 +1495,23 @@ long do_fork(unsigned long clone_flags,
    return nr;
}

+/*
+ * Ok, this is the main fork-routine.
+ *
+ * It copies the process, and if successful kick-starts
+ * it and waits for it to finish using the VM if required.
+ */
+long do_fork(unsigned long clone_flags,
+    unsigned long stack_start,
+    struct pt_regs *regs,
+    unsigned long stack_size,
+    int __user *parent_tidptr,
+    int __user *child_tidptr)
+{
+    return do_fork_task(current, clone_flags, stack_start,
+    regs, stack_size, parent_tidptr, child_tidptr);
+}
+
+
+#ifndef ARCH_MIN_MMSTRUCT_ALIGN
+#define ARCH_MIN_MMSTRUCT_ALIGN 0
+#endif
diff --git a/kernel ptrace.c b/kernel ptrace.c
index 7c76f2f..c65c9fe 100644
--- a/kernel ptrace.c
+++ b/kernel ptrace.c
@@ -159,6 +159,13 @@ int ptrace_may_attach(struct task_struct *task)
    return !err;
}

+int ptrace_may_attach_locked(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+    int err;
+    err = may_attach(task);
+    return !err;
+}
+
+int ptrace_attach(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+    int retval;
+
+

```

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Subject: Re: [PATCH] namespaces: introduce sys\_hijack (v7)  
Posted by [ebiederm](#) on Sat, 27 Oct 2007 02:29:08 GMT  
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"Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> writes:

> This is just a first stab at doing hijack by cgroup files. I force  
> using the 'tasks' file just so that I can (a) predict and check  
> the name of the file, (b) make sure it's a cgroup file, and then  
> (c) trust that taking \_\_d\_cont(dentry parent) gives me a legitimate  
> container.  
>  
> Seems to work at least.

Grr. I really want to look at this, as it seems a pretty sane  
idea from my side. Once we get do\_fork\_task we also have a very nice  
way to speed of kthread\_create.

Anyway off to being burried in trying to stabalize what we have merged  
for 2.6.24. There is a lot there that can use some polish.

Eric

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Subject: Re: [PATCH] namespaces: introduce sys\_hijack (v7)  
Posted by [serue](#) on Wed, 31 Oct 2007 23:13:59 GMT  
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Quoting Serge E. Hallyn (serue@us.ibm.com):

> This is just a first stab at doing hijack by cgroup files. I force  
> using the 'tasks' file just so that I can (a) predict and check  
> the name of the file, (b) make sure it's a cgroup file, and then  
> (c) trust that taking \_\_d\_cont(dentry parent) gives me a legitimate  
> container.  
>



> Seems to work at least.  
>  
> Paul, does this look reasonable? task\_from\_cgroup\_fd() in particular.

The patch I sent does 'hijack a cgroup' by taking a task in the cgroup and hijacking it.

Paul would like to be able to 'enter a cgroup', even if it is empty. Hijack takes more than just the nsproxy from the hijacked task, so this would result in different behavior between hijacking a populated cgroup and an empty cgroup. So we might want to introduce a third type of hijacking, so we have HIJACK\_PID, HIJACK\_CGROUP, and HIJACK\_EMPTY\_CGROUP.

It also then acts like the nsproxy cgroup patchset I sent out months ago for simply entering namespaces. In fact this would need to be restricted to ns cgroups, and ns cgroups would need to grab a reference to the nsproxy.

So do we want to allow hijacking/entering an empty cgroup?

-serge

---

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Subject: Re: [PATCH] namespaces: introduce sys\_hijack (v7)  
Posted by [Paul Menage](#) on Fri, 02 Nov 2007 05:52:20 GMT  
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On Oct 31, 2007 4:13 PM, Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> wrote:

>  
> Paul would like to be able to 'enter a cgroup', even if it is empty.  
> Hijack takes more than just the nsproxy from the hijacked task, so  
> this would result in different behavior between hijacking a populated  
> cgroup and an empty cgroup. So we might want to introduce a third  
> type of hijacking, so we have HIJACK\_PID, HIJACK\_CGROUP, and  
> HIJACK\_EMPTY\_CGROUP.

Do we need all three distinctions? If there was a process in the cgroup, you could just use HIJACK\_PID to hijack it. So HIJACK\_CGROUP could just do what you're currently calling HIJACK\_EMPTY\_CGROUP.

>  
> It also then acts like the nsproxy cgroup patchset I sent out months

> ago for simply entering namespaces. In fact this would need to be  
> restricted to ns cgroups, and ns cgroups would need to grab a reference  
> to the nsproxy.

Doesn't the nsproxy cgroup already grab an nsproxy reference?

>  
> So do we want to allow hijacking/entering an empty cgroup?

In general, entering an empty cgroup is a perfectly fine thing to do -  
it's only the ns\_proxy case where this is complicated, since some  
namespaces aren't safe against third-party changes to the task's  
ns\_proxy.

There really should be some way to enter such a set of namespaces, and  
doing it at fork time pretty much has to be safe since that's when  
nsproxy changes normally occur. Being able to do it at other times  
(maybe only operating on current?) would be nice too.

Paul

---

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Subject: Re: [PATCH] namespaces: introduce sys\_hijack (v7)  
Posted by [serue](#) on Fri, 02 Nov 2007 13:43:50 GMT  
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Quoting Paul Menage (menage@google.com):

> On Oct 31, 2007 4:13 PM, Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> wrote:

> >

> > Paul would like to be able to 'enter a cgroup', even if it is empty.

> > Hijack takes more than just the nsproxy from the hijacked task, so

> > this would result in different behavior between hijacking a populated

> > cgroup and an empty cgroup. So we might want to introduce a third

> > type of hijacking, so we have HIJACK\_PID, HIJACK\_CGROUP, and

> > HIJACK\_EMPTY\_CGROUP.

>

> Do we need all three distinctions? If there was a process in the

> cgroup, you could just use HIJACK\_PID to hijack it. So HIJACK\_CGROUP

No, then you might worry about pid wraparound. Sure it may seem silly  
in most use cases, but if you're requesting the attach through some web  
interface, it could happen.

> could just do what you're currently calling HIJACK\_EMPTY\_CGROUP.

>  
> >  
> > It also then acts like the nsproxy cgroup patchset I sent out months  
> > ago for simply entering namespaces. In fact this would need to be  
> > restricted to ns cgroups, and ns cgroups would need to grab a reference  
> > to the nsproxy.  
>  
> Doesn't the nsproxy cgroup already grab an nsproxy reference?

No. That was done in my patches implementing namespace enter.  
But that can easily be added.

> > So do we want to allow hijacking/entering an empty cgroup?  
>  
> In general, entering an empty cgroup is a perfectly fine thing to do -  
> it's only the ns\_proxy case where this is complicated, since some  
> namespaces aren't safe against third-party changes to the task's  
> ns\_proxy.  
>  
> There really should be some way to enter such a set of namespaces, and  
> doing it at fork time pretty much has to be safe since that's when  
> nsproxy changes normally occur.

Well the main difference is that on fork, most namespaces give you a  
copy of the original namespace, so open resources remain valid. Whereas  
with hijack/enter, you get a "random" populated namespace.

Still I don't think it should be a problem since the resources generally  
retain references to the namespaces in which they are valid.

> Being able to do it at other times  
> (maybe only operating on current?) would be nice too.  
>  
> Paul

-serge

---

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Subject: Re: [PATCH] namespaces: introduce sys\_hijack (v7)  
Posted by [Paul Menage](#) on Sat, 03 Nov 2007 01:16:14 GMT  
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On Nov 2, 2007 6:43 AM, Serge E. Hallyn <[serue@us.ibm.com](mailto:serue@us.ibm.com)> wrote:  
>

> No, then you might worry about pid wraparound. Sure it may seem silly  
> in most use cases, but if you're requesting the attach through some web  
> interface, it could happen.

OK, fair enough. I'd probably name the actions something like  
HIJACK\_CGROUP\_MEMBER and HIJACK\_CGROUP\_NS then.

Paul

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