
Subject: [PATCH] namespaces: introduce sys_hijack (v4)

Posted by [serue](#) on Tue, 09 Oct 2007 20:09:28 GMT

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>From 945fe66259cd0cfdc2fe846287b7821e329a558c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001

From: sergeh@us.ibm.com <hallyn@kernel.(none)>

Date: Tue, 9 Oct 2007 08:30:30 -0700

Subject: [PATCH] namespaces: introduce sys_hijack (v4)

Move most of do_fork() into a new do_fork_task() which acts on a new argument, task, rather than on current. do_fork() becomes a call to do_fork_task(current, ...).

Introduce sys_hijack (for x86 only so far). It is like clone, but in place of a stack pointer (which is assumed null) it accepts a pid. The process identified by that pid is the one which is actually cloned. Some state - include the file table, the signals and sighand (and hence tty), and the ->parent are taken from the calling process.

The effect is a sort of namespace enter. The following program uses sys_hijack to 'enter' all namespaces of the specified pid. For instance in one terminal, do

```
mount -t cgroup -ons /cgroup
hostname
qemu
ns_exec -u /bin/sh
hostname serge
echo $$
1073
cat /proc/$$/cgroup
ns:/node_1073
```

In another terminal then do

```
hostname
qemu
cat /proc/$$/cgroup
ns:/
hijack 1073
hostname
serge
cat /proc/$$/cgroup
ns:/node_1073
```

sys_hijack is arch-dependent and is only implemented for i386 so far.

Changelog:

Aug 23: send a stop signal to the hijacked process (like ptrace does).

Oct 09: Update for 2.6.23-rc8-mm2 (mainly pidns)

Don't take task_lock under rcu_read_lock

Send hijacked process to cgroup_fork() as the first argument.

Removed some unneeded task_locks.

```
=====
hijack.c
=====
```

```
int do_clone_task(void)
{
    execl("/bin/sh", "/bin/sh", NULL);
}

int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
    int pid;
    int ret;
    int status;

    if (argc < 2)
        return 1;
    pid = atoi(argv[1]);

    ret = syscall(327, SIGCHLD, pid, NULL, NULL);

    if (ret == 0) {
        return do_clone_task();
    } else if (ret < 0) {
        perror("sys_hijack");
    } else {
        printf("waiting on cloned process %d\n", ret);
        while (waitpid(ret, &status, __WCLONE) != ret);
        printf("cloned process %d exited with %d\n", ret, status);
    }

    return ret;
}
```

```
=====
```

Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>

```
arch/i386/kernel/process.c | 58 ++++++
arch/i386/kernel/syscall_table.S | 1 +
```

```

arch/s390/kernel/process.c    | 12 +++++-
include/asm-i386/unistd.h     | 3 +-
include/linux/cgroup.h       | 5 +-
include/linux/pid.h          | 2 +-
include/linux/ptrace.h       | 1 +
include/linux/sched.h        | 2 +
include/linux/syscalls.h     | 1 +
kernel/cgroup.c              | 8 +++-
kernel/fork.c                 | 69 ++++++-----
kernel/pid.c                  | 5 +-
kernel/ptrace.c               | 7 +++++
13 files changed, 141 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)

```

```
diff --git a/arch/i386/kernel/process.c b/arch/i386/kernel/process.c
```

```
index bfc01e..01f4d16 100644
```

```
--- a/arch/i386/kernel/process.c
```

```
+++ b/arch/i386/kernel/process.c
```

```
@@ -455,8 +455,15 @@ int copy_thread(int nr, unsigned long clone_flags, unsigned long esp,
    unsigned long unused,
    struct task_struct * p, struct pt_regs * regs)
{
```

```
+ return copy_a_thread(current, nr, clone_flags, esp, unused,
```

```
+ p, regs);
```

```
+}
```

```
+
```

```
+int copy_a_thread(struct task_struct *tsk, int nr, unsigned long clone_flags,
```

```
+ unsigned long esp, unsigned long unused,
```

```
+ struct task_struct * p, struct pt_regs * regs)
```

```
+{
```

```
    struct pt_regs * childregs;
```

```
- struct task_struct *tsk;
```

```
    int err;
```

```
    childregs = task_pt_regs(p);
```

```
@@ -471,7 +478,6 @@ int copy_thread(int nr, unsigned long clone_flags, unsigned long esp,
```

```
    savesegment(gs,p->thread.gs);
```

```
- tsk = current;
```

```
if (unlikely(test_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_IO_BITMAP))) {
```

```
    p->thread.io_bitmap_ptr = kmemdup(tsk->thread.io_bitmap_ptr,
```

```
    IO_BITMAP_BYTES, GFP_KERNEL);
```

```
@@ -783,6 +789,54 @@ asmlinkage int sys_clone(struct pt_regs regs)
```

```
    return do_fork(clone_flags, newsp, &regs, 0, parent_tidptr, child_tidptr);
```

```
}
```

```
+asmlinkage int sys_hijack(struct pt_regs regs)
```

```
+{
```

```

+ unsigned long clone_flags;
+ int __user *parent_tidptr, *child_tidptr;
+ pid_t pid;
+ struct task_struct *task;
+ int ret = -EINVAL;
+
+ clone_flags = regs.ebx;
+ pid = regs.ecx;
+ parent_tidptr = (int __user *)regs.edx;
+ child_tidptr = (int __user *)regs.edi;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ task = find_task_by_vpid(pid);
+ if (task)
+ get_task_struct(task);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ if (task) {
+ task_lock(task);
+ put_task_struct(task);
+ }
+
+ if (task) {
+ if (!ptrace_may_attach_locked(task)) {
+ ret = -EPERM;
+ goto out_put_task;
+ }
+ if (task->ptrace) {
+ ret = -EBUSY;
+ goto out_put_task;
+ }
+ force_sig_specific(SIGSTOP, task);
+
+ task_unlock(task);
+ ret = do_fork_task(task, clone_flags, regs.esp, &regs, 0,
+ parent_tidptr, child_tidptr);
+ wake_up_process(task);
+ task = NULL;
+ }
+
+out_put_task:
+ if (task)
+ task_unlock(task);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This is trivial, and on the face of it looks like it

```

```

* could equally well be done in user mode.
diff --git a/arch/i386/kernel/syscall_table.S b/arch/i386/kernel/syscall_table.S
index df6e41e..495930c 100644
--- a/arch/i386/kernel/syscall_table.S
+++ b/arch/i386/kernel/syscall_table.S
@@ -326,3 +326,4 @@ ENTRY(sys_call_table)
    .long sys_fallocate
    .long sys_revokeat /* 325 */
    .long sys_frevoke
+ .long sys_hijack
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/process.c b/arch/s390/kernel/process.c
index 70c5737..f256e7a 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/process.c
@@ -223,6 +223,14 @@ int copy_thread(int nr, unsigned long clone_flags, unsigned long
new_stackp,
    unsigned long unused,
    struct task_struct * p, struct pt_regs * regs)
{
+ return copy_a_thread(current, nr, clone_flags, new_stackp, unused,
+   p, regs);
+}
+
+int copy_a_thread(struct task_struct *task, int nr, unsigned long clone_flags,
+ unsigned long new_stackp, unsigned long unused,
+   struct task_struct * p, struct pt_regs * regs)
+{
    struct fake_frame
    {
        struct stack_frame sf;
@@ -251,8 +259,8 @@ int copy_thread(int nr, unsigned long clone_flags, unsigned long
new_stackp,
    * save fprs to current->thread.fp_regs to merge them with
    * the emulated registers and then copy the result to the child.
    */
- save_fp_regs(&current->thread.fp_regs);
- memcpy(&p->thread.fp_regs, &current->thread.fp_regs,
+ save_fp_regs(&task->thread.fp_regs);
+ memcpy(&p->thread.fp_regs, &task->thread.fp_regs,
    sizeof(s390_fp_regs));
    p->thread.user_seg = __pa((unsigned long) p->mm->pgd) | _SEGMENT_TABLE;
    /* Set a new TLS ? */
diff --git a/include/asm-i386/unistd.h b/include/asm-i386/unistd.h
index 006c1b3..fe6eeb4 100644
--- a/include/asm-i386/unistd.h
+++ b/include/asm-i386/unistd.h
@@ -332,10 +332,11 @@
#define __NR_fallocate 324

```

```

#define __NR_revokeat 325
#define __NR_frevoke 326
+#define __NR_hijack 327

#ifdef __KERNEL__

-#define NR_syscalls 327
+#define NR_syscalls 328

#define __ARCH_WANT_IPC_PARSE_VERSION
#define __ARCH_WANT_OLD_READDIR
diff --git a/include/linux/cgroup.h b/include/linux/cgroup.h
index 8747932..cb6d335 100644
--- a/include/linux/cgroup.h
+++ b/include/linux/cgroup.h
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ extern int cgroup_init(void);
extern void cgroup_init_smp(void);
extern void cgroup_lock(void);
extern void cgroup_unlock(void);
-extern void cgroup_fork(struct task_struct *p);
+extern void cgroup_fork(struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *p);
extern void cgroup_fork_callbacks(struct task_struct *p);
extern void cgroup_post_fork(struct task_struct *p);
extern void cgroup_exit(struct task_struct *p, int run_callbacks);
@@ -309,7 +309,8 @@ void cgroup_iter_end(struct cgroup *cont, struct cgroup_iter *it);
static inline int cgroup_init_early(void) { return 0; }
static inline int cgroup_init(void) { return 0; }
static inline void cgroup_init_smp(void) {}
-static inline void cgroup_fork(struct task_struct *p) {}
+static inline void cgroup_fork(struct task_struct *parent,
+ struct task_struct *p) {}
static inline void cgroup_fork_callbacks(struct task_struct *p) {}
static inline void cgroup_post_fork(struct task_struct *p) {}
static inline void cgroup_exit(struct task_struct *p, int callbacks) {}
diff --git a/include/linux/pid.h b/include/linux/pid.h
index e29a900..145dce7 100644
--- a/include/linux/pid.h
+++ b/include/linux/pid.h
@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ extern struct pid *find_pid(int nr);
extern struct pid *find_get_pid(int nr);
extern struct pid *find_get_pid(int nr, struct pid_namespace *);

-extern struct pid *alloc_pid(struct pid_namespace *ns);
+extern struct pid *alloc_pid(struct task_struct *task);
extern void FASTCALL(free_pid(struct pid *pid));
extern void zap_pid_ns_processes(struct pid_namespace *pid_ns);

diff --git a/include/linux/ptrace.h b/include/linux/ptrace.h

```

index ae8146a..727a4a9 100644

--- a/include/linux/ptrace.h

+++ b/include/linux/ptrace.h

```
@@ -97,6 +97,7 @@ extern void __ptrace_link(struct task_struct *child,
extern void __ptrace_unlink(struct task_struct *child);
extern void ptrace_untrace(struct task_struct *child);
extern int ptrace_may_attach(struct task_struct *task);
+extern int ptrace_may_attach_locked(struct task_struct *task);
```

```
static inline void ptrace_link(struct task_struct *child,
    struct task_struct *new_parent)
```

diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h

index 4f21af1..d85c3cf 100644

--- a/include/linux/sched.h

+++ b/include/linux/sched.h

```
@@ -1630,6 +1630,7 @@ extern struct mm_struct *get_task_mm(struct task_struct *task);
extern void mm_release(struct task_struct *, struct mm_struct *);
```

```
extern int copy_thread(int, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, struct task_struct *,
struct pt_regs *);
```

```
+extern int copy_a_thread(struct task_struct *, int, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long,
struct task_struct *, struct pt_regs *);
```

```
extern void flush_thread(void);
```

```
extern void exit_thread(void);
```

```
@@ -1645,6 +1646,7 @@ extern int allow_signal(int);
```

```
extern int disallow_signal(int);
```

```
extern int do_execve(char *, char __user * __user *, char __user * __user *, struct pt_regs *);
```

```
+extern long do_fork_task(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long, unsigned long, struct pt_regs *,
unsigned long, int __user *, int __user *);
```

```
extern long do_fork(unsigned long, unsigned long, struct pt_regs *, unsigned long, int __user *,
int __user *);
```

```
struct task_struct *fork_idle(int);
```

diff --git a/include/linux/syscalls.h b/include/linux/syscalls.h

index f696874..5bc7384 100644

--- a/include/linux/syscalls.h

+++ b/include/linux/syscalls.h

```
@@ -616,5 +616,6 @@ int kernel_execve(const char *filename, char *const argv[], char *const
envp[]);
```

```
asmlinkage long sys_revokeat(int dfd, const char __user *filename);
```

```
asmlinkage long sys_frevoke(unsigned int fd);
```

```
+asmlinkage long sys_hijack(unsigned long flags, pid_t pid, int __user *ptid, int __user *ctid);
```

```
#endif
```

diff --git a/kernel/cgroup.c b/kernel/cgroup.c

```

index 1e8aa53..e587896 100644
--- a/kernel/cgroup.c
+++ b/kernel/cgroup.c
@@ -2460,12 +2460,12 @@ static struct file_operations proc_cgroupstats_operations = {
 * At the point that cgroup_fork() is called, 'current' is the parent
 * task, and the passed argument 'child' points to the child task.
 */
-void cgroup_fork(struct task_struct *child)
+void cgroup_fork(struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *child)
{
- task_lock(current);
- child->cgroups = current->cgroups;
+ task_lock(parent);
+ child->cgroups = parent->cgroups;
  get_css_set(child->cgroups);
- task_unlock(current);
+ task_unlock(parent);
  INIT_LIST_HEAD(&child->cg_list);
}

diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
index f85731a..ac73f3e 100644
--- a/kernel/fork.c
+++ b/kernel/fork.c
@@ -621,13 +621,14 @@ struct fs_struct *copy_fs_struct(struct fs_struct *old)

EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(copy_fs_struct);

-static inline int copy_fs(unsigned long clone_flags, struct task_struct * tsk)
+static inline int copy_fs(unsigned long clone_flags,
+ struct task_struct * src, struct task_struct * tsk)
{
  if (clone_flags & CLONE_FS) {
- atomic_inc(&current->fs->count);
+ atomic_inc(&src->fs->count);
    return 0;
  }
- tsk->fs = __copy_fs_struct(current->fs);
+ tsk->fs = __copy_fs_struct(src->fs);
  if (!tsk->fs)
    return -ENOMEM;
  return 0;
@@ -973,7 +974,8 @@ static inline void rt_mutex_init_task(struct task_struct *p)
 * parts of the process environment (as per the clone
 * flags). The actual kick-off is left to the caller.
 */
-static struct task_struct *copy_process(unsigned long clone_flags,
+static struct task_struct *copy_process(struct task_struct *task,

```

```

+ unsigned long clone_flags,
  unsigned long stack_start,
  struct pt_regs *regs,
  unsigned long stack_size,
@@ -1007,15 +1009,17 @@ static struct task_struct *copy_process(unsigned long clone_flags,
  goto fork_out;

  retval = -ENOMEM;
- p = dup_task_struct(current);
+ p = dup_task_struct(task);
  if (!p)
    goto fork_out;

  rt_mutex_init_task(p);

#ifdef CONFIG_TRACE_IRQFLAGS
- DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(!p->hardirqs_enabled);
- DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(!p->softirqs_enabled);
+ if (task == current) {
+ DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(!p->hardirqs_enabled);
+ DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(!p->softirqs_enabled);
+ }
#endif
  retval = -EAGAIN;
  if (atomic_read(&p->user->processes) >=
@@ -1084,7 +1088,7 @@ static struct task_struct *copy_process(unsigned long clone_flags,
  #endif
  p->io_context = NULL;
  p->audit_context = NULL;
- cgroup_fork(p);
+ cgroup_fork(task, p);
#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
  p->mempolicy = mpol_copy(p->mempolicy);
  if (IS_ERR(p->mempolicy)) {
@@ -1132,7 +1136,7 @@ static struct task_struct *copy_process(unsigned long clone_flags,
  goto bad_fork_cleanup_audit;
  if ((retval = copy_files(clone_flags, p)))
    goto bad_fork_cleanup_semundo;
- if ((retval = copy_fs(clone_flags, p)))
+ if ((retval = copy_fs(clone_flags, task, p)))
    goto bad_fork_cleanup_files;
  if ((retval = copy_sighand(clone_flags, p)))
    goto bad_fork_cleanup_fs;
@@ -1144,13 +1148,13 @@ static struct task_struct *copy_process(unsigned long clone_flags,
  goto bad_fork_cleanup_mm;
  if ((retval = copy_namespaces(clone_flags, p)))
    goto bad_fork_cleanup_keys;
- retval = copy_thread(0, clone_flags, stack_start, stack_size, p, regs);

```

```

+ retval = copy_a_thread(task, 0, clone_flags, stack_start, stack_size, p, regs);
  if (retval)
    goto bad_fork_cleanup_namespaces;

  if (pid != &init_struct_pid) {
    retval = -ENOMEM;
- pid = alloc_pid(task_active_pid_ns(p));
+ pid = alloc_pid(task);
  if (!pid)
    goto bad_fork_cleanup_namespaces;

@@ -1164,7 +1168,7 @@ static struct task_struct *copy_process(unsigned long clone_flags,
  p->pid = pid_nr(pid);
  p->tgid = p->pid;
  if (clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD)
- p->tgid = current->tgid;
+ p->tgid = task->tgid;

  p->set_child_tid = (clone_flags & CLONE_CHILD_SETTID) ? child_tidptr : NULL;
  /*
@@ -1380,7 +1384,7 @@ struct task_struct * __cpuinit fork_idle(int cpu)
  struct task_struct *task;
  struct pt_regs regs;

- task = copy_process(CLONE_VM, 0, idle_regs(&regs), 0, NULL,
+ task = copy_process(current, CLONE_VM, 0, idle_regs(&regs), 0, NULL,
  &init_struct_pid);
  if (!IS_ERR(task))
    init_idle(task, cpu);
@@ -1405,12 +1409,12 @@ static inline int fork_traceflag (unsigned clone_flags)
}

/*
- * Ok, this is the main fork-routine.
- *
- * It copies the process, and if successful kick-starts
- * it and waits for it to finish using the VM if required.
+ * if called with task!=current, then caller must ensure that
+ * 1. it has a reference to task
+ * 2. current must have ptrace permission to task
  */
-long do_fork(unsigned long clone_flags,
+long do_fork_task(struct task_struct *task,
+ unsigned long clone_flags,
  unsigned long stack_start,
  struct pt_regs *regs,
  unsigned long stack_size,
@@ -1421,13 +1425,23 @@ long do_fork(unsigned long clone_flags,

```

```

int trace = 0;
long nr;

+ if (task != current) {
+ /* sanity checks */
+ /* we only want to allow hijacking the simplest cases */
+ if (clone_flags & CLONE_SYSVSEM)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (current->ptrace)
+ return -EPERM;
+ if (task->ptrace)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ if (unlikely(current->ptrace)) {
+ trace = fork_traceflag (clone_flags);
+ if (trace)
+ clone_flags |= CLONE_PTRACE;
+ }

- p = copy_process(clone_flags, stack_start, regs, stack_size,
+ p = copy_process(task, clone_flags, stack_start, regs, stack_size,
+ child_tidptr, NULL);
/*
* Do this prior waking up the new thread - the thread pointer
@@ -1489,6 +1503,23 @@ long do_fork(unsigned long clone_flags,
return nr;
}

+/*
+ * Ok, this is the main fork-routine.
+ *
+ * It copies the process, and if successful kick-starts
+ * it and waits for it to finish using the VM if required.
+ */
+long do_fork(unsigned long clone_flags,
+ unsigned long stack_start,
+ struct pt_regs *regs,
+ unsigned long stack_size,
+ int __user *parent_tidptr,
+ int __user *child_tidptr)
+{
+ return do_fork_task(current, clone_flags, stack_start,
+ regs, stack_size, parent_tidptr, child_tidptr);
+}
+
+
+ #ifndef ARCH_MIN_MMSTRUCT_ALIGN
+ #define ARCH_MIN_MMSTRUCT_ALIGN 0
+ #endif

```

```

diff --git a/kernel/pid.c b/kernel/pid.c
index d7388d7..b887a6a 100644
--- a/kernel/pid.c
+++ b/kernel/pid.c
@@ -238,14 +238,15 @@ fastcall void free_pid(struct pid *pid)
    call_rcu(&pid->rcu, delayed_put_pid);
}

-struct pid *alloc_pid(struct pid_namespace *ns)
+struct pid *alloc_pid(struct task_struct *srctsk)
{
    struct pid *pid;
    enum pid_type type;
    int i, nr;
- struct pid_namespace *tmp;
+ struct pid_namespace *tmp, *ns;
    struct upid *upid;

+ ns = task_active_pid_ns(srctsk);
    pid = kmem_cache_alloc(ns->pid_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
    if (!pid)
        goto out;
diff --git a/kernel/ptrace.c b/kernel/ptrace.c
index 7c76f2f..c65c9fe 100644
--- a/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -159,6 +159,13 @@ int ptrace_may_attach(struct task_struct *task)
    return !err;
}

+int ptrace_may_attach_locked(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+ int err;
+ err = may_attach(task);
+ return !err;
+}
+
+int ptrace_attach(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+ int retval;
--
1.5.1

```

Containers mailing list
Containers@lists.linux-foundation.org
<https://lists.linux-foundation.org/mailman/listinfo/containers>

Subject: Re: [PATCH] namespaces: introduce sys_hijack (v4)
Posted by [Cedric Le Goater](#) on Wed, 10 Oct 2007 17:06:23 GMT
[View Forum Message](#) <> [Reply to Message](#)

Serge E. Hallyn wrote:

```
>>From 945fe66259cd0cfdc2fe846287b7821e329a558c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> From: sergeh@us.ibm.com <hallyn@kernel.(none)>
> Date: Tue, 9 Oct 2007 08:30:30 -0700
> Subject: [PATCH] namespaces: introduce sys_hijack (v4)
>
> Move most of do_fork() into a new do_fork_task() which acts on
> a new argument, task, rather than on current. do_fork() becomes
> a call to do_fork_task(current, ...).
>
> Introduce sys_hijack (for x86 only so far). It is like clone, but
> in place of a stack pointer (which is assumed null) it accepts a
> pid. The process identified by that pid is the one which is
> actually cloned. Some state - include the file table, the signals
> and sighand (and hence tty), and the ->parent are taken from the
> calling process.
```

hmm, I'm wondering how this is going to work for a process which would have unshared its device (pts) namespace. How are we going to link the pts living in different namespaces if the stdios of the hijacked process is using them ? like in the case of a shell, which is certainly something we would like to hijacked.

it looks like a challenge for me. maybe I'm wrong.

C.

```
> The effect is a sort of namespace enter. The following program
> uses sys_hijack to 'enter' all namespaces of the specified pid.
> For instance in one terminal, do
>
> mount -t cgroup -ons /cgroup
> hostname
> qemu
> ns_exec -u /bin/sh
> hostname serge
>     echo $$
>     1073
> cat /proc/$$/cgroup
> ns:/node_1073
```

Is there a reason to have the 'node_' prefix ? couldn't we just use \$pid ?

```
> In another terminal then do
```

```
>
> hostname
> qemu
> cat /proc/$$/cgroup
> ns:/
> hijack 1073
> hostname
> serge
> cat /proc/$$/cgroup
> ns:/node_1073
>
> sys_hijack is arch-dependent and is only implemented for i386 so far.
```

and worked on my qemu.

Thanks !

C.

Containers mailing list
Containers@lists.linux-foundation.org
<https://lists.linux-foundation.org/mailman/listinfo/containers>

Subject: Re: [PATCH] namespaces: introduce sys_hijack (v4)
Posted by [serue](#) on Wed, 10 Oct 2007 18:32:34 GMT
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Quoting Cedric Le Goater (clg@fr.ibm.com):

```
> Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> >>From 945fe66259cd0cfdc2fe846287b7821e329a558c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> > From: sergeh@us.ibm.com <hallyn@kernel.(none)>
> > Date: Tue, 9 Oct 2007 08:30:30 -0700
> > Subject: [PATCH] namespaces: introduce sys_hijack (v4)
> >
> > Move most of do_fork() into a new do_fork_task() which acts on
> > a new argument, task, rather than on current. do_fork() becomes
> > a call to do_fork_task(current, ...).
> >
> > Introduce sys_hijack (for x86 only so far). It is like clone, but
> > in place of a stack pointer (which is assumed null) it accepts a
> > pid. The process identified by that pid is the one which is
> > actually cloned. Some state - include the file table, the signals
> > and sighand (and hence tty), and the ->parent are taken from the
> > calling process.
>
> hmm, I'm wondering how this is going to work for a process which
> would have unshared its device (pts) namespace. How are we going
```

> to link the pts living in different namespaces if the stdios of the
> hijacked process is using them ? like in the case of a shell, which
> is certainly something we would like to hijacked.
>
> it looks like a challenge for me. maybe I'm wrong.

Might be a problem, but tough to address that until we actually
have a dev ns or devpts ns and established semantics.

Note the filestruct comes from current, not the hijack target, so
presumably we can work around the tty issue in any case by
keeping an open file across the hijack?

For instance, use the attached modified version of hijack.c
which puts a writeable fd for /tmp/helloworld in fd 5, then
does hijack, then from the resulting shell do

```
echo ab >&5
```

So we should easily be able to work around it.

Or am i missing something?

```
> > The effect is a sort of namespace enter. The following program  
> > uses sys_hijack to 'enter' all namespaces of the specified pid.  
> > For instance in one terminal, do  
> >  
> > mount -t cgroup -ons /cgroup  
> > hostname  
> > qemu  
> > ns_exec -u /bin/sh  
> > hostname serge  
> >     echo $$  
> >     1073  
> > cat /proc/$$/cgroup  
> > ns:/node_1073  
>  
> Is there a reason to have the 'node_' prefix ? couldn't we just  
> use $pid ?
```

Good question. It's just how the ns-cgroup does it... If you want to
send in a patch to change that, I'll ack it.

```
> > In another terminal then do  
> >  
> > hostname  
> > qemu  
> > cat /proc/$$/cgroup
```

```
> > ns:/
> > hijack 1073
> > hostname
> > serge
> > cat /proc/$$/cgroup
> > ns:/node_1073
> >
> > sys_hijack is arch-dependent and is only implemented for i386 so far.
>
> and worked on my qemu.
>
> Thanks !
```

Cool. Thanks for testing.

-serge

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File Attachments

1) [duphijack.c](#), downloaded 255 times

Subject: Re: [PATCH] namespaces: introduce sys_hijack (v4)

Posted by [serue](#) on Thu, 11 Oct 2007 22:15:34 GMT

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Quoting Serge E. Hallyn (serue@us.ibm.com):

> > From 945fe66259cd0cfdc2fe846287b7821e329a558c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001

> From: sergeh@us.ibm.com <[hallyn@kernel.\(none\)](mailto:hallyn@kernel.(none))>

> Date: Tue, 9 Oct 2007 08:30:30 -0700

> Subject: [PATCH] namespaces: introduce sys_hijack (v4)

>

> Move most of do_fork() into a new do_fork_task() which acts on
> a new argument, task, rather than on current. do_fork() becomes
> a call to do_fork_task(current, ...).

>

> Introduce sys_hijack (for x86 only so far). It is like clone, but
> in place of a stack pointer (which is assumed null) it accepts a
> pid. The process identified by that pid is the one which is
> actually cloned. Some state - include the file table, the signals
> and sighand (and hence tty), and the ->parent are taken from the
> calling process.

>

> The effect is a sort of namespace enter. The following program

```

> uses sys_hijack to 'enter' all namespaces of the specified pid.
> For instance in one terminal, do
>
> mount -t cgroup -ons /cgroup
> hostname
> qemu
> ns_exec -u /bin/sh
> hostname serge
>     echo $$
>     1073
> cat /proc/$$/cgroup
> ns:/node_1073
>
> In another terminal then do
>
> hostname
> qemu
> cat /proc/$$/cgroup
> ns:/
> hijack 1073
> hostname
>     serge
> cat /proc/$$/cgroup
> ns:/node_1073
>
> sys_hijack is arch-dependent and is only implemented for i386 so far.
>
> Changelog:
> Aug 23: send a stop signal to the hijacked process
> (like ptrace does).
> Oct 09: Update for 2.6.23-rc8-mm2 (mainly pidns)
> Don't take task_lock under rcu_read_lock
> Send hijacked process to cgroup_fork() as
> the first argument.
> Removed some unneeded task_locks.

```

Thanks to Cedric for finding an oops when using pid namespaces. The following patch fixes the problem.

In addition, to hijack a process in another pid namespace, the hijack.c test program needs to be updated to do waitpid as

```

while(waitpid(-1, &status, __WALL) != -1)
;

```

as shown below:

```

=====
hijack.c

```

```

=====
int do_clone_task(void)
{
    execl("/bin/sh", "/bin/sh", NULL);
}

int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
    int pid;
    int ret;
    int status;

    if (argc < 2)
        return 1;
    pid = atoi(argv[1]);

    ret = syscall(327, SIGCHLD, pid, NULL, NULL);

    if (ret == 0) {
        return do_clone_task();
    } else if (ret < 0) {
        perror("sys_hijack");
    } else {
        printf("waiting on cloned process %d\n", ret);
        while(waitpid(-1, &status, __WALL) != -1)
            ;
        printf("cloned process %d exited with %d\n", ret, status);
    }

    return ret;
}
=====

```

>From f1d9621e8325471e3ccde7f5fc2ed5a7be582524 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: sergeh@us.ibm.com <hallyn@kernel.(none)>
Date: Thu, 11 Oct 2007 14:26:05 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 2/2] hijack: pidns bugfix

My change to alloc_pid was bogus and introduced a pidns bug. Fix.

Signed-off-by: sergeh@us.ibm.com <hallyn@kernel.(none)>

```

include/linux/pid.h | 2 +-
kernel/fork.c      | 2 +-
kernel/pid.c       | 5 +++-
3 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

```

```

diff --git a/include/linux/pid.h b/include/linux/pid.h
index 145dce7..e29a900 100644
--- a/include/linux/pid.h
+++ b/include/linux/pid.h
@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ extern struct pid *find_pid(int nr);
extern struct pid *find_get_pid(int nr);
extern struct pid *find_ge_pid(int nr, struct pid_namespace *);

-extern struct pid *alloc_pid(struct task_struct *task);
+extern struct pid *alloc_pid(struct pid_namespace *ns);
extern void FASTCALL(free_pid(struct pid *pid));
extern void zap_pid_ns_processes(struct pid_namespace *pid_ns);

diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
index ac73f3e..c1d4672 100644
--- a/kernel/fork.c
+++ b/kernel/fork.c
@@ -1154,7 +1154,7 @@ static struct task_struct *copy_process(struct task_struct *task,

    if (pid != &init_struct_pid) {
        retval = -ENOMEM;
-    pid = alloc_pid(task);
+    pid = alloc_pid(task_active_pid_ns(p));
        if (!pid)
            goto bad_fork_cleanup_namespaces;

diff --git a/kernel/pid.c b/kernel/pid.c
index b887a6a..d7388d7 100644
--- a/kernel/pid.c
+++ b/kernel/pid.c
@@ -238,15 +238,14 @@ fastcall void free_pid(struct pid *pid)
    call_rcu(&pid->rcu, delayed_put_pid);
}

-struct pid *alloc_pid(struct task_struct *srctsk)
+struct pid *alloc_pid(struct pid_namespace *ns)
{
    struct pid *pid;
    enum pid_type type;
    int i, nr;
-    struct pid_namespace *tmp, *ns;
+    struct pid_namespace *tmp;
    struct upid *upid;

-    ns = task_active_pid_ns(srctsk);
    pid = kmem_cache_alloc(ns->pid_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
    if (!pid)
        goto out;

```

--
1.5.1

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Subject: Re: [PATCH] namespaces: introduce sys_hijack (v4)
Posted by [Cedric Le Goater](#) on Fri, 12 Oct 2007 09:30:33 GMT
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Serge E. Hallyn wrote:

```
> Quoting Serge E. Hallyn (serue@us.ibm.com):  
>> >From 945fe66259cd0cfdc2fe846287b7821e329a558c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001  
>> From: sergeh@us.ibm.com <hallyn@kernel.(none)>  
>> Date: Tue, 9 Oct 2007 08:30:30 -0700  
>> Subject: [PATCH] namespaces: introduce sys_hijack (v4)  
>>  
>> Move most of do_fork() into a new do_fork_task() which acts on  
>> a new argument, task, rather than on current. do_fork() becomes  
>> a call to do_fork_task(current, ...).  
>>  
>> Introduce sys_hijack (for x86 only so far). It is like clone, but  
>> in place of a stack pointer (which is assumed null) it accepts a  
>> pid. The process identified by that pid is the one which is  
>> actually cloned. Some state - include the file table, the signals  
>> and sighand (and hence tty), and the ->parent are taken from the  
>> calling process.  
>>  
>> The effect is a sort of namespace enter. The following program  
>> uses sys_hijack to 'enter' all namespaces of the specified pid.  
>> For instance in one terminal, do  
>>  
>> mount -t cgroup -ons /cgroup  
>> hostname  
>> qemu  
>> ns_exec -u /bin/sh  
>> hostname serge  
>> echo $$  
>> 1073  
>> cat /proc/$$/cgroup  
>> ns:/node_1073  
>>  
>> In another terminal then do  
>>  
>> hostname
```

```
>> qemu
>> cat /proc/$$/cgroup
>> ns:/
>> hijack 1073
>> hostname
>> serge
>> cat /proc/$$/cgroup
>> ns:/node_1073
>>
>> sys_hijack is arch-dependent and is only implemented for i386 so far.
>>
>> Changelog:
>> Aug 23: send a stop signal to the hijacked process
>> (like ptrace does).
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>> Don't take task_lock under rcu_read_lock
>> Send hijacked process to cgroup_fork() as
>> the first argument.
>> Removed some unneeded task_locks.
>
> Thanks to Cedric for finding an oops when using pid namespaces. The
> following patch fixes the problem.
```

it works fine now.

Thanks !

C.

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Subject: Re: [PATCH] namespaces: introduce sys_hijack (v4)
Posted by [Cedric Le Goater](#) on Tue, 16 Oct 2007 08:51:04 GMT
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```
>> hmm, I'm wondering how this is going to work for a process which
>> would have unshared its device (pts) namespace. How are we going
>> to link the pts living in different namespaces if the stdios of the
>> hijacked process is using them ? like in the case of a shell, which
>> is certainly something we would like to hijacked.
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>> it looks like a challenge for me. maybe I'm wrong.
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> Might be a problem, but tough to address that until we actually
> have a dev ns or devpts ns and established semantics.
```

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> Note the filestruct comes from current, not the hijack target, so
> presumably we can work around the tty issue in any case by
> keeping an open file across the hijack?
>
> For instance, use the attached modified version of hijack.c
> which puts a writeable fd for /tmp/helloworld in fd 5, then
> does hijack, then from the resulting shell do
>
> echo ab >&5
>
> So we should easily be able to work around it.

yes. it should.

> Or am i missing something?

I guess we need to work a little more on the pts/device namespace to see how it interacts.

```
>>> The effect is a sort of namespace enter. The following program
>>> uses sys_hijack to 'enter' all namespaces of the specified pid.
>>> For instance in one terminal, do
>>>
>>> mount -t cgroup -ons /cgroup
>>> hostname
>>> qemu
>>> ns_exec -u /bin/sh
>>> hostname serge
>>>     echo $$
>>>     1073
>>> cat /proc/$$/cgroup
>>> ns:/node_1073
>> Is there a reason to have the 'node_' prefix ? couldn't we just
>> use $pid ?
>
> Good question. It's just how the ns-cgroup does it... If you want to
> send in a patch to change that, I'll ack it.
```

just below.

I gave a quick look to the ns subsystem and didn't see how the node_\$pid was destroyed. do we have to do a rmdir ?

Thanks,

C.

Signed-off-by: Cedric Le Goater <clg@fr.ibm.com>

kernel/cgroup.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

Index: 2.6.23-mm1/kernel/cgroup.c

```
=====
--- 2.6.23-mm1.orig/kernel/cgroup.c
+++ 2.6.23-mm1/kernel/cgroup.c
@@ -2604,7 +2604,7 @@ int cgroup_clone(struct task_struct *tsk
     cg = ts->cgroups;
     parent = task_cgroup(tsk, subsys->subsys_id);

-    snprintf(nodename, MAX_CGROUP_TYPE_NAMELEN, "node_%d", ts->pid);
+    snprintf(nodename, MAX_CGROUP_TYPE_NAMELEN, "%d", ts->pid);

/* Pin the hierarchy */
atomic_inc(&parent->root->sb->s_active);
```

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Subject: Re: [PATCH] namespaces: introduce sys_hijack (v4)
Posted by [Paul Menage](#) on Tue, 16 Oct 2007 09:09:44 GMT
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One thought on this - could we make the API have a "which" parameter that indicates the type of thing being acted upon? E.g., like `sys_setpriority()`, which can specify the target as a process, a pgrp or a user.

Right now the target would just be a process, but I'd really like the ability to be able to specify an fd on a cgroup directory to indicate that I want the child to inherit from that cgroup's namespaces. That way you wouldn't need to keep a child process alive in the namespace just to act as a hijack target.

Paul

On 10/9/07, Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> wrote:
> >From 945fe66259cd0cfdc2fe846287b7821e329a558c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> From: sergeh@us.ibm.com <hallyn@kernel.(none)>
> Date: Tue, 9 Oct 2007 08:30:30 -0700
> Subject: [PATCH] namespaces: introduce sys_hijack (v4)

>

> Move most of do_fork() into a new do_fork_task() which acts on
> a new argument, task, rather than on current. do_fork() becomes
> a call to do_fork_task(current, ...).

>

> Introduce sys_hijack (for x86 only so far). It is like clone, but
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> actually cloned. Some state - include the file table, the signals
> and sighand (and hence tty), and the ->parent are taken from the
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> For instance in one terminal, do

>

```

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> hostname
> qemu
> ns_exec -u /bin/sh
> hostname serge
> echo $$
> 1073
> cat /proc/$$/cgroup
> ns:/node_1073

```

>

> In another terminal then do

>

```

> hostname
> qemu
> cat /proc/$$/cgroup
> ns:/
> hijack 1073
> hostname
> serge
> cat /proc/$$/cgroup
> ns:/node_1073

```

>

> sys_hijack is arch-dependent and is only implemented for i386 so far.

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> Changelog:

- > Aug 23: send a stop signal to the hijacked process
(like ptrace does).
- > Oct 09: Update for 2.6.23-rc8-mm2 (mainly pidns)
- > Don't take task_lock under rcu_read_lock
- > Send hijacked process to cgroup_fork() as
the first argument.
- > Removed some unneeded task_locks.

```

>
> =====
> hijack.c
> =====
>
> int do_clone_task(void)
> {
>     execl("/bin/sh", "/bin/sh", NULL);
> }
>
> int main(int argc, char *argv[])
> {
>     int pid;
>     int ret;
>     int status;
>
>     if (argc < 2)
>         return 1;
>     pid = atoi(argv[1]);
>
>     ret = syscall(327, SIGCHLD, pid, NULL, NULL);
>
>     if (ret == 0) {
>         return do_clone_task();
>     } else if (ret < 0) {
>         perror("sys_hijack");
>     } else {
>         printf("waiting on cloned process %d\n", ret);
>         while (waitpid(ret, &status, __WCLONE) != ret);
>         printf("cloned process %d exited with %d\n", ret, status);
>     }
>
>     return ret;
> }
> =====
>
> Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
> ---
> arch/i386/kernel/process.c      | 58 ++++++
> arch/i386/kernel/syscall_table.S |  1 +
> arch/s390/kernel/process.c      | 12 +++++-
> include/asm-i386/unistd.h       |  3 +-
> include/linux/cgroup.h         |  5 +-+
> include/linux/pid.h            |  2 +-
> include/linux/ptrace.h         |  1 +
> include/linux/sched.h          |  2 +
> include/linux/syscalls.h       |  1 +
> kernel/cgroup.c                |  8 +-+

```

```

> kernel/fork.c          | 69 ++++++-----
> kernel/pid.c          | 5 +-
> kernel/ptrace.c       | 7 ++++
> 13 files changed, 141 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/i386/kernel/process.c b/arch/i386/kernel/process.c
> index bfcd01e..01f4d16 100644
> --- a/arch/i386/kernel/process.c
> +++ b/arch/i386/kernel/process.c
> @@ -455,8 +455,15 @@ int copy_thread(int nr, unsigned long clone_flags, unsigned long esp,
>      unsigned long unused,
>      struct task_struct * p, struct pt_regs * regs)
> {
> +     return copy_a_thread(current, nr, clone_flags, esp, unused,
> +         p, regs);
> +}
> +
> +int copy_a_thread(struct task_struct *tsk, int nr, unsigned long clone_flags,
> +     unsigned long esp, unsigned long unused,
> +     struct task_struct * p, struct pt_regs * regs)
> +{
> +     struct pt_regs * childregs;
> -     struct task_struct *tsk;
> +     int err;
>
> +     childregs = task_pt_regs(p);
> @@ -471,7 +478,6 @@ int copy_thread(int nr, unsigned long clone_flags, unsigned long esp,
>
> +     savesegment(gs,p->thread.gs);
>
> -     tsk = current;
> +     if (unlikely(test_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_IO_BITMAP))) {
> +         p->thread.io_bitmap_ptr = kmemdup(tsk->thread.io_bitmap_ptr,
> +             IO_BITMAP_BYTES, GFP_KERNEL);
> @@ -783,6 +789,54 @@ asmlinkage int sys_clone(struct pt_regs regs)
> +     return do_fork(clone_flags, newsp, &regs, 0, parent_tidptr, child_tidptr);
> + }
>
> +asmlinkage int sys_hijack(struct pt_regs regs)
> +{
> +     unsigned long clone_flags;
> +     int __user *parent_tidptr, *child_tidptr;
> +     pid_t pid;
> +     struct task_struct *task;
> +     int ret = -EINVAL;
> +
> +     clone_flags = regs.ebx;
> +     pid = regs.ecx;

```

```

> + parent_tidptr = (int __user *)regs.edx;
> + child_tidptr = (int __user *)regs.edi;
> +
> + rcu_read_lock();
> + task = find_task_by_vpid(pid);
> + if (task)
> +     get_task_struct(task);
> + rcu_read_unlock();
> +
> + if (task) {
> +     task_lock(task);
> +     put_task_struct(task);
> + }
> +
> + if (task) {
> +     if (!ptrace_may_attach_locked(task)) {
> +         ret = -EPERM;
> +         goto out_put_task;
> +     }
> +     if (task->ptrace) {
> +         ret = -EBUSY;
> +         goto out_put_task;
> +     }
> +     force_sig_specific(SIGSTOP, task);
> +
> +     task_unlock(task);
> +     ret = do_fork_task(task, clone_flags, regs.esp, &regs, 0,
> +         parent_tidptr, child_tidptr);
> +     wake_up_process(task);
> +     task = NULL;
> + }
> +
> +out_put_task:
> +     if (task)
> +         task_unlock(task);
> +     return ret;
> +}
> +
> /*
> * This is trivial, and on the face of it looks like it
> * could equally well be done in user mode.
> diff --git a/arch/i386/kernel/syscall_table.S b/arch/i386/kernel/syscall_table.S
> index df6e41e..495930c 100644
> --- a/arch/i386/kernel/syscall_table.S
> +++ b/arch/i386/kernel/syscall_table.S
> @@ -326,3 +326,4 @@ ENTRY(sys_call_table)
>     .long sys_fallocate
>     .long sys_revokeat          /* 325 */

```

```

> .long sys_frevoke
> + .long sys_hijack
> diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/process.c b/arch/s390/kernel/process.c
> index 70c5737..f256e7a 100644
> --- a/arch/s390/kernel/process.c
> +++ b/arch/s390/kernel/process.c
> @@ -223,6 +223,14 @@ int copy_thread(int nr, unsigned long clone_flags, unsigned long
new_stackp,
>     unsigned long unused,
>     struct task_struct * p, struct pt_regs * regs)
> {
> +     return copy_a_thread(current, nr, clone_flags, new_stackp, unused,
> +                          p, regs);
> +}
> +
> +int copy_a_thread(struct task_struct *task, int nr, unsigned long clone_flags,
> +                 unsigned long new_stackp, unsigned long unused,
> +                 struct task_struct * p, struct pt_regs * regs)
> +{
>     struct fake_frame
>     {
>         struct stack_frame sf;
> @@ -251,8 +259,8 @@ int copy_thread(int nr, unsigned long clone_flags, unsigned long
new_stackp,
>     * save fprs to current->thread.fp_regs to merge them with
>     * the emulated registers and then copy the result to the child.
>     */
> -     save_fp_regs(&current->thread.fp_regs);
> -     memcpy(&p->thread.fp_regs, &current->thread.fp_regs,
> +     save_fp_regs(&task->thread.fp_regs);
> +     memcpy(&p->thread.fp_regs, &task->thread.fp_regs,
>             sizeof(s390_fp_regs));
>     p->thread.user_seg = __pa((unsigned long) p->mm->pgd) | _SEGMENT_TABLE;
>     /* Set a new TLS ? */
> diff --git a/include/asm-i386/unistd.h b/include/asm-i386/unistd.h
> index 006c1b3..fe6eeb4 100644
> --- a/include/asm-i386/unistd.h
> +++ b/include/asm-i386/unistd.h
> @@ -332,10 +332,11 @@
> #define __NR_fallocate      324
> #define __NR_revokeat      325
> #define __NR_frevoke       326
> +#define __NR_hijack        327
>
> #ifdef __KERNEL__
>
> -#define NR_syscalls 327
> +#define NR_syscalls 328

```

```

>
> #define __ARCH_WANT_IPC_PARSE_VERSION
> #define __ARCH_WANT_OLD_READDIR
> diff --git a/include/linux/cgroup.h b/include/linux/cgroup.h
> index 8747932..cb6d335 100644
> --- a/include/linux/cgroup.h
> +++ b/include/linux/cgroup.h
> @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ extern int cgroup_init(void);
> extern void cgroup_init_smp(void);
> extern void cgroup_lock(void);
> extern void cgroup_unlock(void);
> -extern void cgroup_fork(struct task_struct *p);
> +extern void cgroup_fork(struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *p);
> extern void cgroup_fork_callbacks(struct task_struct *p);
> extern void cgroup_post_fork(struct task_struct *p);
> extern void cgroup_exit(struct task_struct *p, int run_callbacks);
> @@ -309,7 +309,8 @@ void cgroup_iter_end(struct cgroup *cont, struct cgroup_iter *it);
> static inline int cgroup_init_early(void) { return 0; }
> static inline int cgroup_init(void) { return 0; }
> static inline void cgroup_init_smp(void) {}
> -static inline void cgroup_fork(struct task_struct *p) {}
> +static inline void cgroup_fork(struct task_struct *parent,
> +
> +                               struct task_struct *p) {}
> static inline void cgroup_fork_callbacks(struct task_struct *p) {}
> static inline void cgroup_post_fork(struct task_struct *p) {}
> static inline void cgroup_exit(struct task_struct *p, int callbacks) {}
> diff --git a/include/linux/pid.h b/include/linux/pid.h
> index e29a900..145dce7 100644
> --- a/include/linux/pid.h
> +++ b/include/linux/pid.h
> @@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ extern struct pid *find_pid(int nr);
> extern struct pid *find_get_pid(int nr);
> extern struct pid *find_get_pid(int nr, struct pid_namespace *);
>
> -extern struct pid *alloc_pid(struct pid_namespace *ns);
> +extern struct pid *alloc_pid(struct task_struct *task);
> extern void FASTCALL(free_pid(struct pid *pid));
> extern void zap_pid_ns_processes(struct pid_namespace *pid_ns);
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/ptrace.h b/include/linux/ptrace.h
> index ae8146a..727a4a9 100644
> --- a/include/linux/ptrace.h
> +++ b/include/linux/ptrace.h
> @@ -97,6 +97,7 @@ extern void __ptrace_link(struct task_struct *child,
> extern void __ptrace_unlink(struct task_struct *child);
> extern void ptrace_untrace(struct task_struct *child);
> extern int ptrace_may_attach(struct task_struct *task);
> +extern int ptrace_may_attach_locked(struct task_struct *task);

```

```

>
> static inline void ptrace_link(struct task_struct *child,
>                               struct task_struct *new_parent)
> diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h
> index 4f21af1..d85c3cf 100644
> --- a/include/linux/sched.h
> +++ b/include/linux/sched.h
> @@ -1630,6 +1630,7 @@ extern struct mm_struct *get_task_mm(struct task_struct *task);
> extern void mm_release(struct task_struct *, struct mm_struct *);
>
> extern int copy_thread(int, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, struct task_struct *,
struct pt_regs *);
> +extern int copy_a_thread(struct task_struct *, int, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned
long, struct task_struct *, struct pt_regs *);
> extern void flush_thread(void);
> extern void exit_thread(void);
>
> @@ -1645,6 +1646,7 @@ extern int allow_signal(int);
> extern int disallow_signal(int);
>
> extern int do_execve(char *, char __user * __user *, char __user * __user *, struct pt_regs *);
> +extern long do_fork_task(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long, unsigned long, struct pt_regs
*, unsigned long, int __user *, int __user *);
> extern long do_fork(unsigned long, unsigned long, struct pt_regs *, unsigned long, int __user *,
int __user *);
> struct task_struct *fork_idle(int);
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/syscalls.h b/include/linux/syscalls.h
> index f696874..5bc7384 100644
> --- a/include/linux/syscalls.h
> +++ b/include/linux/syscalls.h
> @@ -616,5 +616,6 @@ int kernel_execve(const char *filename, char *const argv[], char *const
envp[]);
>
> asmlinkage long sys_revokeat(int dfd, const char __user *filename);
> asmlinkage long sys_frevoked(unsigned int fd);
> +asmlinkage long sys_hijack(unsigned long flags, pid_t pid, int __user *ptid, int __user *ctid);
>
> #endif
> diff --git a/kernel/cgroup.c b/kernel/cgroup.c
> index 1e8aa53..e587896 100644
> --- a/kernel/cgroup.c
> +++ b/kernel/cgroup.c
> @@ -2460,12 +2460,12 @@ static struct file_operations proc_cgroupstats_operations = {
> * At the point that cgroup_fork() is called, 'current' is the parent
> * task, and the passed argument 'child' points to the child task.
> */
> -void cgroup_fork(struct task_struct *child)

```

```

> +void cgroup_fork(struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *child)
> {
> -   task_lock(current);
> -   child->cgroups = current->cgroups;
> +   task_lock(parent);
> +   child->cgroups = parent->cgroups;
>   get_css_set(child->cgroups);
> -   task_unlock(current);
> +   task_unlock(parent);
>   INIT_LIST_HEAD(&child->cg_list);
> }
>
> diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
> index f85731a..ac73f3e 100644
> --- a/kernel/fork.c
> +++ b/kernel/fork.c
> @@ -621,13 +621,14 @@ struct fs_struct *copy_fs_struct(struct fs_struct *old)
>
> EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(copy_fs_struct);
>
> -static inline int copy_fs(unsigned long clone_flags, struct task_struct * tsk)
> +static inline int copy_fs(unsigned long clone_flags,
> +      struct task_struct * src, struct task_struct * tsk)
> {
>   if (clone_flags & CLONE_FS) {
> -     atomic_inc(&current->fs->count);
> +     atomic_inc(&src->fs->count);
>     return 0;
>   }
> -   tsk->fs = __copy_fs_struct(current->fs);
> +   tsk->fs = __copy_fs_struct(src->fs);
>   if (!tsk->fs)
>     return -ENOMEM;
>   return 0;
> @@ -973,7 +974,8 @@ static inline void rt_mutex_init_task(struct task_struct *p)
> * parts of the process environment (as per the clone
> * flags). The actual kick-off is left to the caller.
> */
> -static struct task_struct *copy_process(unsigned long clone_flags,
> +static struct task_struct *copy_process(struct task_struct *task,
> +      unsigned long clone_flags,
> +      unsigned long stack_start,
> +      struct pt_regs *regs,
> +      unsigned long stack_size,
> @@ -1007,15 +1009,17 @@ static struct task_struct *copy_process(unsigned long clone_flags,
>     goto fork_out;
>
>
>     retval = -ENOMEM;

```

```

> - p = dup_task_struct(current);
> + p = dup_task_struct(task);
>   if (!p)
>       goto fork_out;
>
>   rt_mutex_init_task(p);
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_TRACE_IRQFLAGS
> -   DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(!p->hardirqs_enabled);
> -   DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(!p->softirqs_enabled);
> +   if (task == current) {
> +       DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(!p->hardirqs_enabled);
> +       DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(!p->softirqs_enabled);
> +   }
> #endif
>   retval = -EAGAIN;
>   if (atomic_read(&p->user->processes) >=
> @@ -1084,7 +1088,7 @@ static struct task_struct *copy_process(unsigned long clone_flags,
> #endif
>   p->io_context = NULL;
>   p->audit_context = NULL;
> -   cgroup_fork(p);
> +   cgroup_fork(task, p);
> #ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
>   p->mempolicy = mpol_copy(p->mempolicy);
>   if (IS_ERR(p->mempolicy)) {
> @@ -1132,7 +1136,7 @@ static struct task_struct *copy_process(unsigned long clone_flags,
>       goto bad_fork_cleanup_audit;
>   if ((retval = copy_files(clone_flags, p)))
>       goto bad_fork_cleanup_semundo;
> -   if ((retval = copy_fs(clone_flags, p)))
> +   if ((retval = copy_fs(clone_flags, task, p)))
>       goto bad_fork_cleanup_files;
>   if ((retval = copy_sighand(clone_flags, p)))
>       goto bad_fork_cleanup_fs;
> @@ -1144,13 +1148,13 @@ static struct task_struct *copy_process(unsigned long clone_flags,
>       goto bad_fork_cleanup_mm;
>   if ((retval = copy_namespaces(clone_flags, p)))
>       goto bad_fork_cleanup_keys;
> -   retval = copy_thread(0, clone_flags, stack_start, stack_size, p, regs);
> +   retval = copy_a_thread(task, 0, clone_flags, stack_start, stack_size, p, regs);
>   if (retval)
>       goto bad_fork_cleanup_namespaces;
>
>   if (pid != &init_struct_pid) {
>       retval = -ENOMEM;
> -       pid = alloc_pid(task_active_pid_ns(p));
> +       pid = alloc_pid(task);

```

```

>         if (!pid)
>             goto bad_fork_cleanup_namespaces;
>
> @@ -1164,7 +1168,7 @@ static struct task_struct *copy_process(unsigned long clone_flags,
>     p->pid = pid_nr(pid);
>     p->tgid = p->pid;
>     if (clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD)
> -         p->tgid = current->tgid;
> +         p->tgid = task->tgid;
>
>     p->set_child_tid = (clone_flags & CLONE_CHILD_SETTID) ? child_tidptr : NULL;
>     /*
> @@ -1380,7 +1384,7 @@ struct task_struct * __cpuinit fork_idle(int cpu)
>     struct task_struct *task;
>     struct pt_regs regs;
>
> -     task = copy_process(CLONE_VM, 0, idle_regs(&regs), 0, NULL,
> +     task = copy_process(current, CLONE_VM, 0, idle_regs(&regs), 0, NULL,
>         &init_struct_pid);
>     if (!IS_ERR(task))
>         init_idle(task, cpu);
> @@ -1405,12 +1409,12 @@ static inline int fork_traceflag (unsigned clone_flags)
> }
>
> /*
> - * Ok, this is the main fork-routine.
> - *
> - * It copies the process, and if successful kick-starts
> - * it and waits for it to finish using the VM if required.
> + * if called with task!=current, then caller must ensure that
> + * 1. it has a reference to task
> + * 2. current must have ptrace permission to task
> */
> -long do_fork(unsigned long clone_flags,
> +long do_fork_task(struct task_struct *task,
> +     unsigned long clone_flags,
> +     unsigned long stack_start,
> +     struct pt_regs *regs,
> +     unsigned long stack_size,
> @@ -1421,13 +1425,23 @@ long do_fork(unsigned long clone_flags,
>     int trace = 0;
>     long nr;
>
> +     if (task != current) {
> +         /* sanity checks */
> +         /* we only want to allow hijacking the simplest cases */
> +         if (clone_flags & CLONE_SYSVSEM)
> +             return -EINVAL;

```

```

> +     if (current->ptrace)
> +         return -EPERM;
> +     if (task->ptrace)
> +         return -EINVAL;
> +     }
>     if (unlikely(current->ptrace)) {
>         trace = fork_traceflag (clone_flags);
>         if (trace)
>             clone_flags |= CLONE_PTRACE;
>     }
>
> -     p = copy_process(clone_flags, stack_start, regs, stack_size,
> +     p = copy_process(task, clone_flags, stack_start, regs, stack_size,
>         child_tidptr, NULL);
>     /*
>     * Do this prior waking up the new thread - the thread pointer
> @@ -1489,6 +1503,23 @@ long do_fork(unsigned long clone_flags,
>     return nr;
> }
>
> +/*
> + * Ok, this is the main fork-routine.
> + *
> + * It copies the process, and if successful kick-starts
> + * it and waits for it to finish using the VM if required.
> + */
> +long do_fork(unsigned long clone_flags,
> +     unsigned long stack_start,
> +     struct pt_regs *regs,
> +     unsigned long stack_size,
> +     int __user *parent_tidptr,
> +     int __user *child_tidptr)
> +{
> +     return do_fork_task(current, clone_flags, stack_start,
> +         regs, stack_size, parent_tidptr, child_tidptr);
> +}
> +
> #ifndef ARCH_MIN_MMSTRUCT_ALIGN
> #define ARCH_MIN_MMSTRUCT_ALIGN 0
> #endif
> diff --git a/kernel/pid.c b/kernel/pid.c
> index d7388d7..b887a6a 100644
> --- a/kernel/pid.c
> +++ b/kernel/pid.c
> @@ -238,14 +238,15 @@ fastcall void free_pid(struct pid *pid)
>     call_rcu(&pid->rcu, delayed_put_pid);
> }
>

```

```

> -struct pid *alloc_pid(struct pid_namespace *ns)
> +struct pid *alloc_pid(struct task_struct *srctsk)
> {
>     struct pid *pid;
>     enum pid_type type;
>     int i, nr;
> -     struct pid_namespace *tmp;
> +     struct pid_namespace *tmp, *ns;
>     struct upid *upid;
>
> +     ns = task_active_pid_ns(srctsk);
>     pid = kmem_cache_alloc(ns->pid_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
>     if (!pid)
>         goto out;
> diff --git a/kernel/ptrace.c b/kernel/ptrace.c
> index 7c76f2f..c65c9fe 100644
> --- a/kernel/ptrace.c
> +++ b/kernel/ptrace.c
> @@ -159,6 +159,13 @@ int ptrace_may_attach(struct task_struct *task)
>     return !err;
> }
>
> +int ptrace_may_attach_locked(struct task_struct *task)
> +{
> +     int err;
> +     err = may_attach(task);
> +     return !err;
> +}
> +
> int ptrace_attach(struct task_struct *task)
> {
>     int retval;
> --
> 1.5.1
>
> _____
> Containers mailing list
> Containers@lists.linux-foundation.org
> https://lists.linux-foundation.org/mailman/listinfo/containers
>

```

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Subject: Re: [PATCH] namespaces: introduce sys_hijack (v4)

Quoting Cedric Le Goater (clg@fr.ibm.com):

>
>> hmm, I'm wondering how this is going to work for a process which
>> would have unshared its device (pts) namespace. How are we going
>> to link the pts living in different namespaces if the stdios of the
>> hijacked process is using them ? like in the case of a shell, which
>> is certainly something we would like to hijacked.
>>>
>>> it looks like a challenge for me. maybe I'm wrong.
>>
>> Might be a problem, but tough to address that until we actually
>> have a dev ns or devpts ns and established semantics.
>>
>> Note the filestruct comes from current, not the hijack target, so
>> presumably we can work around the tty issue in any case by
>> keeping an open file across the hijack?
>>
>> For instance, use the attached modified version of hijack.c
>> which puts a writeable fd for /tmp/helloworld in fd 5, then
>> does hijack, then from the resulting shell do
>>
>> echo ab >&5
>>
>> So we should easily be able to work around it.
>
> yes. it should.
>
>> Or am i missing something?
>
> I guess we need to work a little more on the pts/device namespace
> to see how it interacts.
>
>>> The effect is a sort of namespace enter. The following program
>>> uses sys_hijack to 'enter' all namespaces of the specified pid.
>>> For instance in one terminal, do
>>>
>>> mount -t cgroup -ons /cgroup
>>> hostname
>>> qemu
>>> ns_exec -u /bin/sh
>>> hostname serge
>>> echo \$\$
>>> 1073
>>> cat /proc/\$\$/cgroup
>>> ns:/node_1073
>> Is there a reason to have the 'node_' prefix ? couldn't we just

> >> use \$pid ?
> >
> > Good question. It's just how the ns-cgroup does it... If you want to
> > send in a patch to change that, I'll ack it.
>
> just below.
>
> I gave a quick look to the ns subsystem and didn't see how the node_\$pid
> was destroyed. do we have to do a rmdir ?
>
> Thanks,
>
>
> C.
>
> Signed-off-by: Cedric Le Goater <clg@fr.ibm.com>

Thanks.

Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>

```
> ---
> kernel/cgroup.c | 2 +-
> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> Index: 2.6.23-mm1/kernel/cgroup.c
> =====
> --- 2.6.23-mm1.orig/kernel/cgroup.c
> +++ 2.6.23-mm1/kernel/cgroup.c
> @@ -2604,7 +2604,7 @@ int cgroup_clone(struct task_struct *tsk
>     cg = tsk->cgroups;
>     parent = task_cgroup(tsk, subsys->subsys_id);
>
> -     snprintf(nodename, MAX_CGROUP_TYPE_NAMELEN, "node_%d", tsk->pid);
> +     snprintf(nodename, MAX_CGROUP_TYPE_NAMELEN, "%d", tsk->pid);
>
>     /* Pin the hierarchy */
>     atomic_inc(&parent->root->sb->s_active);
```

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Subject: Re: [PATCH] namespaces: introduce sys_hijack (v4)
Posted by [serue](#) on Tue, 16 Oct 2007 14:37:44 GMT
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Quoting Paul Menage (menage@google.com):

> One thought on this - could we make the API have a "which" parameter
> that indicates the type of thing being acted upon? E.g., like
> sys_setpriority(), which can specify the target as a process, a pgrp
> or a user.

>
> Right now the target would just be a process, but I'd really like the
> ability to be able to specify an fd on a cgroup directory to indicate
> that I want the child to inherit from that cgroup's namespaces. That
> way you wouldn't need to keep a child process alive in the namespace
> just to act as a hijack target.

Good idea. I would in fact originally have taken a cgroup instead of a pid, but wasn't sure how best to identify the cgroup. Originally I was more worried about pid exiting/wraparound, but then decided that with a real container the container_init can't go away until the container goes away anyway.

Anyway, I can go ahead and add 'int which' to the parameter list now, and leave the details of how to specify a cgroup for later. That way at least the api won't fundamentally change again.

Good idea, thanks.

-serge

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Subject: Re: [PATCH] namespaces: introduce sys_hijack (v4)
Posted by [Paul Menage](#) on Tue, 16 Oct 2007 16:32:16 GMT
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On 10/16/07, Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> wrote:
> pid, but wasn't sure how best to identify the cgroup. Originally I was
> more worried about pid exiting/wraparound, but then decided that with a
> real container the container_init can't go away until the container goes
> away anyway.

For those "real containers" that have init. Not everything is going to need that level of virtualization, particularly if you're primarily interested in isolation.

>
> Anyway, I can go ahead and add 'int which' to the parameter list now,
> and leave the details of how to specify a cgroup for later. That way at

> least the api won't fundamentally change again.

Great, thanks.

Paul

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Subject: Re: [PATCH] namespaces: introduce sys_hijack (v4)
Posted by [serue](#) on Tue, 16 Oct 2007 18:57:37 GMT
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Quoting Paul Menage (menage@google.com):

> On 10/16/07, Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> wrote:
> > pid, but wasn't sure how best to identify the cgroup. Originally I was
> > more worried about pid exiting/wraparound, but then decided that with a
> > real container the container_init can't go away until the container goes
> > away anyway.
>
> For those "real containers" that have init. Not everything is going to
> need that level of virtualization, particularly if you're primarily
> interested in isolation.

Currently every pid namespace's pid==1 must stick around as long as the pid namespace does. If you kill the pid==1, all processes in the container are killed.

> > Anyway, I can go ahead and add 'int which' to the parameter list now,
> > and leave the details of how to specify a cgroup for later. That way at
> > least the api won't fundamentally change again.
>
> Great, thanks.

Since the goal here is to get the API right, do you know how we expect to send the cgroup in? A string?

Currently my prototype is

```
+asmlinkage long sys_hijack(unsigned long flags, int which, pid_t pid,  
+                          const char __user *cgroup);
```

But that doesn't seem quite right. At that point we just ditch 'which' and use cgroups if it's not NULL, use pid otherwise...

Thoughts?

thanks,
-serge

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Subject: Re: [PATCH] namespaces: introduce sys_hijack (v4)
Posted by [Paul Menage](#) on Tue, 16 Oct 2007 19:03:17 GMT
[View Forum Message](#) <> [Reply to Message](#)

On 10/16/07, Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> wrote:

>
> Currently every pid namespace's pid==1 must stick around as long as the
> pid namespace does. If you kill the pid==1, all processes in the
> container are killed.

What about people who aren't using pid namespaces?

>
> > Anyway, I can go ahead and add 'int which' to the parameter list now,
> > and leave the details of how to specify a cgroup for later. That way at
> > least the api won't fundamentally change again.
> >
> > Great, thanks.
>
> Since the goal here is to get the API right, do you know how we expect
> to send the cgroup in? A string?

My thought was to use an fd on an open cgroup directory - that can be trivially translated into a cgroup.

Paul

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Subject: Re: [PATCH] namespaces: introduce sys_hijack (v4)
Posted by [serue](#) on Tue, 16 Oct 2007 19:12:00 GMT
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Quoting Paul Menage (menage@google.com):
> On 10/16/07, Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> wrote:

> >
> > Currently every pid namespace's pid==1 must stick around as long as the
> > pid namespace does. If you kill the pid==1, all processes in the
> > container are killed.
>
> What about people who aren't using pid namespaces?

Not really isolated? :)

> > > Anyway, I can go ahead and add 'int which' to the parameter list now,
> > > and leave the details of how to specify a cgroup for later. That way at
> > > least the api won't fundamentally change again.
> > >
> > > Great, thanks.
> >
> > Since the goal here is to get the API right, do you know how we expect
> > to send the cgroup in? A string?
>
> My thought was to use an fd on an open cgroup directory - that can be
> trivially translated into a cgroup.

Oh good, so I can just pass in a single arg id, so

```
asmlinkage long sys_hijack(unsigned long clone_flags, int which,  
                           unsigned long id);
```

?

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Subject: Re: [PATCH] namespaces: introduce sys_hijack (v4)
Posted by [Paul Menage](#) on Tue, 16 Oct 2007 19:29:36 GMT
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On 10/16/07, Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> wrote:

>
> Oh good, so I can just pass in a single arg id, so
>
> asmlinkage long sys_hijack(unsigned long clone_flags, int which,
> unsigned long id);
>
>

Sounds good.

Paul

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<https://lists.linux-foundation.org/mailman/listinfo/containers>

Subject: Re: [PATCH] namespaces: introduce sys_hijack (v4)
Posted by [Paul Menage](#) on Tue, 16 Oct 2007 19:32:05 GMT
[View Forum Message](#) <> [Reply to Message](#)

On 10/16/07, Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> wrote:

```
>  
> Oh good, so I can just pass in a single arg id, so  
>  
> asmlinkage long sys_hijack(unsigned long clone_flags, int which,  
>             unsigned long id);  
>
```

Sounds good.

Paul

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Subject: Re: [PATCH] namespaces: introduce sys_hijack (v4)
Posted by [Cedric Le Goater](#) on Tue, 16 Oct 2007 21:28:22 GMT
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```
> asmlinkage long sys_hijack(unsigned long clone_flags, int which,  
>     unsigned long id);
```

I expect to get more explanation of the arguments in the patch
you are going to send :)

'which' is used as a switch for 'id' : pid or fd on a open cgroup
directory. right ?

Thanks,

C.

Containers mailing list
Containers@lists.linux-foundation.org

Subject: Re: [PATCH] namespaces: introduce sys_hijack (v4)

Posted by [serue](#) on Tue, 16 Oct 2007 21:32:00 GMT

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Quoting Cedric Le Goater (clg@fr.ibm.com):

>
> > asmlinkage long sys_hijack(unsigned long clone_flags, int which,
> > unsigned long id);
>
> I expect to get more explanation of the arguments in the patch
> you are going to send :)

There'll have to be a man page at some point (ugh).

> 'which' is used as a switch for 'id' : pid or fd on a open cgroup
> directory. right ?

Yup.

-serge

Containers mailing list

Containers@lists.linux-foundation.org

<https://lists.linux-foundation.org/mailman/listinfo/containers>
