
Subject: [PATCH v3] Allow access to /proc/\$PID/fd after setuid()

Posted by [adobriyan](#) on Fri, 09 Feb 2007 15:02:57 GMT

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/proc/\$PID/fd has r-x----- permissions, so if process does setuid(), it will not be able to access /proc/*/fd/. This breaks fstatat() emulation in glibc.

```
open("foo", O_RDONLY|O_DIRECTORY)      = 4
setuid32(65534)                      = 0
stat64("/proc/self/fd/4/bar", 0xbfafb298) = -1 EACCES (Permission denied)
```

Comments and suggestions from Andrew Morton and Oleg Nesterov.

Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@openvz.org>

```
fs/proc/base.c | 18 ++++++=====
1 file changed, 18 insertions(+)
```

```
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -1414,10 +1414,28 @@ static struct file_operations proc_fd_op
};

/*
+ * /proc/pid/fd needs a special permission handler so that a process can still
+ * access /proc/self/fd after it has executed a setuid().
+ */
+static int proc_fd_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask,
+    struct nameidata *nd)
+{
+    int rv;
+
+    rv = generic_permission(inode, mask, NULL);
+    if (rv == 0)
+        return 0;
+    if (task_pid(current) == proc_pid(inode))
+        rv = 0;
+    return rv;
+}
+
+/*
+ * proc directories can do almost nothing..
+*/
static struct inode_operations proc_fd_inode_operations = {
    .lookup = proc_lookupfd,
    + .permission = proc_fd_permission,
```

```
.setattr = proc setattr,  
};
```
