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Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 0/2] net: connect to UNIX sockets from specified root  
Posted by [Stanislav Kinsbursky](#) on Sat, 11 Aug 2012 11:15:24 GMT  
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> On 08/11/2012 03:09 AM, H. Peter Anvin wrote:  
>> On 08/10/2012 12:28 PM, Alan Cox wrote:  
>>> Explicitly for Linux yes - this is not generally true of the AF\_UNIX  
>>> socket domain and even the permissions aspect isn't guaranteed to be  
>>> supported on some BSD environments !  
>> Yes, but let's worry about what the Linux behavior should be.  
>>  
>>> The name is however just a proxy for the socket itself. You don't even  
>>> get a device node in the usual sense or the same inode in the file system  
>>> space.  
>>  
>> No, but it is looked up the same way any other inode is (the difference  
>> between FIFOs and sockets is that sockets have separate connections,  
>> which is also why open() on sockets would be nice.)  
>>  
>> However, there is a fundamental difference between AF\_UNIX sockets and  
>> open(), and that is how the pathname is delivered. It thus would make  
>> more sense to provide the openat()-like information in struct  
>> sockaddr\_un, but that may be very hard to do in a sensible way. In that  
>> sense it perhaps would be cleaner to be able to do an open[at]() on the  
>> socket node with O\_PATH (perhaps there should be an O\_SOCKET option,  
>> even?) and pass the resulting file descriptor to bind() or connect().  
> I vote for this (openat + O\_WHATEVER on a unix socket) as well. It will  
> help us in checkpoint-restore, making handling of overmounted/unlinked  
> sockets much cleaner.

I have to notice, that it's not enough and doesn't solve the issue.  
There should be some way how to connect/bind already existent unix  
socket (from kernel, at least), because socket can be created in user space.  
And this way (sock operation or whatever) have to provide an ability to  
lookup UNIX socket starting from specified root to support containers.

>  
>> -hpa  
> Thanks,  
> Pavel  
>

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