## Subject: Re: User namespaces and keys Posted by ebiederm on Wed, 23 Feb 2011 15:45:49 GMT View Forum Message <> Reply to Message David Howells <a href="mailto:dhowells@redhat.com">dhowells@redhat.com</a>> writes:

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> Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> wrote:
>> > I guess we need to look at how to mix keys and namespaces again.
>>
>> From strictly kernel pov, at the moment, keys are strictly usable only
>> by the user in your own user namespace.
>
> I'm not sure that's currently completely true. Key quota maintenance is
> namespaced, and the key's owner UID/GID belong to that namespace, so that's
> okay, but:
>
 (*) key_task_permission() does not distinguish UIDs and GIDs from different
     namespaces.
>
>
 (*) A key can be referred to by its serial number, no matter whose namespace
    it is in, and will yield up its given UID/GID, even if these aren't
>
    actually meaningful in your namespace.
>
>
>
    This means request_key() can successfully upcall at the moment.
>
> I wonder if I should make the following changes:
> (1) If the key and the accessor are in different user namespaces, then skip
    the UID and GID comparisons in key_task_permission(). That means that to
>
    be able to access the key you'd have to possess the key and the key would
    have to grant you Possessor access, or the key would have to grant you
>
    Other access.
>
> (2) If the key and someone viewing the key description are in different
    namespaces, then indicate that the UID and the GID are -1, irrespective of
>
    the actual values.
>
>
 (3) When an upcall is attempting to instantiate a key, it is allowed to access
    the keys of requestor using the requestor's credentials (UID, GID, groups,
>
    security label). Ensure that this will be done in the requestor's user
>
    namespace.
>
>
>
    Nothing should need to be done here, since search_process_keyrings()
     switches to the requestor's creds.
>
```

> Oh, and are security labels user-namespaced?

Not at this time. The user namespace as currently merged is little more than a place holder for a proper implementation. Serge is busily fleshing out that proper implementation.

Until we reach the point where all checks that have historically been "if (uid1 == uid2)" become "if ((uidns1 == uidns2) && (uid1 == uid2))" there will be problems.

The security labels and probably Ism's in general need to be per user namespace but we simply have not gotten that far. For the short term I will be happy when we get a minimally usable user namespace.

Eric

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