
Subject: Re: [PATCH 5/9] Allow ptrace from non-init user namespaces

Posted by [ebiederm](#) on Fri, 18 Feb 2011 02:59:57 GMT

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"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> writes:

> ptrace is allowed to tasks in the same user namespace according to
> the usual rules (i.e. the same rules as for two tasks in the init
> user namespace). ptrace is also allowed to a user namespace to
> which the current task has CAP_SYS_PTRACE capability.

I don't see how it can go wrong at the moment but
same_or_ancestor_user_ns is too permissive and potentially inefficient.
Can you please replace it with a simple user namespace equality check.

Eric

> Changelog:

> Dec 31: Address feedback by Eric:

> . Correct ptrace uid check
> . Rename may_ptrace_ns to ptrace_capable
> . Also fix the cap_ptrace checks.

> Jan 1: Use const cred struct

> Jan 11: use task_ns_capable() in place of ptrace_capable().

>

> Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>

> ---

> include/linux/capability.h | 2 +

> include/linux/user_namespace.h | 9 +++++++

> kernel/ptrace.c | 27 ++++++-----

> kernel/user_namespace.c | 16 ++++++-----

> security/commoncap.c | 48 ++++++-----

> 5 files changed, 82 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)

>

> diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h

> index cb3d2d9..bc0f262 100644

> --- a/include/linux/capability.h

> +++ b/include/linux/capability.h

> @@ -546,6 +546,8 @@ extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_init_eff_set;

> */

> #define has_capability(t, cap) (security_real_capable((t), &init_user_ns, (cap)) == 0)

>

> +#define has_ns_capability(t, ns, cap) (security_real_capable((t), (ns), (cap)) == 0)

> +

> /**

> * has_capability_noaudit - Determine if a task has a superior capability available (unaudited)

```

> * @t: The task in question
> diff --git a/include/linux/user_namespace.h b/include/linux/user_namespace.h
> index faf4679..862fc59 100644
> --- a/include/linux/user_namespace.h
> +++ b/include/linux/user_namespace.h
> @@ -39,6 +39,9 @@ static inline void put_user_ns(struct user_namespace *ns)
> uid_t user_ns_map_uid(struct user_namespace *to, const struct cred *cred, uid_t uid);
> gid_t user_ns_map_gid(struct user_namespace *to, const struct cred *cred, gid_t gid);
>
> +int same_or_ancestor_user_ns(struct task_struct *task,
> + struct task_struct *victim);
> +
> #else
>
> static inline struct user_namespace *get_user_ns(struct user_namespace *ns)
> @@ -66,6 +69,12 @@ static inline gid_t user_ns_map_gid(struct user_namespace *to,
> return gid;
> }
>
> +static inline int same_or_ancestor_user_ns(struct task_struct *task,
> + struct task_struct *victim)
> +{
> + return 1;
> +}
> +
> #endif
>
> #endif /* _LINUX_USER_H */
> diff --git a/kernel/ptrace.c b/kernel/ptrace.c
> index 1708b1e..cde4655 100644
> --- a/kernel/ptrace.c
> +++ b/kernel/ptrace.c
> @@ -134,21 +134,24 @@ int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
>     return 0;
>     rCU_read_lock();
>     tcred = __task_cred(task);
> - if ((cred->uid != tcred->euid ||
> -     cred->uid != tcred->suid ||
> -     cred->uid != tcred->uid ||
> -     cred->gid != tcred->egid ||
> -     cred->gid != tcred->sgid ||
> -     cred->gid != tcred->gid) &&
> -     !capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE)) {
> -     rCU_read_unlock();
> -     return -EPERM;
> - }
> + if (cred->user->user_ns == tcred->user->user_ns &&

```

```

> + (cred->uid == tcred->euid &&
> + cred->uid == tcred->suid &&
> + cred->uid == tcred->uid &&
> + cred->gid == tcred->egid &&
> + cred->gid == tcred->sgid &&
> + cred->gid == tcred->gid))
> + goto ok;
> + if (ns_capable(tcred->user->user_ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
> + goto ok;
> + rCU_read_unlock();
> + return -EPERM;
> +ok:
>   rCU_read_unlock();
>   smp_rmb();
>   if (task->mm)
>     dumpable = get_dumpable(task->mm);
> - if (!dumpable && !capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
> + if (!dumpable && !task_ns_capable(task, CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
>   return -EPERM;
>
>   return security_ptrace_access_check(task, mode);
> @@ -198,7 +201,7 @@ int ptrace_attach(struct task_struct *task)
>   goto unlock_tasklist;
>
>   task->ptrace = PT_PTRACED;
> - if (capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
> + if (task_ns_capable(task, CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
>   task->ptrace |= PT_PTRACE_CAP;
>
>   __ptrace_link(task, current);
> diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c
> index 9da289c..0ef2258 100644
> --- a/kernel/user_namespace.c
> +++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c
> @@ -129,6 +129,22 @@ gid_t user_ns_map_gid(struct user_namespace *to, const struct cred
*cred, gid_t
>   return overflowgid;
> }
>
> +int same_or_ancestor_user_ns(struct task_struct *task,
> + struct task_struct *victim)
> +{
> + struct user_namespace *u1 = task_cred_xxx(task, user)->user_ns;
> + struct user_namespace *u2 = task_cred_xxx(victim, user)->user_ns;
> + for (;;) {
> + if (u1 == u2)
> + return 1;
> + if (u1 == &init_user_ns)

```

```

> + return 0;
> +
> + u1 = u1->creator->user_ns;
> +
> + /* We never get here */
> + return 0;
> +
> +
> static __init int user_namespaces_init(void)
> {
>     user_ns_cachep = KMEM_CACHE(user_namespace, SLAB_PANIC);
> diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
> index 51fa9ec..12ff65c 100644
> --- a/security/commoncap.c
> +++ b/security/commoncap.c
> @@ -130,18 +130,34 @@ int cap_settime(struct timespec *ts, struct timezone *tz)
>     * @child: The process to be accessed
>     * @mode: The mode of attachment.
>     *
> + * If we are in the same or an ancestor user_ns and have all the target
> + * task's capabilities, then ptrace access is allowed.
> + * If we have the ptrace capability to the target user_ns, then ptrace
> + * access is allowed.
> + * Else denied.
> +
> + *
> + * Determine whether a process may access another, returning 0 if permission
> + * granted, -ve if denied.
> +
> int cap_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
> {
>     int ret = 0;
> +
>     const struct cred *cred, *tcred;
>
>     rcu_read_lock();
> -
>     if (!cap_issubset(__task_cred(child)->cap_permitted,
> -         current_cred()->cap_permitted) &&
> -         !capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
> -         ret = -EPERM;
> +
>     cred = current_cred();
> +
>     tcred = __task_cred(child);
> +
>     /*
> +     * The ancestor user_ns check may be gratuitous, as I think
> +     * we've already guaranteed that in kernel/ptrace.c.
> +
> +     if (same_or_ancestor_user_ns(current, child) &&
> +         cap_issubset(tcred->cap_permitted, cred->cap_permitted))
> +         goto out;

```

I have commented on this before but I took a good hard look this time,

and can comment more intelligently.

The cap_issubset check is for the case where we don't use the CAP_SYS_PTRACE capability, as such is only valid in the same user namespace. Furthermore capabilities really are not comparable between different user namespaces. So can you please replace the same_or_ancestor_user_ns with a simple namespace equality check. Having the wrong logic in here will just be confusing in the future.

Also could you name tcred child_cread I think that would be clearer in the test below.

```
> + if (ns_capable(tcrc->user->user_ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE))  
> + goto out;  
> + ret = -EPERM;  
> +out:  
>   rCU_read_unlock();  
>   return ret;
```

I also find it strange that we allow CAP_SYS_PTRACE to allow us to ptrace processes with more capabilities than ourselves. But that is an entirely different issue.

```
> }  
> @@ -150,18 +166,34 @@ int cap_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int  
mode)  
>   * cap_ptrace_traceme - Determine whether another process may trace the current  
>   * @parent: The task proposed to be the tracer  
>   *  
> + * If parent is in the same or an ancestor user_ns and has all current's  
> + * capabilities, then ptrace access is allowed.  
> + * If parent has the ptrace capability to current's user_ns, then ptrace  
> + * access is allowed.  
> + * Else denied.  
> + *  
>   * Determine whether the nominated task is permitted to trace the current  
>   * process, returning 0 if permission is granted, -ve if denied.  
>   */  
> int cap_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)  
> {  
>   int ret = 0;  
> + const struct cred *cred, *tcrc;  
>  
>   rCU_read_lock();  
> - if (!cap_issubset(current_cred()->cap_permitted,  
> -     __task_cred(parent)->cap_permitted) &&  
> -     !has_capability(parent, CAP_SYS_PTRACE))  
> - ret = -EPERM;
```

```
> + cred = __task_cred(parent);
> + tcred = current_cred();
> + /*
> + * The ancestor user_ns check may be gratuitous, as I think
> + * we've already guaranteed that in kernel/ptrace.c.
> + */
> + if (same_or_ancestor_user_ns(parent, current) &&
> +     cap_issubset(tcred->cap_permitted, cred->cap_permitted))
> +     goto out;
> + if (has_ns_capability(parent, tcred->user->user_ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
> +     goto out;
> + ret = -EPERM;
> +out:
>     rCU_read_unlock();
>     return ret;
> }
```

Containers mailing list

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<https://lists.linux-foundation.org/mailman/listinfo/containers>
