
Subject: Re: [PATCH 6/9] user namespaces: convert all capable checks in kernel/sys.c

Posted by [ebiederm](#) on Fri, 18 Feb 2011 01:57:15 GMT

[View Forum Message](#) <> [Reply to Message](#)

"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> writes:

> This allows setuid/setgid in containers. It also fixes some
> corner cases where kernel logic foregoes capability checks when
> uids are equivalent. The latter will need to be done throughout
> the whole kernel.

Except for the extra printk in sethostname this looks good.

Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>

>
> Changelog:
> Jan 11: Use nsown_capable() as suggested by Bastian Blank.
> Jan 11: Fix logic errors in uid checks pointed out by Bastian.
> Feb 15: allow prlimit to current (was regression in previous version)
>
> Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
> ---
> kernel/sys.c | 74 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
> 1 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c
> index 7a1bbad..075370d 100644
> --- a/kernel/sys.c
> +++ b/kernel/sys.c
> @@ -118,17 +118,29 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(cad_pid);
>
> void (*pm_power_off_prepare)(void);
>
> +/* called with rcu_read_lock, creds are safe */
> +static inline int set_one_prio_perm(struct task_struct *p)
> +{
> + const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *pcred = __task_cred(p);
> +
> + if (pcred->user->user_ns == cred->user->user_ns &&
> + (pcred->uid == cred->euid ||
> + pcred->euid == cred->euid))
> + return 1;
> + if (ns_capable(pcred->user->user_ns, CAP_SYS_NICE))
> + return 1;
> + return 0;
> +}

```

> +
> /*
>  * set the priority of a task
>  * - the caller must hold the RCU read lock
>  */
> static int set_one_prio(struct task_struct *p, int niceval, int error)
> {
> - const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *pcred = __task_cred(p);
>   int no_nice;
>
> - if (pcred->uid != cred->euid &&
> -   pcred->euid != cred->euid && !capable(CAP_SYS_NICE)) {
> + if (!set_one_prio_perm(p)) {
>   error = -EPERM;
>   goto out;
> }
> @@ -502,7 +514,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setregid, gid_t, rgid, gid_t, egid)
>   if (rgid != (gid_t) -1) {
>     if (old->gid == rgid ||
>         old->egid == rgid ||
> -     capable(CAP_SETGID))
> +     nsown_capable(CAP_SETGID))
>     new->gid = rgid;
>   else
>     goto error;
> @@ -511,7 +523,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setregid, gid_t, rgid, gid_t, egid)
>   if (old->gid == egid ||
>       old->egid == egid ||
>       old->sgid == egid ||
> -     capable(CAP_SETGID))
> +     nsown_capable(CAP_SETGID))
>     new->egid = egid;
>   else
>     goto error;
> @@ -546,7 +558,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setgid, gid_t, gid)
>   old = current_cred();
>
>   retval = -EPERM;
> - if (capable(CAP_SETGID))
> + if (nsown_capable(CAP_SETGID))
>   new->gid = new->egid = new->sgid = new->fsgid = gid;
>   else if (gid == old->gid || gid == old->sgid)
>     new->egid = new->fsgid = gid;
> @@ -613,7 +625,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setreuid, uid_t, ruid, uid_t, euid)
>   new->uid = ruid;
>   if (old->uid != ruid &&
>       old->euid != ruid &&
> -   !capable(CAP_SETUID))

```

```

> + !nsown_capable(CAP_SETUID))
> goto error;
> }
>
> @@ -622,7 +634,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setreuid, uid_t, ruid, uid_t, euid)
> if (old->uid != euid &&
>     old->euid != euid &&
>     old->suid != euid &&
> - !capable(CAP_SETUID))
> + !nsown_capable(CAP_SETUID))
> goto error;
> }
>
> @@ -670,7 +682,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setuid, uid_t, uid)
> old = current_cred();
>
> retval = -EPERM;
> - if (capable(CAP_SETUID)) {
> + if (nsown_capable(CAP_SETUID)) {
> new->suid = new->uid = uid;
> if (uid != old->uid) {
>     retval = set_user(new);
> @@ -712,7 +724,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(setresuid, uid_t, ruid, uid_t, euid, uid_t, suid)
> old = current_cred();
>
> retval = -EPERM;
> - if (!capable(CAP_SETUID)) {
> + if (!nsown_capable(CAP_SETUID)) {
> if (ruid != (uid_t) -1 && ruid != old->uid &&
>     ruid != old->euid && ruid != old->suid)
>     goto error;
> @@ -776,7 +788,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(setresgid, gid_t, rgid, gid_t, egid, gid_t, sgid)
> old = current_cred();
>
> retval = -EPERM;
> - if (!capable(CAP_SETGID)) {
> + if (!nsown_capable(CAP_SETGID)) {
> if (rgid != (gid_t) -1 && rgid != old->gid &&
>     rgid != old->egid && rgid != old->sgid)
>     goto error;
> @@ -836,7 +848,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setfsuid, uid_t, uid)
>
> if (uid == old->uid || uid == old->euid ||
>     uid == old->suid || uid == old->fsuid ||
> - capable(CAP_SETUID)) {
> + nsown_capable(CAP_SETUID)) {
> if (uid != old->fsuid) {
> new->fsuid = uid;

```

```

> if (security_task_fix_setuid(new, old, LSM_SETID_FS) == 0)
> @@ -869,7 +881,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setfsgid, gid_t, gid)
>
> if (gid == old->gid || gid == old->egid ||
>     gid == old->sgid || gid == old->fsgid ||
> -   capable(CAP_SETGID)) {
> +   nsown_capable(CAP_SETGID)) {
>     if (gid != old_fsgid) {
>       new->fsgid = gid;
>       goto change_okay;
> @@ -1177,8 +1189,11 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(sethostname, char __user *, name, int, len)
> int errno;
> char tmp[__NEW_UTS_LEN];
>
> - if (!ns_capable(current->nsproxy->uts_ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> + if (!ns_capable(current->nsproxy->uts_ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
> +   printk(KERN_NOTICE "%s: did not have CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n", __func__);
>   return -EPERM;
> + }
> + printk(KERN_NOTICE "%s: did have CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n", __func__);

```

Ouch! This new print statement could be really annoying if an unprivileged user calls sethostname. Could you remove it?

```

> if (len < 0 || len > __NEW_UTS_LEN)
>   return -EINVAL;
> down_write(&uts_sem);
> @@ -1226,7 +1241,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setdomainname, char __user *, name, int, len)
> int errno;
> char tmp[__NEW_UTS_LEN];
>
> - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> + if (!ns_capable(current->nsproxy->uts_ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
>   return -EPERM;
> if (len < 0 || len > __NEW_UTS_LEN)
>   return -EINVAL;
> @@ -1341,6 +1356,8 @@ int do_prlimit(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned int resource,
>   rlim = tsk->signal->rlim + resource;
>   task_lock(tsk->group_leader);
>   if (new_rlim) {
> +   /* Keep the capable check against init_user_ns until
> +    cgroups can contain all limits */
>   if (new_rlim->rlim_max > rlim->rlim_max &&
>       !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE))
>     retval = -EPERM;
> @@ -1384,19 +1401,22 @@ static int check_prlimit_permission(struct task_struct *task)
> {
>   const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *tcred;

```

```

>
> - tcred = __task_cred(task);
> - if (current != task &&
> -     (cred->uid != tcred->euid ||
> -     cred->uid != tcred->suid ||
> -     cred->uid != tcred->uid ||
> -     cred->gid != tcred->egid ||
> -     cred->gid != tcred->sgid ||
> -     cred->gid != tcred->gid) &&
> -     !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE)) {
> - return -EPERM;
> - }
> + if (current == task)
> + return 0;
>
> - return 0;
> + tcred = __task_cred(task);
> + if (cred->user->user_ns == tcred->user->user_ns &&
> +     (cred->uid == tcred->euid &&
> +     cred->uid == tcred->suid &&
> +     cred->uid == tcred->uid &&
> +     cred->gid == tcred->egid &&
> +     cred->gid == tcred->sgid &&
> +     cred->gid == tcred->gid))
> + return 0;
> + if (ns_capable(tcred->user->user_ns, CAP_SYS_RESOURCE))
> + return 0;
> +
> + return -EPERM;
> }
>
> SYSCALL_DEFINE4(prlimit64, pid_t, pid, unsigned int, resource,

```

Containers mailing list

Containers@lists.linux-foundation.org

<https://lists.linux-foundation.org/mailman/listinfo/containers>
