Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/6] IPC namespace - utils Posted by Cedric Le Goater on Tue, 13 Jun 2006 21:17:44 GMT

View Forum Message <> Reply to Message

Eric W. Biederman wrote:

- >> task records a list of struct sem_undo each containing a semaphore id. When
- >> we unshare ipc namespace, we break the 'reference' between the semaphore id
- >> and the struct sem array because the struct sem array are cleared and freed
- >> in the new namespace. When the task exit, that inconstency could lead to
- >> unexpected results in exit_sem(), task locks, BUG_ON, etc. Nope?

>

- > Agreed. Hmm. I bet I didn't see this one earlier because it is specific
- > to the unshare case. In this case I guess we should either deny the unshare
- > or simply undo all of the semaphores. Because we will never be able to
- > talk to them again.

So aren't we reaching the unshare() limits? Shouldn't we be using the exec() principle for the sysvipc namespace? clear it all and start from scratch.

- > Thinking about this some more we need to unsharing the semaphore undo semantics
- > when we create a new instances of the sysvipc namespace. Which means that
- > until that piece is implemented we can't unshare the sysvipc namespace.

no big issue I think. exit_sem() does it already. it would end up coding the yet unsupported unshare_semundo().

> But we clearly need the check in check_unshare_flags and the start of copy_process.

Yes. CLONE_SYSVSEM and CLONE_NEWIPC overlap in some ways.

- >>> * I don't like the idea of being able to unshare the ipc namespace and keep
- >>> some shared memory from the previous ipc namespace mapped in the process mm.
- >>>> Should we forbid the unshare?
- >>> No. As long as the code handles that case properly we should be fine.
- >> what is the proper way to handle that case ? the current patchset is not
- >> protected: a process can be in one ipc namespace and use a shared segment
- >> from a previous ipc namespace. This situation is not desirable in a
- >> migration scenario. May be asking too much for the moment ... and I agree
- >> this can be fixed by the way namespaces are created.

>

- > As long as the appropriate reference counting happens it shouldn't be
- > a problem. We obviously can't use the sysvipc name of the shm area
- > but mmap and reads and writes should continue to work.

in that case, namespace ids are protected but namespace objects aren't. I expect a higher level object (container) making sure this is consistent.

Page 2 of 2 ---- Generated from OpenVZ Forum