
Subject: Re: [PATCH] ptrace: it is fun to strace /sbin/init

Posted by [serue](#) on Tue, 25 Mar 2008 18:06:11 GMT

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Quoting Stephen Smalley (sds@tycho.nsa.gov):

>
> On Tue, 2008-03-25 at 08:40 -0500, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> > Quoting Stephen Smalley (sds@tycho.nsa.gov):
> > >
> > > On Tue, 2008-03-25 at 02:04 +0300, Oleg Nesterov wrote:
> > > > On 03/24, Pavel Machek wrote:
> > > > >
> > > > > /sbin/init is important, but there are other important (and sometimes
> > > > > much more important) services. Why it is so special so that we can't
> > > > > debug/strace it?
> > > > >
> > > > > Maybe. Let's kill /sbin/init protection in 2.6.26. But making it
> > > > > optional is wrong.
> > > > >
> > > > > You are right, the boot parameter is silly. How about sysctl?
> > > > >
> > > > > Stephen, do you see any security problems if we make /sbin/init
> > > > > ptraceable by default?
> > > > >
> > > > > Not an issue for SELinux (we apply an orthogonal check based on security
> > > > > context, so we can already block ptrace of init independent of whether
> > > > > root/CAP_SYS_PTRACE can do it). I'm not sure though as to whether
> > > > > people using capabilities have ever relied on this special protection of
> > > > > init (e.g. custom init spawns children with lesser capabilities and
> > > > > relies on the fact that they cannot ptrace init to effectively re-gain
> > > > > those capabilities, even if they possess CAP_SYS_PTRACE).
> > > > >
> > > > > Still thinking it through, but it seems like special casing init isn't
> > > > > useful. There are likely to be other tasks with all capabilities
> > > > > set which the malicious task could just as well ptrace to do his
> > > > > mischief, right?
> > > > >
> > > > > Depends on the bounding set. Didn't it used to be the case that only
> > > > > init had CAP_SETPCAP (until the meaning of it was changed by the
> > > > > filesystem capability support)?

Not quite. CAP_SETPCAP was taken out of everyone's bounding set. But kernel/sysctl.c allowed only init to add capabilities to the bounding set. (Whereas CAP_SYS_MODULE was sufficient to remove them).

> Might want to double check with e.g. the vservers folks that they
> weren't relying in any way on special handling of init.

Herbert, Pavel, do you have objections to allowing ptrace of init?
(I believe Eric has already Acked the idea iirc?)

thanks,
-serge

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