## Subject: Re: [PATCH 4/4] The control group itself Posted by serue on Tue, 15 Jan 2008 17:49:41 GMT

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Quoting Paul Menage (menage@google.com):

- > On Jan 15, 2008 6:44 AM, Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> wrote:
- > >
- >> I don't think so... Wouldn't really make sense for the cgroup
- > > infrastructure to presume to know what to enforce, and I don't see any
- > > checks around the \_write functions in cgroup.c, and no capable() calls
- > > at all.

>

- > The cgroup filesystem can provide simple unix-level permissions on any
- > given file. Am I right in thinking that having an entry in the mapper
- > doesn't automatically give privileges for a device to the members of
- > the cgroup, but they also have to have sufficient privilege in their
- > own right? If so, that might be sufficient.

Oh, well actually I think what we'd want is to require both CAP\_NS\_OVERRIDE and either CAP\_MKNOD or CAP\_SYS\_ADMIN. So it's probably fine to leave this as is for now, and after I resend the patchset which pushes CAP\_NS\_OVERRIDE (which is in a 4-patch userns patchset I've been sitting on) the extra checks can be added.

- > One other thought should the parse/print routines themselves do a
- > translation based on the device mappings for the writer/reader's
- > cgroup? That way you could safely give a VE full permission to write
- > to its children's device maps, but it would only be able to add/remap
- > device targets that it could address itself.

Oh, well if we do this then we can just as well use the translation functions to not allow a VE to add to its own set of devices, right?

Then maybe capable(CAP\_NS\_OVERRIDE|CAP\_SYS\_ADMIN) would only be required to add devices.

Though there \*is\* some bit of danger to removing devices from a privileged daemon, isn't there? Though I can't think of examples just now. (Sorry, piercing headache, can't think quite right, will think about this later)

-serge

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