Subject: Re: [patch 1/2] [RFC] Simple tamper-proof device filesystem. Posted by Oren Laadan on Tue, 18 Dec 2007 03:03:42 GMT

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## Serge E. Hallyn wrote:

- > Quoting Oren Laadan (orenl@cs.columbia.edu):
- >> I hate to bring this again, but what if the admin in the container
- >> mounts an external file system (eg. nfs, usb, loop mount from a file,
- >> or via fuse), and that file system already has a device that we would
- >> like to ban inside that container?

>

- > Miklos' user mount patches enforced that if !capable(CAP\_MKNOD),
- > then mnt->mnt\_flags |= MNT\_NODEV. So that's no problem.

Yes, that works to disallow all device files from a mounted file system.

But it's a black and white thing: either they are all banned or allowed; you can't have some devices allowed and others not, depending on type A scenario where this may be useful is, for instance, if we some apps in the container to execute withing a pre-made chroot (sub)tree within that container.

> But that's been pulled out of -mm! ? Crap.
> Since anyway we will have to keep a white- (or black-) list of devices
>> that are permitted in a container, and that list may change even change
>> per container -- why not enforce the access control at the VFS layer ?
>> It's safer in the long run.
>
> By that you mean more along the lines of Pavel's patch than my whitelist
> LSM, or you actually mean Tetsuo's filesystem (i assume you don't mean that
> by 'vfs layer' :), or something different entirely?

By 'vfs' I mean at open() time, and not at mount(), or mknod() time. Either yours or Pavel's; I tend to prefer not to use LSM as it may collide with future security modules.

Oren.

>

:)

> thanks,

> -serge

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