## Subject: [RFC] [PATCH -mm] oom\_kill: remove uid==0 checks Posted by serue on Wed, 12 Dec 2007 21:18:35 GMT

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>From a5fd2d7c75168076dc6b4b94ea8cda529fc506b1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001

From: serue@us.ibm.com <serue@us.ibm.com>

Date: Wed, 5 Dec 2007 14:07:40 -0800

Subject: [RFC] [PATCH -mm] oom\_kill: remove uid==0 checks

Root processes are considered more important when out of memory and killing processes. The check for CAP\_SYS\_ADMIN was augmented with a check for uid==0 or euid==0.

There are several possible ways to look at this:

- uid comparisons are unnecessary, trust CAP\_SYS\_ADMIN alone. However CAP\_SYS\_RESOURCE is the one that really means "give me extra resources" so allow for that as well.
- Any privileged code should be protected, but uid is not an indication of privilege. So we should check whether any capabilities are raised.
- 3. uid==0 makes processes on the host as well as in containers more important, so we should keep the existing checks.
- 4. uid==0 makes processes only on the host more important, even without any capabilities. So we should be keeping the (uid==0||euid==0) check but only when userns==&init\_user\_ns.

I'm following number 1 here.

Andrew, I've cc:d you here bc in doing this patch I noticed that your 64-bit capabilities patch switched this code from an explicit check of cap\_t(p->cap\_effective) to using \_\_capable(). That means that now being glossed over by the oom killer means PF\_SUPERPRIV will be set. Is that intentional?

```
* less likely that we kill those.

*/
- if (__capable(p, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || p->uid == 0 || p->euid == 0)
+ if (__capable(p, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || __capable(p, CAP_SYS_RESOURCE))
points /= 4;

/*
--
1.5.1

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```