Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] hijack: update task\_alloc\_security Posted by serue on Tue, 27 Nov 2007 15:43:56 GMT View Forum Message <> Reply to Message

Quoting Stephen Smalley (sds@tycho.nsa.gov): > On Tue, 2007-11-27 at 00:52 -0500, Joshua Brindle wrote: > > Mark Nelson wrote: > > Subject: [PATCH 2/2] hijack: update task\_alloc\_security > > >

> > Update task\_alloc\_security() to take the hijacked task as a second > > argument.

> > >

>>> For the selinux version, refuse permission if hijack\_src!=current,

> > since we have no idea what the proper behavior is. Even if we

> > > assume that the resulting child should be in the hijacked task's

- > > > domain, depending on the policy that may not be enough information
- > > since init\_t executing /bin/bash could result in a different domain
- > > > than login\_t executing /bin/bash.

>>>

>>>

> > This means its basically not possible to hijack tasks with SELinux

> right? It would be a shame if this weren't useful to people running SELinux.

- > I agree with this part we don't want people to have to choose between
- > using containers and using selinux, so if hijack is going to be a

> requirement for effective use of containers, then we need to make them

> work together.

Absolutely, we just need to decide how to properly make it work with selinux. Maybe we check for

allow (current\_domain):(hijacked\_process\_domain) hijack type\_transition hijacked\_process\_domain \ vserver\_enter\_binary\_t:process vserver1\_hijack\_admin\_t;

The reason I decided to punt on this altogether is that the decision of which type to use for the resulting process seems tricky and definately requires new policy.

If we are using completely custom and simple policies for vservers, i.e. every process in a vserver is type vserver\_3\_t, then it's not so complicated. But if I hijack a process in 'container 3', and the resulting type is calculated in part based on the type of the hijacked process, then I'll end up with a different type based on whether I'm hijackign the init process, an ssh daemon, someone's shell, etc. Then I do some admin activity in that resulting process and end up labeling files in the vserver based on the process I had hijacked. > It seems to me (I may be wrong, I'm sure someone will let me know if I > > am) that the right way to handle this with SELinux is to check to see if > > the current task (caller of sys\_hijack) has permission to ptrace (or >

> I think this may already happen in the first patch, by virtue of calling > the existing ptrace checks including the security hook. Right?

Good point, I forgot about that. So that may suffice for a permissions check. Now we just need to decide how to determine a type for the resulting process.

> some other permission deemed suitable, perhaps a new one) and if so copy
> the security blob pointer from the hijacked task to the new one (we
> don't want tranquility problems).
> Just to clarify, we wouldn't be copying the pointer; here we are

> allocating and populating a new task's security structure. We can
> either continue to inherit the SIDs from current in all cases, or we
> could set tsec1 = hijack\_src->security; in selinux\_task\_alloc\_security()
> if we wanted to inherit from the hijacked task instead. The latter
> would be similar to what you do in copy\_hijackable\_taskinfo() for uids
> and capabilities IIUC. However, which behavior is right needs more
> discussion I think, as the new task is a mixture of the caller's state
> and the hijacked task's state. Which largely seems a recipe for
> disaster.

Yes, especially if we don't have a single type for all processes in a container.

Maybe what's needed is a more general discussion about how selinux policy is to be used with containers, even without hijack. I have a vm set aside where I'm starting to write a container policy module. I just need to get a kernel lined up. Was hoping to start next week.

In the meantime I still think it's prudent to punt on the selinux hijacking code for now.

thanks,

-serge

>

- >> From your paragraph above it seems like you were thinking there should
- > > be a transition at hijack time but we don't automatically transition
- > > anywhere except exec.
- > >

> > Anyway, I just don't think you should completely disable this for

> SELinux users.

> >

```
>>> Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Mark Nelson <markn@au1.ibm.com>
>>>---
>>> include/linux/security.h | 12 +++++++++---
>>> kernel/fork.c
                            2 +-
>>> security/dummy.c
                            3 ++-
>>> security/security.c
                           4 ++--
>>> security/selinux/hooks.c | 6 ++++-
>>> 5 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
>>>
>>> Index: upstream/include/linux/security.h
> > > ======
>>>--- upstream.orig/include/linux/security.h
>>>+++ upstream/include/linux/security.h
>>> @ @ -545,9 +545,13 @ @ struct request_sock;
>>> * Return 0 if permission is granted.
>>> * @task alloc security:
>>> * @p contains the task_struct for child process.
>>>+ * @task contains the task struct for process to be hijacked
>>> * Allocate and attach a security structure to the p-security field. The
>>> * security field is initialized to NULL when the task structure is
>>> * allocated.
>> + * @task will usually be current. If it is not equal to current, then
>>>+ * a sys_hijack system call is going on, and current is asking for a
>>>+ * child to be created in the context of the hijack src, @task.
>>> * Return 0 if operation was successful.
>> * @task_free_security:
>>> * @p contains the task_struct for process.
>>> @ @ -1301,7 +1305,8 @ @ struct security operations {
>>> int (*dentry_open) (struct file *file);
>>>
>>> int (*task_create) (unsigned long clone_flags);
>> - int (*task_alloc_security) (struct task_struct * p);
>>> + int (*task_alloc_security) (struct task_struct *p,
           struct task_struct *task);
>>>+
>>> void (*task free security) (struct task struct * p);
>>> int (*task_setuid) (uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags);
>>> int (*task post setuid) (uid t old ruid /* or fsuid */,
>>> @ @ -1549,7 +1554,7 @ @ int security_file_send_sigiotask(struct
>>> int security file receive(struct file *file);
>>> int security dentry open(struct file *file);
>>> int security_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags);
> > - int security_task_alloc(struct task_struct *p);
>>> +int security_task_alloc(struct task_struct *p, struct task_struct *task);
>>> void security_task_free(struct task_struct *p);
>>> int security_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags);
>>> int security task post setuid(uid t old ruid, uid t old euid,
>> @@ -2021,7 +2026,8 @@ static inline int security task create (
```

```
>>> return 0;
>>> }
>>>
> > -static inline int security_task_alloc (struct task_struct *p)
> > + static inline int security_task_alloc(struct task_struct *p,
>>>+
             struct task_struct *task)
>>> {
>>> return 0;
>>> }
> > > Index: upstream/kernel/fork.c
> > > =============
> > > --- upstream.orig/kernel/fork.c
>>>+++ upstream/kernel/fork.c
>>> @ @ -1177,7 +1177,7 @ @ static struct task_struct *copy_process(
>>> /* Perform scheduler related setup. Assign this task to a CPU. */
>> sched_fork(p, clone_flags);
>>>
>>> - if ((retval = security_task_alloc(p)))
>>>+ if ((retval = security_task_alloc(p, task)))
>>> goto bad_fork_cleanup_policy;
>>> if ((retval = audit alloc(p)))
>>> goto bad fork cleanup security;
>>> Index: upstream/security/dummy.c
=====
>>> --- upstream.orig/security/dummy.c
>>>+++ upstream/security/dummy.c
>>> @ @ -475,7 +475,8 @ @ static int dummy_task_create (unsigned I
>>> return 0;
>>> }
>>>
>>> -static int dummy task alloc security (struct task struct *p)
>>>+static int dummy_task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *p,
            struct task_struct *task)
>>>+
>>> {
>>> return 0;
>>> }
>>> Index: upstream/security/security.c
> > > =========
>>> --- upstream.orig/security/security.c
>>>+++ upstream/security/security.c
>>> @@ -568,9 +568,9 @@ int security task create(unsigned long c
>>> return security_ops->task_create(clone_flags);
>>> }
>>>
>>> -int security_task_alloc(struct task_struct *p)
> > + int security_task_alloc(struct task_struct *p, struct task_struct *task)
>>> {
>>> - return security_ops->task_alloc_security(p);
```

```
>> + return security_ops->task_alloc_security(p, task);
>>> }
>>>
>>> void security_task_free(struct task_struct *p)
> > > Index: upstream/security/selinux/hooks.c
>>>--- upstream.orig/security/selinux/hooks.c
>>>+++ upstream/security/selinux/hooks.c
>>> @ @ -2788,11 +2788,15 @ @ static int selinux task create(unsigned
>>> return task has perm(current, current, PROCESS FORK);
>>> }
>>>
> > - static int selinux_task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *tsk)
>>>+static int selinux_task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *tsk,
            struct task_struct *hijack_src)
> > > +
>>> {
>>> struct task security struct *tsec1, *tsec2;
>>> int rc:
>>>
>>>+ if (hijack_src != current)
>>>+ return -EPERM;
> > > +
>>> tsec1 = current->security;
>>>
>> rc = task_alloc_security(tsk);
>>>-
> > To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in
> > > the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org
> >> More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
>>>
>>>
> >
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>>-
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