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Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] capabilities: introduce per-process capability bounding set (v7)

Posted by [serue](#) on Sat, 17 Nov 2007 03:42:26 GMT

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Quoting Andrew Morgan ([morgan@kernel.org](mailto:morgan@kernel.org)):

> Serge,  
>  
> I've been thinking a lot about this one. As an alternative  
> implementation, have you considered changing one bounding capability bit  
> per system call? Something like this:  
>  
>   prctl(PR\_CAPBSET\_READ, CAPVERSION, CAP\_NET\_RAW);  
>       returns -> 1(allowed) or 0(blocked)  
>   prctl(PR\_CAPBSET\_DROP, CAPVERSION, CAP\_NET\_RAW)  
>       returns -> 0(success) or -EPERM;

Interesting. Didn't like it on first read, but it certainly has its appeal. Sure, I'll whip something like this up.

> I also think we should use CAP\_SETPCAP for the privilege of manipulating  
> the bounding set. In many ways irrevocably removing a permission  
> requires the same level of due care as adding one (to pl).

Aside from being heavy-handed, it also means that we are restricting the use of per-process capability bounding sets to kernels with file capabilities compiled in, right? Are we ok with that?

> This has scalability designed in, at the expense of more system calls to  
> get the same (rare) work done.

>  
> Cheers  
>  
> Andrew

Thanks,  
-serge

>  
> Serge E. Hallyn wrote:  
> >>From 9ba95f1dbf88a512ffd423f6ccd627dc0460b052 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001  
> > From: Serge E. Hallyn <[serue@us.ibm.com](mailto:serue@us.ibm.com)>  
> > Date: Mon, 12 Nov 2007 16:50:04 -0500  
> > Subject: [PATCH 2/2] capabilities: introduce per-process capability bounding set (v7)  
> >  
> > The capability bounding set is a set beyond which capabilities  
> > cannot grow. Currently cap\_bset is per-system. It can be  
> > manipulated through sysctl, but only init can add capabilities.

>> Root can remove capabilities. By default it includes all caps  
>> except CAP\_SETPCAP.  
>>  
>> This patch makes the bounding set per-process. It is inherited  
>> at fork from parent. No one can add elements, CAP\_SYS\_ADMIN is  
>> required to remove them. Perhaps a new capability should be  
>> introduced to control the ability to remove capabilities, in  
>> order to help prevent running a privileged app with enough  
>> privs to be dangerous but not enough to be successful.  
>>  
>> One example use of this is to start a safer container. For  
>> instance, until device namespaces or per-container device  
>> whitelists are introduced, it is best to take CAP\_MKNOD away  
>> from a container.  
>>  
>> Two questions:  
>>  
>> 1. I set CAP\_FULL\_SET and CAP\_INIT\_EFF\_SET to contain  
>> only valid capabilities. Does that seem like a future maintenance  
>> headache? We only want the capability bounding set returned from kernel  
>> to container valid capabilities, so having CAP\_FULL\_SET contain all  
>> capabilities would mean that on every cap\_prctl\_getbset() we'd have to  
>> either manually clear invalid bits or let userspace sort it out.  
>>  
>> 2. Would getting and setting the bounding sets be  
>> better done through syscall? That better mirrors the capset+capget,  
>> but using prctl better mirrors the keep\_capabilities setting.  
>>  
>> The following test program will get and set the bounding  
>> set. For instance  
>>  
>> ./bset get  
>> (lists capabilities in bset)  
>> ./bset strset cap\_sys\_admin  
>> (starts shell with new bset)  
>> (use capset, setuid binary, or binary with  
>> file capabilities to try to increase caps)  
>>  
>> =====  
>> bset.c:  
>> =====  
>> #include <sys/prctl.h>  
>> #include <linux/capability.h>  
>> #include <sys/types.h>  
>> #include <unistd.h>  
>> #include <stdio.h>  
>> #include <stdlib.h>  
>> #include <string.h>

```
> >
> > #ifndef PR_GET_CAPBSET
> > #define PR_GET_CAPBSET 23
> > #endif
> >
> > #ifndef PR_SET_CAPBSET
> > #define PR_SET_CAPBSET 24
> > #endif
> >
> > #define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_1 0x19980330
> > #define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_2 0x20071026
> > #define CAPVERSION _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_2
> >
> > #define NUMCAPS 31
> >
> > int usage(char *me)
> > {
> >     printf("Usage: %s get\n", me);
> >     printf("      %s set capability_string\n", me);
> >     printf("      capability_string is for instance:\n");
> >     printf("      cap_sys_admin,cap_mknod,cap_dac_override\n");
> >     return 1;
> > }
> >
> > char *capturable[] = {
> >     "cap_dac_override",
> >     "cap_dac_read_search",
> >     "cap_fowner",
> >     "cap_fsetid",
> >     "cap_kill",
> >     "cap_setgid",
> >     "cap_setuid",
> >     "cap_setpcap",
> >     "cap_linux_immutable",
> >     "cap_net_bind_service",
> >     "cap_net_broadcast",
> >     "cap_net_admin",
> >     "cap_net_raw",
> >     "cap_ipc_lock",
> >     "cap_ipc_owner",
> >     "cap_sys_module",
> >     "cap_sys_rawio",
> >     "cap_sys_chroot",
> >     "cap_sys_ptrace",
> >     "cap_sys_pacct",
> >     "cap_sys_admin",
> >     "cap_sys_boot",
> >     "cap_sys_nice",
```

```

>> "cap_sys_resource",
>> "cap_sys_time",
>> "cap_sys_tty_config",
>> "cap_mknod",
>> "cap_lease",
>> "cap_audit_write",
>> "cap_audit_control",
>> "cap_setfcap"
>> };
>>
>> char *bittosstr(unsigned int i, unsigned int j)
>> {
>> if (i!=0 || j>31)
>> return "invalid";
>> return captable[j];
>> }
>>
>> void print_capset(unsigned int *bset)
>> {
>> unsigned int i, j, comma=0;
>> printf("Capability bounding set: ");
>> for (i=0; i<2; i++) {
>> for (j=0; j<31; j++)
>> if (bset[i] & (1 << (j+1)))
>> printf("%s%s", comma++?", ":"",bittosstr(i, j));
>> }
>> printf("\n");
>> }
>>
>> int getbcap(void)
>> {
>> unsigned int bset[2];
>> if (prctl(PR_GET_CAPBSET, CAPVERSION, &bset)) {
>> perror("prctl");
>> return 1;
>> }
>> print_capset(bset);
>> return 0;
>> }
>>
>> int captoint(char *cap)
>> {
>> int i;
>> for (i=0; i<NUMCAPS; i++)
>> if (strcmp(captable[i], cap) == 0)
>> return i+1;
>> return -1;
>> }

```

```

> >
> > int setbcap(char *str)
> > {
> >     int ret;
> >     unsigned int bset[2];
> >     char *token = strtok(str, ",");
> >
> >     bset[0] = bset[1] = 0;
> >     while (token) {
> >         int bit = cappoint(token);
> >         if (bit < 0) {
> >             printf("invalid cap: %s\n", token);
> >             return 1;
> >         }
> >         bset[bit/32] |= 1 << (bit%32);
> >         token = strtok(NULL, ",");
> >
> >     }
> >     if (prctl(PR_SET_CAPBSET, CAPVERSION, &bset)) {
> >         perror("prctl");
> >         return 1;
> >     }
> >     return 0;
> > }
> >
> > int main(int argc, char *argv[])
> > {
> >     if (argc<2)
> >         return usage(argv[0]);
> >     if (strcmp(argv[1], "get")==0)
> >         return getbcap();
> >     if (strcmp(argv[1], "set")!=0 || argc<3)
> >         return usage(argv[0]);
> >     if (setbcap(argv[2]))
> >         return 1;
> >     return execl("/bin/bash", "/bin/bash", NULL);
> > }
> > =====
> >
> > Changelog:
> > Enforce current-> capabilities are subsets of the
> > new bounding set.
> >
> > As suggested by Andrew Morgan, send the capability
> > version along with the bset for prctl(PR_SET_CAPBSET)
> > and PR_GET_CAPBSET)
> >
> > Adapt to 64-bit capabilities.

```

```

> >
> > Update CAP_FULL_SET and CAP_INIT_EFF_SET to only
> > contain valid capabilities.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
> > ---
> > include/linux/capability.h | 34 ++++++-----+
> > include/linux/init_task.h | 1 +
> > include/linux/prctl.h | 4 +++
> > include/linux/sched.h | 2 ++
> > include/linux/security.h | 5 ----
> > include/linux/sysctl.h | 3 --
> > kernel/fork.c | 1 +
> > kernel/sys.c | 53 ++++++-----+
> > kernel/sysctl.c | 35 -----
> > kernel/sysctl_check.c | 7 ----
> > security/commoncap.c | 37 ++++++-----+
> > 11 files changed, 124 insertions(+), 58 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h
> > index a1d93da..64e668a 100644
> > --- a/include/linux/capability.h
> > +++ b/include/linux/capability.h
> > @@ -202,7 +202,6 @@ typedef struct kernel_cap_struct {
> > #define CAP_IPC_OWNER 15
> >
> > /* Insert and remove kernel modules - modify kernel without limit */
> > /*-/* Modify cap_bset */
> > #define CAP_SYS_MODULE 16
> >
> > /* Allow ioperm/iopl access */
> > @@ -259,6 +258,7 @@ typedef struct kernel_cap_struct {
> > arbitrary SCSI commands */
> > /* Allow setting encryption key on loopback filesystem */
> > /* Allow setting zone reclaim policy */
> > /*+/* Allow taking bits out of capability bounding set */
> >
> > #define CAP_SYS_ADMIN 21
> >
> > @@ -315,6 +315,12 @@ typedef struct kernel_cap_struct {
> > #define CAP_SETFCAP 31
> >
> > /*
> > + * XXX
> > + * When adding a capability, please update the definitions of
> > + * CAP_FULL_SET and CAP_INIT_EFF_SET below
> > + */
> > +

```

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> > +/*
> > * Bit location of each capability (used by user-space library and kernel)
> > */
> >
> > @@ -341,8 +347,8 @@ typedef struct kernel_cap_struct {
> > #else /* HAND-CODED capability initializers */
> >
> > # define CAP_EMPTY_SET {{ 0, 0 }}
> > -# define CAP_FULL_SET {{ ~0, ~0 }}
> > -# define CAP_INIT_EFF_SET {{ ~CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SETPCAP), ~0 }}
> > +# define CAP_FULL_SET {{ ~0, 0 }}
> > +# define CAP_INIT_EFF_SET {{ ~CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SETPCAP), 0 }}
> > # define CAP_FS_SET {{ CAP_FS_MASK_B0, 0 }}
> > # define CAP_NFSD_SET {{ CAP_FS_MASK_B0|CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE), 0 }}
> >
> > @@ -350,6 +356,17 @@ typedef struct kernel_cap_struct {
> >
> > #define CAP_INIT_INH_SET CAP_EMPTY_SET
> >
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
> > +/*
> > + * Because of the reduced scope of CAP_SETPCAP when filesystem
> > + * capabilities are in effect, it is safe to allow this capability to
> > + * be available in the default configuration.
> > +*/
> > +# define CAP_INIT_BSET CAP_FULL_SET
> > +#else
> > +# define CAP_INIT_BSET CAP_INIT_EFF_SET
> > +#endif
> > +
> > # define cap_clear(c) do { (c) = __cap_empty_set; } while (0)
> > # define cap_set_full(c) do { (c) = __cap_full_set; } while (0)
> > # define cap_set_init_eff(c) do { (c) = __cap_init_eff_set; } while (0)
> > @@ -465,6 +482,17 @@ extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_init_eff_set;
> > int capable(int cap);
> > int __capable(struct task_struct *t, int cap);
> >
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_COMMONCAP
> > +extern int cap_prctl_setbset(kernel_cap_t new_bset);
> > +extern int cap_prctl_getbset(kernel_cap_t *bset);
> > +#else
> > +#include <linux/errno.h>
> > +static inline int cap_prctl_setbset(kernel_cap_t new_bset)
> > +{ return -EINVAL; }
> > +static inline int cap_prctl_getbset(kernel_cap_t *bset)
> > +{ return -EINVAL; }
> > +#endif

```

```

> > +
> > #endif /* __KERNEL__ */
> >
> > #endif /* !_LINUX_CAPABILITY_H */
> > diff --git a/include/linux/init_task.h b/include/linux/init_task.h
> > index cae35b6..5c84d14 100644
> > --- a/include/linux/init_task.h
> > +++ b/include/linux/init_task.h
> > @@ -147,6 +147,7 @@ extern struct group_info init_groups;
> >   .cap_effective = CAP_INIT_EFF_SET, \
> >   .cap_inheritable = CAP_INIT_INH_SET, \
> >   .cap_permitted = CAP_FULL_SET, \
> > + .cap_bset = CAP_INIT_BSET, \
> >   .keep_capabilities = 0, \
> >   .user = INIT_USER, \
> >   .comm = "swapper", \
> > diff --git a/include/linux/prctl.h b/include/linux/prctl.h
> > index e2eff90..a7de023 100644
> > --- a/include/linux/prctl.h
> > +++ b/include/linux/prctl.h
> > @@ -63,4 +63,8 @@
> > #define PR_GET_SECCOMP 21
> > #define PR_SET_SECCOMP 22
> >
> > /* Get/set the capability bounding set */
> > +#define PR_GET_CAPBSET 23
> > +#define PR_SET_CAPBSET 24
> > +
> > #endif /* _LINUX_PRCTL_H */
> > diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h
> > index 1d17f7c..bf51a16 100644
> > --- a/include/linux/sched.h
> > +++ b/include/linux/sched.h
> > @@ -1041,7 +1041,7 @@ struct task_struct {
> >   uid_t uid,euid,suid,fsuid;
> >   gid_t gid,egid,sgid,fsgid;
> >   struct group_info *group_info;
> >   - kernel_cap_t cap_effective, cap_inheritable, cap_permitted;
> > + kernel_cap_t cap_effective, cap_inheritable, cap_permitted, cap_bset;
> >   unsigned keep_capabilities:1;
> >   struct user_struct *user;
> >   #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
> > diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> > index f771ad8..04b18f1 100644
> > --- a/include/linux/security.h
> > +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> > @@ -34,11 +34,6 @@
> > #include <linux/xfrm.h>

```

```

> > #include <net/flow.h>
> >
> > /*
> > - * Bounding set
> > - */
> > -extern kernel_cap_t cap_bset;
> > -
> > extern unsigned securebits;
> >
> > struct ctl_table;
> > diff --git a/include/linux/sysctl.h b/include/linux/sysctl.h
> > index 4f5047d..fa900cb 100644
> > --- a/include/linux/sysctl.h
> > +++ b/include/linux/sysctl.h
> > @@ -102,7 +102,6 @@ enum
> > KERN_NODENAME=7,
> > KERN_DOMAINNAME=8,
> >
> > - KERN_CAP_BSET=14, /* int: capability bounding set */
> > KERN_PANIC=15, /* int: panic timeout */
> > KERN_REALROOTDEV=16, /* real root device to mount after initrd */
> >
> > @@ -962,8 +961,6 @@ extern int proc_destring(struct ctl_table *, int, struct file *,
> >     void __user *, size_t *, loff_t *);
> > extern int proc_dointvec(struct ctl_table *, int, struct file *,
> >     void __user *, size_t *, loff_t *);
> > -extern int proc_dointvec_bset(struct ctl_table *, int, struct file *,
> >     void __user *, size_t *, loff_t *);
> > extern int proc_dointvec_minmax(struct ctl_table *, int, struct file *,
> >     void __user *, size_t *, loff_t *);
> > extern int proc_dointvec_jiffies(struct ctl_table *, int, struct file *,
> > diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
> > index 5639b3e..9e4a5e1 100644
> > --- a/kernel/fork.c
> > +++ b/kernel/fork.c
> > @@ -1087,6 +1087,7 @@ static struct task_struct *copy_process(unsigned long clone_flags,
> > #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
> > p->security = NULL;
> > #endif
> > + p->cap_bset = current->cap_bset;
> > p->io_context = NULL;
> > p->audit_context = NULL;
> > cgroup_fork(p);
> > diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c
> > index 4c77ed2..b2bca40 100644
> > --- a/kernel/sys.c
> > +++ b/kernel/sys.c
> > @@ -1637,7 +1637,56 @@ asmlinkage long sys_umask(int mask)

```

```

>> mask = xchg(&current->fs->umask, mask & S_IRWXUGO);
>> return mask;
>> }
>> +
>> +long prctl_get_capbset(unsigned long vp, unsigned long bp)
>> +{
>> + long error;
>> + int tocopy;
>> + int i;
>> + kernel_cap_t bset;
>> +
>> + if (vp == _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_2)
>> + tocopy = _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_2;
>> + else if (vp == _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_1)
>> + tocopy = _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_1;
>> + else
>> + return -EINVAL;
>> +
>> + error = cap_prctl_getbset(&bset);
>> + if (error)
>> + return error;
>> +
>> + for (i = tocopy; i < _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S; i++) {
>> + if (bset.cap[i])
>> + /* Cannot represent w/ legacy structure */
>> + return -ERANGE;
>> +
>> +
>> + error = copy_to_user((__u32 __user *)bp, &bset, tocopy * sizeof(__u32));
>> + return error;
>> +
>> +
>> +long prctl_set_capbset(unsigned long vp, unsigned long bp)
>> +{
>> + int tocopy;
>> + int i;
>> + kernel_cap_t bset;
>> +
>> + if (vp == _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_2)
>> + tocopy = _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_2;
>> + else if (vp == _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_1)
>> + tocopy = _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_1;
>> + else
>> + return -EINVAL;
>> +
>> + if (copy_from_user(&bset, (__u32 __user *)bp, tocopy * sizeof(__u32)))
>> + return -EFAULT;
>> + for (i = tocopy; i < _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S; i++)

```

```

> > + bset.cap[i] = 0;
> > +
> > + return cap_prctl_setbset(bset);
> > +
> > +
> > asmlinkage long sys_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
> >     unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5)
> > {
> > @@ -1738,6 +1787,10 @@ asmlinkage long sys_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2,
> >     unsigned long arg3,
> >     case PR_GET_SECCOMP:
> >         error = prctl_get_seccomp();
> >         break;
> >     case PR_GET_CAPBSET:
> >         return prctl_get_capbset(arg2, arg3);
> >     case PR_SET_CAPBSET:
> >         return prctl_set_capbset(arg2, arg3);
> >     case PR_SET_SECCOMP:
> >         error = prctl_set_seccomp(arg2);
> >         break;
> > diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c
> > index 489b0d1..d858819 100644
> > --- a/kernel/sysctl.c
> > +++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
> > @@ -383,15 +383,6 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = {
> >     .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec_taint,
> > },
> > #endif
> > -#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_CAPABILITIES
> > -{
> > -    .procname = "cap-bound",
> > -    .data = &cap_bset,
> > -    .maxlen = sizeof(kernel_cap_t),
> > -    .mode = 0600,
> > -    .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec_bset,
> > -},
> > -#endif /* def CONFIG_SECURITY_CAPABILITIES */
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD
> > {
> >     .ctl_name = KERN_REALROOTDEV,
> > @@ -1910,26 +1901,6 @@ static int do_proc_dointvec_bset_conv(int *negp, unsigned long
> *lvalp,
> >     return 0;
> > }
> >
> > -#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_CAPABILITIES
> > -/*
> > - * init may raise the set.

```

```

>> - */
>> -
>> -int proc_dointvec_bset(struct ctl_table *table, int write, struct file *filp,
>> - void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
>> -{
>> - int op;
>> -
>> - if (write && !capable(CAP_SYS_MODULE)) {
>> - return -EPERM;
>> - }
>> -
>> - op = is_global_init(current) ? OP_SET : OP_AND;
>> - return do_proc_dointvec(table, write, filp, buffer, lenp, ppos,
>> - do_proc_dointvec_bset_conv, &op);
>> -}
>> -#endif /* def CONFIG_SECURITY_CAPABILITIES */
>> -
>> /*
>> * Taint values can only be increased
>> */
>> @@ -2343,12 +2314,6 @@ int proc_dointvec(struct ctl_table *table, int write, struct file *filp,
>> return -ENOSYS;
>> }
>> -
>> -int proc_dointvec_bset(struct ctl_table *table, int write, struct file *filp,
>> - void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
>> -{
>> - return -ENOSYS;
>> -}
>> -
>> int proc_dointvec_minmax(struct ctl_table *table, int write, struct file *filp,
>> void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
>> {
>> diff --git a/kernel/sysctl_check.c b/kernel/sysctl_check.c
>> index 8f5baac..526fa36 100644
>> --- a/kernel/sysctl_check.c
>> +++ b/kernel/sysctl_check.c
>> @@ -38,10 +38,6 @@ static struct trans_ctl_table trans_kern_table[] = {
>> { KERN_NODENAME, "hostname" },
>> { KERN_DOMAINNAME, "domainname" },
>> -
>> -#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_CAPABILITIES
>> -{ KERN_CAP_BSET, "cap-bound" },
>> -#endif /* def CONFIG_SECURITY_CAPABILITIES */
>> -
>> { KERN_PANIC, "panic" },
>> { KERN_REALROOTDEV, "real-root-dev" },
>>

```

```

>> @@ -1522,9 +1518,6 @@ int sysctl_check_table(struct ctl_table *table)
>>     (table->strategy == sysctl_ms_jiffies) ||
>>     (table->proc_handler == proc_dosstring) ||
>>     (table->proc_handler == proc_dointvec) ||
>> -#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_CAPABILITIES
>> -    (table->proc_handler == proc_dointvec_bset) ||
>> -#endif /* def CONFIG_SECURITY_CAPABILITIES */
>>     (table->proc_handler == proc_dointvec_minmax) ||
>>     (table->proc_handler == proc_dointvec_jiffies) ||
>>     (table->proc_handler == proc_dointvec_userhz_jiffies) ||
>> diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
>> index 3a95990..d28222f 100644
>> --- a/security/commoncap.c
>> +++ b/security/commoncap.c
>> @@ -36,9 +36,6 @@
>> # define CAP_INIT_BSET CAP_INIT_EFF_SET
>> #endif /* def CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES */
>>
>> -kernel_cap_t cap_bset = CAP_INIT_BSET; /* systemwide capability bound */
>> -EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_bset);
>> -
>> /* Global security state */
>>
>> unsigned securebits = SECUREBITS_DEFAULT; /* systemwide security settings */
>> @@ -330,7 +327,8 @@ void cap_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
>> /* Derived from fs/exec.c:compute_creds. */
>> kernel_cap_t new_permitted, working;
>>
>> - new_permitted = cap_intersect (bprm->cap_permitted, cap_bset);
>> + new_permitted = cap_intersect (bprm->cap_permitted,
>> +     current->cap_bset);
>> working = cap_intersect (bprm->cap_inheritable,
>>     current->cap_inheritable);
>> new_permitted = cap_combine (new_permitted, working);
>> @@ -611,3 +609,34 @@ int cap_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
>> return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
>> }
>>
>> +/*
>> + * cap_prctl_setbset currently requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN. The reason is
>> + * my fear that an ordinary user could selectively take capabilities
>> + * out, then run a setuid root binary or binary with file capabilities,
>> + * which would perform part of a dangerous action with CAP_SOMECAPI1,
>> + * then fail to perform the second part of the action because
>> + * CAP_SOMECAPI2 is not in bset, leaving things in an unsafe state,
>> + * i.e a sensitive file owned by the non-root user because CAP_CHOWN
>> + * was not allowed.
>> +*/

```

```
> > +int cap_prctl_setbset(kernel_cap_t new_bset)
> > +{
> > + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> > + return -EPERM;
> > + if (!cap_issubset(new_bset, current->cap_bset))
> > + return -EPERM;
> > + current->cap_bset = new_bset;
> > + current->cap_effective = cap_intersect(current->cap_effective,
> > + new_bset);
> > + current->cap_permitted = cap_intersect(current->cap_permitted,
> > + new_bset);
> > + current->cap_inheritable = cap_intersect(current->cap_inheritable,
> > + new_bset);
> > + return 0;
> > +}
> > +
> > +int cap_prctl_getbset(kernel_cap_t *bset)
> > +{
> > + *bset = current->cap_bset;
> > + return 0;
> > +}
>
>
> -
> To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in
> the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org
> More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
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