
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH] namespaces: document unshare security implications
Posted by [serue](#) on Thu, 15 Nov 2007 16:40:35 GMT
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Quoting Eric W. Biederman (ebiederm@xmission.com):

> "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> writes:

Thanks for responding, Eric. Good points.

> > Ok, the following isn't meant so much as a patch as for discussion.
> > However, this may be a change we want to think about for awhile and
> > collect opinions and facts. So having this file sitting in the
> > kernel tree (updated with the results of any discussion we have in the
> > meantime) may be useful.
> >
> > So what do people think? Are we ok using CAP_SYS_ADMIN? Do we
> > authorize unsharing of each resource using the capability required
> > to administrate the resource? Do we introduce CAP_NS_UNSHARE? Do
> > we add CAP_SYS_USHARE, CAP_NET_UNSHARE, and CAP_USER_UNSHARE? Or
> > do we allow unprivileged users to unshare, trusting that the actual
> > administration is properly authorized?
>
> Well if we ant to sit this in the kernel we need to remove mention
> of CAP_NS_UNSHARE.

Mostly for now I wanted it to sit in the mailing list :)

> However even there the document below is only an ok first stab at
> documenting things.
>
> The big big big problem are suid executables. If we don't have suid
> executables and the namespaces only apply to our children we can
> unshare them all day long and no one cares. If we do have suid executables
> any messing up of their context that they are not prepared to deal with
> is a potential security violation.

Ok let's look just at the mounts namespace since that one is complete.

Unsharing the mounts namespace makes no change in mounts context, and
does not provide the user any additional privilege to make such change.
So suid executable are safe.

> So I think CAP_SYS_ADMIN is a good starting place. It is trivial verifiable
> that it is safe. So starting there allows us to work on other aspects
> of the problem for now.

It was a good starting place, but at this point I have two concerns with
sticking with CAP_SYS_ADMIN:

1. now that file capabilities are upstream, people may want to add just the requisite capability in fP for an unsharing helper program. Cedric had mentioned wanting to do that.

If we are going to switch to unprivileged unshares, then doing so later is ok. But if we're going to switch to a custom capability later, then that could be seen as an API change since users will have to switch the capability on all the unsharing programs.

2. As I pointed out a few times, we can cleanly separate unsharing namespace and actually manipulating the resources. By requiring CAP_SYS_ADMIN for both unsharing a mounts namespace and for performing privileged mounts, any program given the authority to unshare is automatically given the authority to also completely manipulate the mounts, both in the new private namespace and the original namespace (by just not unsharing).

It's even worse with the net namespace, since the privilege needed to unshare the namespace authorizes you to update *other* namespaces in the system, but *not* network devices! But like you say let's stick with established namespaces.

So while I started the original email just wanting some discussion, now I'm actually thinking that we should consider the appended patch soon.

> I would like to remove the restrictions from creating new namespaces
> however we will either have to have restrictions like the current
> unprivileged mount patches, so we don't surprised root.

Yes, exactly, we need to understand exactly how the resources being unshared can be updated and how separate the unsharing and updating really are semantically (per namespace). That's why I wanted to start floating the document now. I don't think it's something one person can sit down and write out in one sitting, bc something will be overlooked.

> Or we figure out
> how to ensure we don't have suid applications.

... "how to ensure we don't have suid applications" seems the wrong level to think at. Rather, for each namespace, what do the tools which will be privileged to perform updates depend upon?

An obvious example is depending on a file location, i.e. /etc/fstab. The proper implementation of user mounts solves that. /etc/resolv.conf is another example, except in this case we have the updating of the network namespace (kinda) depending on proper updates of the mounts namespace (and user namespace).

> Given my intuitive understanding of a complete uid namespace it
> fundamentally prohibits suid executables from executing because those
> users simply do not exist in the new namespace. So my hunch is we can
> drop the requirement for CAP_SYS_ADMIN on namespace creation in
> concert with a uid namespace creation.
>
> So my feeling at the moment is that we need to flesh out and complete
> the namespaces we have user, net, pid, user and then come back and
> see what we can do.

I think you're saying "what we're doing is at least safe, so let's wait to change things."

My assertion is that the current approach is not the safest bc we have to give unneeded extra authority to a mounts unsharing helper.

> I don't think it makes sense to document a snapshot in time of the
> discussion with unresolved issues in the Documentation directory.

1. The basics aren't going to change, updating your network namespace will require CAP_NET_ADMIN.

2. These things should really be considered now, bc resulting implications may have effects on the namespace design. As an example, the interaction of network namespaces, pid namespaces, netlink sockets, and audit daemons makes me uneasy.

> Documenting what is and how we got there is fine (that is timeless)
> documenting what could be will likely be out of date before the patch
> is merged into Linus's tree.

Yes you're right. I'm keeping my own list, just turned it into a patch for getting comment :) But keeping the doc in sync with the code in several trees would be (near) impossible.

>
> Eric

>From 0e04048d0a22cfd9507487a09ca8d7aa500be1c2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Date: Thu, 15 Nov 2007 10:47:32 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 1/1] namespaces: introduce CAP_NS_UNSHARE for some namespaces

(purely for comment at this point)

Unsharing and manipulating a namespace can be - depending upon the namespace and the implications of unsharing - two different things.

But we are using the same capability to authorize unsharing and manipulating the mounts and uts namespaces.

Using CAP_SYS_ADMIN to authorize namespace unshares means that a program given just the CAP_SYS_ADMIN file permitted capability also authorizes the program to manipulate the namespaces - before and after unshare.

Introduce CAP_NS_UNSHARE and use it to authorize unsharing of the uts and mounts namespaces.

CAP_SYS_ADMIN continues to authorize the unsharing of other namespaces until the implications are better understood.

Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>

```
include/linux/capability.h | 4 ++++
kernel/nsproxy.c           | 29 ++++++-----
2 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
```

diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h

index a1d93da..2660f8a 100644

--- a/include/linux/capability.h

+++ b/include/linux/capability.h

@@ -314,6 +314,10 @@ typedef struct kernel_cap_struct {

#define CAP_SETFCAP 31

/* Unshare mounts namespace */

/* Unshare UTS namespace */

#define CAP_NS_UNSHARE 32

+
/*

* Bit location of each capability (used by user-space library and kernel)

*/

diff --git a/kernel/nsproxy.c b/kernel/nsproxy.c

index 79f871b..a4972fb 100644

--- a/kernel/nsproxy.c

+++ b/kernel/nsproxy.c

@@ -114,6 +114,25 @@ out_ns:

return ERR_PTR(err);

}

#define NEED_CAPSYSADMIN_FLAGS \

+ (CLONE_NEWIPC| \

+ CLONE_NEWUSER| \

+ CLONE_NEWPID| \

+ CLONE_NEWNET)

+

```

+ #define NEED_CAPNSUNSHARE_FLAGS \
+ (CLONE_NEWNS | \
+ CLONE_NEWUTS)
+
+static int authorize_unshare(unsigned long flags)
+{
+ if ((flags & NEED_CAPSYSADMIN_FLAGS) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+ if ((flags & NEED_CAPNSUNSHARE_FLAGS) && !capable(CAP_NS_UNSHARE))
+ return -EPERM;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * called from clone. This now handles copy for nsproxy and all
+ * namespaces therein.
@@ -133,10 +152,9 @@ int copy_namespaces(unsigned long flags, struct task_struct *tsk)
    CLONE_NEWUSER | CLONE_NEWPID | CLONE_NEWNET)))
    return 0;

- if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
- err = -EPERM;
+ err = authorize_unshare(flags);
+ if (err)
    goto out;
- }

    new_ns = create_new_namespaces(flags, tsk, tsk->fs);
    if (IS_ERR(new_ns)) {
@@ -186,8 +204,9 @@ int unshare_nsproxy_namespaces(unsigned long unshare_flags,
    CLONE_NEWUSER | CLONE_NEWNET)))
    return 0;

- if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
- return -EPERM;
+ err = authorize_unshare(unshare_flags);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;

    *new_nsp = create_new_namespaces(unshare_flags, current,
    new_fs ? new_fs : current->fs);
--

```

1.5.1.1.GIT

Containers mailing list
Containers@lists.linux-foundation.org
<https://lists.linux-foundation.org/mailman/listinfo/containers>
