## Subject: Re: [PATCH] Send quota messages via netlink Posted by Jan Kara on Tue, 04 Sep 2007 22:49:21 GMT

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On Tue 04-09-07 16:32:10, Serge E. Hallyn wrote: > Quoting Jan Kara (jack@suse.cz): > > On Thu 30-08-07 17:14:47, Serge E. Hallyn wrote: >>> Quoting Jan Kara (jack@suse.cz): >>> I imagine it so that you have a machine and on it several virtual >>> machines which are sharing a filesystem (or it could be a cluster). Now you >>> want UIDs to be independent between these virtual machines. That's it, >>> right? >>> Now to continue the example: Alice has UID 100 on machineA, Bob has >>> UID 100 on machineB. These translate to UIDs 1000 and 1001 on the common >>> filesystem. Process of Alice writes to a file and Bob becomes to be over >>> quota. In this situation, there would be probably two processes (from >>> machineA and machineB) listening on the netlink socket. We want to send a >>> message so that on Alice's desktop we can show a message: "You caused >>> Bob to exceed his quotas" and of Bob's desktop: "Alice has caused that you >>> are over quota.". >>> Since this is over NFS, you handle it the way you would any other time >>> that user Alice on some other machine managed to do this. >> I meant this would actually happen over a local filesystem (imagine > > something like "hostfs" from UML). > > Ok, then that is where I was previously suggesting that we use an api to > report a uid meaningful in bob's context, where we currently (in the > absense of meaningful mount uids and uid equivalence) tell Bob that root > was the one who brought him over quota. From a user pov 'nobody' would

> was the one who brought him over quota. From a user pov 'nobody' would > make more sense, but I don't think we want the kernel to know about user > nobody, right?

But what is the problem with using the filesystem ids? All virtual machines in my example should have a notion of those...

- > So if the msg weren't broadcast, or netlink sockets were tied to one
- > user namespace, we could call a
- > int uid\_in\_user\_ns(struct user \*, struct user\_ns \*)
- > sending in Alice's user struct and Bob's userns, and use the result in
- > the netlink message. Otherwise I'm not sure what is the right answer.
- > We just might need the equivalent of 'struct pid' to struct user, or
- > persistant global user namespace ids (persistant after user namespace
- > destruction, not across reboot) so we can safely send the user\_ns \* in a
- > netlink msg.

Yes, that could also be a solution.

- >>> Because there may be is not a notion of Bob on machineA or of Alice on
- >>> machineB, we are in trouble, right? What I like the most is to use the

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>>> filesystem identities (as you suggested in some other email). I. e. because
>>> both Alice and Bob share a filesystem, identities of both have to make sense
>>> to it (for example for purposes of permission checking). So we can probably
>>>
>> Right, so long as we're talking about local filesystems that's the way
>>> to go. If a file write was allowed which brought bob over quota,
>>> clearly the person responsible had some uid valid on the filesystem to
>> allow him to do so.
>> Fine. So I'll keep UID in the quota netlink protocol with the meaning
>> "the identity of the user for filesystem operations".
> I think that's ok.
> Hopefully when that changes to accommodate user namespaces, we can use
> netlink field versioning to make that transition pretty seamless?
 Yes, we'd just assign the attribute a different number and teach
userspace about the new attribute format...
> If not, then we probably should in fact make some decision now so as not
> to change the api.
>>> send via netlink these (in our example ids 1000 and 1001) and hope that
>>> inside machineA and machineB there will be a way to translate these
>>> identities to names "Alice" and "Bob". So that user can understand what
>>> is happenning. Does this sound plausible?
>>> If we go this route, then we only need a kernel function, that will
>>> for a pair ($filesystem, $task) return indentity of that $task used
>>> for operations on $filesystem...
>>>
>>> Ok, now I see. This is again unrelated to user namespaces, it's an
>> issue regardless.
>>>
>>> Is there no way to just report Alice as the guilty party to Bob on his
>> machine as (host=nfsserver,uid=1000)?
>> You know, in fact this contains all the information but it is guite useless
>> for an ordinary user. The message should be understandable to average desktop
> What is the ordinary user going to do about it? If the user didn't set
> up the nfsserver and/or the second client, the only thing he can do is
> report the guilty user to an admin. In which case the tuple
> (host=nfsserver,uid=1000) is exactly the data he needs to report.
 Maybe write him an email or go and bang him with a baseball bat;)
Seriously, if someone (like admin) is able to find a physical identity of the
guilty user, then we should be able to do this in a software too, shouldn't
we?
    Honza
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