
Subject: Re: [patch] unprivileged mounts update
Posted by [serue](#) on Thu, 26 Apr 2007 16:19:29 GMT
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Quoting Miklos Szeredi (miklos@szeredi.hu):

> > Quoting Miklos Szeredi (miklos@szeredi.hu):

> > > Right, I figure if the normal action is to always do

> > > mnt->user = current->fsuid, then for the special case we

> > > pass a uid in someplace. Of course... do we not have a

> > > place to do that? Would it be a no-no to use 'data' for

> > > a non-fs-specific arg?

> > >

> > > I guess it would be OK for bind, but not for new- and remounts, where

> > > 'data' is already used.

> > >

> > > Maybe it's best to stay with fsuid after all, and live with having to

> > > restore capabilities. It's not so bad after all, this seems to do the

> > > trick:

> > >

> > > cap_t cap = cap_get_proc();

> > > setfsuid(uid);

> > > cap_set_proc(cap);

> > >

> > > Unfortunately these functions are not in libc, but in a separate

> > > "libcap" library. Ugh.

> >

> > Ok, are you still planning to nix the MS_SETUSER flag, though, as

> > Eric suggested? I think it's cleanest - always set the mnt->user

> > field to current->fsuid, and require CAP_SYS_ADMIN if the

> > mountpoint->mnt->user != current->fsuid.

>

> It would be a nice cleanup, but I think it's unworkable for the

> following reasons:

>

> Up till now mount(2) and umount(2) always required CAP_SYS_ADMIN, and

> we must make sure, that unless there's some explicit action by the

> sysadmin, these rules are still enforced.

>

> For example, with just a check for mnt->mnt_uid == current->fsuid, a

> fsuid=0 process could umount or submount all the "legacy" mounts even

> without CAP_SYS_ADMIN.

>

> This is a fundamental security problem, with getting rid of MS_SETUSER

> and MNT_USER.

>

> Another, rather unlikely situation is if an existing program sets

> fsuid to non-zero before calling mount, hence unwantingly making that

> mount owned by some user after these patches.

>
> Also adding "user=0" to the options in /proc/mounts would be an
> interface breakage, that is probably harmless, but people wouldn't like
> it. Special casing the zero uid for this case is more ugly IMO, than
> the problem we are trying to solve.
>
> If we didn't have existing systems to deal with, then of course I'd
> agree with Eric's suggestion.
>
> Miklos

So then as far as you're concerned, the patches which were in -mm will remain unchanged?

-serge

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