## Subject: Re: [patch 2/8] allow unprivileged umount Posted by ebiederm on Sat, 21 Apr 2007 12:53:58 GMT

View Forum Message <> Reply to Message

Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> writes:

```
> On Sat, 21 Apr 2007 10:09:42 +0200 Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> wrote:
>> > +static bool permit_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
>> > > +{
>> > >
>> > > ...
>> > >
>> > + return mnt->mnt_uid == current->uid;
>> > > +}
>> >
>> > Yes, this seems very wrong. I'd have thought that comparing user struct*'s
>> > would get us a heck of a lot closer to being able to support aliasing of
>> > UIDs between different namespaces.
>> >
>>
>> OK, I'll fix this up.
>>
>> Actually an earlier version of this patch did use user_struct's but
>> I'd changed it to uids, because it's simpler.
>
> OK...
>> I didn't think about
>> this being contrary to the id namespaces thing.
> Well I was madly assuming that when serarate UID namespaces are in use, UID
> 42 in container A will have a different user_struct from UID 42 in
> container B. I'd suggest that we provoke an opinion from Eric & co before
> you do work on this.
```

That is what I what I have been thinking as well, storing a user struct on each mount point seems sane, plus it allows per user mount rlimits which is major plus. Especially since we seem to be doing accounting only for user mounts a per user rlimit seems good.

To get the user we should be user fs\_uid as HPA suggested.

Finally I'm pretty certain the capability we should care about in this context is CAP\_SETUID. Instead of CAP\_SYS\_ADMIN.

If we have CAP\_SETUID we can become which ever user owns the mount, and the root user in a container needs this, so he can run login

programs. So changing the appropriate super user checks from CAP\_SYS\_ADMIN to CAP\_SETUID I think is the right thing todo.

With the CAP\_SETUID thing handled I'm not currently seeing any adverse implications to using this in containers.

Ok. Now that I have a reasonable approximation of the 10,000 foot view now to see how the patches match up.

Eric

Containers mailing list

Containers mailing list
Containers@lists.linux-foundation.org
https://lists.linux-foundation.org/mailman/listinfo/containers