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Re: [RFC] [PATCH 2/2] namespace enter: introduce sys_hijack (v3) [message #19886 is a reply to message #19812] Mon, 03 September 2007 08:02 Go to previous messageGo to previous message
Paul Menage is currently offline  Paul Menage
Messages: 642
Registered: September 2006
Senior Member
On 8/29/07, Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> wrote:
> >From aec05999084bf3a94add66e98462652ed9408f86 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> From: sergeh@us.ibm.com <sergeh@us.ibm.com>
> Date: Wed, 22 Aug 2007 15:03:57 -0700
> Subject: [RFC] [PATCH 2/2] namespace enter: introduce sys_hijack (v3)
>
> Introduce sys_hijack (for x86 only).  It is like clone, but in
> place of a stack pointer (which is assumed null) it accepts a
> pid.  The process identified by that pid is the one which is
> actually cloned.  Some state - include the file table, the signals
> and sighand (and hence tty), and the ->parent are taken from the
> calling process.

What do you do if there are no processes in a particular container?

I prefer your suggestion of tying this to the nsproxy subsystem - that
would allow you to spawn a child with a given set of namespaces, even
if there were no appropriate process to hijack.

Paul
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