> > Does this mean, that containers will need this?  Or that you don't
> > know yet?
> 
> The uid namespace is something we have to handle carefully and we
> have not decided on the final design.
> 
> What is clear is that all permission checks will need to become
> either (uid namspace, uid) tuple comparisons.  Or struct user
> pointer comparisons.  To see if we are talking about the same
> uid.
> 
> So the eventual uid namespace combined with the possibility
> for rlimits if we use struct user *.  See to make using a struct
> user a clear win.

OK, if we don't yet know, I'd rather leave this for later.  It will be
trivial to change to user_struct if we want per-user rlimits.

> >> storing a user struct on each mount point seems sane, plus it allows
> >> per user mount rlimits which is major plus.  Especially since we
> >> seem to be doing accounting only for user mounts a per user rlimit
> >> seems good.
> >
> > I'm not against per-user rlimits for mounts, but I'd rather do this
> > later...
> 
> Then let's add a non-discriminate limit.  Instead of a limit that
> applies only to root.

See reply to relevant patch.

> >> To get the user we should be user fs_uid as HPA suggested.
> >
> > fsuid is exclusively used for checking file permissions, which we
> > don't do here anymore.  So while it could be argued, that mount() _is_
> > a filesystem operation, it is really a different sort of filesystem
> > operation than the rest.
> >
> > OTOH it wouldn't hurt to use fsuid instead of ruid...
> 
> Yes.  I may be confused but I'm pretty certain we want either
> the fsuid or the euid to be the mount owner.  ruid just looks wrong.
> The fsuid is a special case of the effective uid.  Which is who
> we should perform operations as.  Unless I'm just confused.

Definitely not euid.  Euid is the one which is effective, i.e. it will
basically always be zero for a privileged mount().

Ruid is the one which is returned by getuid().  If a user execs a
suid-root program, then ruid will be the id of the user, while euid
will be zero.


> >> Finally I'm pretty certain the capability we should care about in
> >> this context is CAP_SETUID.  Instead of CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
> >> 
> >> If we have CAP_SETUID we can become which ever user owns the mount,
> >> and the root user in a container needs this, so he can run login
> >> programs.  So changing the appropriate super user checks from
> >> CAP_SYS_ADMIN to CAP_SETUID I think is the right thing todo.
> >
> > That's a flawed logic.  If you want to mount as a specific user, and
> > you have CAP_SETUID, then just use set*uid() and then mount().
> 
> Totally agreed for mount.
> 
> > Changing the capability check for mount() would break the userspace
> > ABI.
> 
> Sorry I apparently wasn't clear.  CAP_SETUID should be the capability
> check for umount.

The argument applies to umount as well.  For compatibility, we _need_
the CAP_SYS_ADMIN check.  And if program has CAP_SETUID but not
CAP_SYS_ADMIN, it can just set the id to the mount owner before
calling umount.

Miklos
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