SecurityFocus Article [message #3093] |
Thu, 11 May 2006 14:51 |
Ed White
Messages: 1 Registered: May 2006
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Junior Member |
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A researcher of the french NSA discovered a scary vulnerability in modern x86 cpus and chipsets that expose the kernel to direct tampering.
The problem is that a feature called System Management Mode could be used to bypass the kernel and execute code at the highest level possible: ring zero.
The big problem is that the attack is possible thanks to the way X Windows is designed, and so the only way to eradicate it is to redesign it, moving video card driver into the kernel, but it seems that this cannot be done also for missing drivers and documentation!
I would like to know if OpenVZ barriers could be bypassed using this attack, or not. Maybe we will need a patch for the kernel, or for OpenVZ itself, or what?
Any hint is appreciated.
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The quest for ring 0
by Federico Biancuzzi
2006-05-10
Federico Biancuzzi interviews French researcher Loïc Duflot to learn about the System Management Mode attack, how to mitigate it, what hardware is vulnerable, and why we should be concerned with recent X Server bugs.
http://www.securityfocus.com/columnists/402
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Re: SecurityFocus Article [message #3101 is a reply to message #3093] |
Fri, 12 May 2006 11:06 |
Kirill Korotaev
Messages: 137 Registered: January 2006
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Senior Member |
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Ed White,
> A researcher of the french NSA discovered a scary vulnerability in modern x86 cpus and chipsets that expose the kernel to direct tampering.
>
> The problem is that a feature called System Management Mode could be used to bypass the kernel and execute code at the highest level possible: ring zero.
>
> The big problem is that the attack is possible thanks to the way X Windows is designed, and so the only way to eradicate it is to redesign it, moving video card driver into the kernel, but it seems that this cannot be done also for missing drivers and documentation!
>
> I would like to know if OpenVZ barriers could be bypassed using this attack, or not. Maybe we will need a patch for the kernel, or for OpenVZ itself, or what?
>
> Any hint is appreciated.
> ------------------------------------------------------------ -----------
>
> The quest for ring 0
>
> by Federico Biancuzzi
> 2006-05-10
>
> Federico Biancuzzi interviews French researcher Loïc Duflot to
learn about the System Management Mode attack, how to mitigate it, what
hardware is vulnerable, and why we should be concerned with recent X
Server bugs.
> http://www.securityfocus.com/columnists/402
>
> _______________________________________________
I read this article and my opinion is the following:
OpenVZ is not vulnerable.
---------------- quote ------------------
To carry out the general privilege escalation scheme, the attacker needs
write access to various Programmed I/O registers and write access to the
legacy video RAM range (0xA0000-0xbffff)
---------------- quote ------------------
none of these is available in OpenVZ VPS by default, so it should be
impossible to exploit it from the VPS. OpenVZ doesn't give an access to
any hardware by default at all.
Also, as the author states it is possible to lock SMRAM with D_LCK bit
in SMRAM control register:
---------------- quote ------------------
It should also be noted that there is in the SMRAM control register a
bit called D_LCK. If this bit is set, the SMRAM control becomes read
only, and only a hard reset can clear the D_LCK bit. If this bit was set
after the D_OPEN bit has been cleared, then it would be impossible to
modify the default trusted SMI handler while in protected mode. The
trouble is that on all the desktops I tested the D_LCK bit was cleared.
---------------- quote ------------------
So if one really thinks it is a problem, then it is possible to lock
SMRAM and that's all. Not sure it will be fixed in mainstream somehow
actually.
Kirill
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Re: SecurityFocus Article [message #3204 is a reply to message #3093] |
Wed, 17 May 2006 08:20 |
John Kelly
Messages: 97 Registered: May 2006 Location: Palmetto State
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Member |
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On Thu May 11 2006, Ed White wrote:
> A researcher of the french NSA discovered a scary vulnerability in modern
> x86 cpus and chipsets that expose the kernel to direct tampering. The problem
> is that a feature called System Management Mode could be used to bypass the
> kernel and execute code at the highest level possible: ring zero.
Ring 0 kernel bad. KLOS good:
http://crpit.com/confpapers/CRPITV38Vasudevan.pdf
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