Quoting Stephen Smalley (sds@tycho.nsa.gov):
> On Tue, 2007-11-27 at 16:38 -0600, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> > Quoting Stephen Smalley (sds@tycho.nsa.gov):
> > > On Tue, 2007-11-27 at 10:11 -0600, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> > > > Quoting Crispin Cowan (crispin@crispincowan.com):
> > > > > Just the name "sys_hijack" makes me concerned.
> > > > > 
> > > > > This post describes a bunch of "what", but doesn't tell us about "why"
> > > > > we would want this. What is it for?
> > > > 
> > > > Please see my response to Casey's email.
> > > > 
> > > > > And I second Casey's concern about careful management of the privilege
> > > > > required to "hijack" a process.
> > > > 
> > > > Absolutely.  We're definately still in RFC territory.
> > > > 
> > > > Note that there are currently several proposed (but no upstream) ways to
> > > > accomplish entering a namespace:
> > > > 
> > > > 	1. bind_ns() is a new pair of syscalls proposed by Cedric.  An
> > > > 	nsproxy is given an integer id.  The id can be used to enter
> > > > 	an nsproxy, basically a straight current->nsproxy = target_nsproxy;
> > > > 
> > > > 	2. I had previously posted a patchset on top of the nsproxy
> > > > 	cgroup which allowed entering a nsproxy through the ns cgroup
> > > > 	interface.
> > > > 
> > > > There are objections to both those patchsets because simply switching a
> > > > task's nsproxy using a syscall or file write in the middle of running a
> > > > binary is quite unsafe.  Eric Biederman had suggested using ptrace or
> > > > something like it to accomplish the goal.
> > > > 
> > > > Just using ptrace is however not safe either.  You are inheriting *all*
> > > > of the target's context, so it shouldn't be difficult for a nefarious
> > > > container/vserver admin to trick the host admin into running something
> > > > which gives the container/vserver admin full access to the host.
> > > 
> > > I don't follow the above - with ptrace, you are controlling a process
> > > already within the container (hence in theory already limited to its
> > > container), and it continues to execute within that container.  What's
> > > the issue there?
> > 
> > Hmm, yeah, I may have overspoken - I'm not good at making up exploits
> > but while I see it possible to confuse the host admin by setting bogus
> > environment, I guess there may not be an actual exploit.
> > 
> > Still after the fork induced through ptrace, we'll have to execute a
> > file out of the hijacked process' namespaces and path (unless we get
> > *really* 'exotic').  With hijack, execution continues under the caller's
> > control, which I do much prefer.
> > 
> > The remaining advantages of hijack over ptrace (beside "using ptrace for
> > that is crufty") are
> > 
> > 	1. not subject to pid wraparound (when doing hijack_cgroup
> > 	   or hijack_ns)
> > 	2. ability to enter a namespace which has no active processes
> 
> So possibly I'm missing something, but the situation with hijack seems
> more exploitable than ptrace to me - you've created a hybrid task with
> one foot in current's world (open files, tty, connection to parent,
> executable) and one foot in the target's world (namespaces, uid/gid)
> which can then be leveraged by other tasks within the target's
> world/container as a way of breaking out of the container.  No?

I *think* the things coming out of the new container are well enough
chosen to prevent that.  I see where you're opening up to being killed
by a task in the target container, though.  But apart from setting a
PF_FLAG I'm not sure how to stop that anyway.

This actually reminds me that we need a valid uid in the target
namespace in the HIJACK_NS case.  It's not a problem right now, but
as I was just looking at fixing up kernel/signal.c in light of user
namespaces, it is something to keep in mind.

> > These also highlight selinux issues.  In the case of hijacking an
> > empty cgroup, there is no security context (because there is no task) so
> > the context of 'current' will be used.  In the case of hijacking a
> > populated cgroup, a task is chosen "at random" to be the hijack source.
> 
> Seems like you might be better off with a single operation for creating
> a new task within a given namespace set / cgroup rather than trying to
> handle multiple situations with different semantics / inheritance
> behavior.  IOW, forget about hijacking a specific pid or picking a task
> at random from a populated cgroup - just always initialize the state of
> the newly created task in the same manner based solely on elements of
> the caller's state and the cgroup's state.

So you're saying implement only the HIJACK_NS?

I'm fine with that.  Does anyone on the containers list object?

> > So there are two ways to look at deciding which context to use.  Since
> > control continues in the original acting process' context, we might
> > want the child to continue in its context.  However if the process
> > creates any objects in the virtual server, we don't want them
> > mislabeled, so we might want the task in the hijacked task's context.
> 
> I suspect that we want to continue in the parent's context, and then the
> program can always use setfscreatecon() or exec a helper in a different
> context if it wants to create files with contexts tailored to the
> target.

That sounds good to me...

So we're looking at:

	1. drop HIJACK_PID and HIJACK_CGROUP

	2. have selinux_task_alloc_security() always set task->security
	to current->security and allow the hijack case.

thanks,
-serge
_______________________________________________
Containers mailing list
Containers@lists.linux-foundation.org
https://lists.linux-foundation.org/mailman/listinfo/containers